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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1.  Overview 
As Athanasiadou (1997) states in the introductory chapter of the volume On 
Conditionals Again, the semantic concept of conditionality and conditional 
constructions have long been central concerns of various disciplines including 
linguistics, psychology, and philosophy. 1  They have been approached from 
remarkably different angles, thus exhibiting their multifaceted function and their 
crucial role in our understanding of language.  In a word, conditionals and related 
phenomena have been a central and controversial topic, and thus have attracted many 
researchers. 
     Traditionally, it has been assumed that conditional constructions directly reflect 
the characteristically human ability to reason about alternative situations, to make 
inferences based on incomplete information, to imagine possible correlations between 
situations, and to understand how the world would change if certain correlations were 
different (cf. Traugott et al. (1986:3)).  In a word, the conditional construction is 
regarded as an epitome of human rational capacity.  Behind this traditional view is 
the Western academic background wherein the inquiry into truth and how to find truth 
through valid reasoning and logical argumentation has been a primary concern since 
the time of the ancient Greeks (cf. Akatsuka (1997: 323)). 
Thus, in the field of logic, conditionals (or material implications) are defined as 
                                                     
1 The term construction in this thesis refers to any pattern, at level of generality, in which units are 
connected in syntax (cf. Matthews (2007:75)). 
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a relation between two propositions, the protasis (p) and the apodosis (q), such that 
either p and q are both true, or p is false q is true, or p is false and q is false; excluded 
is the possibility of p being true while q is false (Comrie (1986:78)).  In the field of 
linguistics, conditionals are roughly defined as complex sentences composed of a main 
clause (apodosis) and a subordinate clause (protasis) (cf. Dancygier (1998:1)), and the 
following characteristics are generally recognized as semantic/pragmatic components 
for the interpretation of (open) conditionals: 
 (1) a. Invariant meaning: the truth values of p and q are related in such a way as 
to exclude the combination where p is true and q false. 
  b. Consequence implicature: q is a consequence of p. 
  c. Only-if implicature: if not p, then not q. 
  d. Don‟t know implicature: the speaker doesn‟t know whether p and q are 
true or false. 
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002:739), with slight modifications) 
As can be understood from (1), what Huddleston and Pullum (2002) refer to as 
invariant meaning, i.e. (1a), is inherited from the traditional view of logic.  The other 
components, too, indicate that conditional constructions in natural language have been 
seen from the viewpoint of truth-values and that there is some interdependency 
between p and q in conditionals.2  
Furthermore, conditional constructions have been mainly investigated from the 
following two viewpoints in combination with the truth-conditional view:  one is 
concerned with the question of how to capture reality or factuality, and the other is 
                                                     
2 For more details about the historical aspect of linguistic study of conditional constructions from the 
Western viewpoint, see Traugott et al., eds. (1986), Athanasiadou and Dirven, eds. (1997), and 
Declerck and Reed (2001).  See also Arita (1993) for the history of the study of Japanese 
conditionals. 
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concerned with the relationship between protases and apodoses such as causation.  
With regard to the first view, for example, many researchers have tried to deal with 
logic-sentences, i.e. conditional sentences and reason sentences (sentences with 
because or since), in terms of the distinction between reality (or realis) and 
hypotheticality (or irrealis) (cf. Sakahara (1985), Chung and Timberlake (1985), 
Athanasiadou and Dirven (1997), Wierzbicka (1997), Maeda (2009), among others): 
traditionally, conditional sentences are regarded as hypothetical, while reason 
sentences are regarded as real or factual. 
The second view is concerned with the correlation or interdependency between 
the protasis and apodosis.  Masuoka and Takubo (1992:192), for example, define 
conditional expressions as “interdependency between two events.”  In particular, 
recent studies (Sweetser (1990), Masuoka (1993), Tsubomoto (1993), Nakau (1994), 
Dancygier (1998), Tsunoda (2004), Dancygier and Sweetser (2005), among others) are 
concerned with the relationship between human cognitive structure and clause linkage.  
That is, those studies take notice of the polysemous characteristics of conditional 
constructions, and ascribe such characteristics to human cognitive structure. 
     In short, conditional constructions have been investigated from multiple 
viewpoints: truth-values, semantic concepts such as actuality/factuality and 
hypotheticality, and eventual/conceptual interdependency between protases and 
apodoses. 
 
1.2.  The Scope and the Aim of this Thesis 
1.2.1. Scope 
This thesis attempts to provide a description of conditional constructions in 
English and Japanese from a viewpoint slightly different from the traditional view 
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reviewed above.  Specifically, although innumerable researchers have been paying 
attention to conditional constructions, the conditional constructions that will be dealt 
with in this thesis have not been investigated in great detail.  They are illustrated 
below: 
 (3) a.   If you‟re hungry, (I tell you) there are some biscuits on the sideboard. 
  b.  onaka-ga suiteru-nara (osieru kedo), syokkidana-ni bisuketto-ga aru-yo. 
 (4) a.  If you don‟t know, (I tell you) it‟s Saturday today. 
  b.  sira nai-nara *(osieru kedo), kyoo-wa doyoobi-da. 
 (5) Harry saw, in his mind‟s eye, the expression on Hermione’s face if she ever 
heard about this abuse of house-elves, and decided never to mention it to her. 
(J.K. Rowling. Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince [italics are mine]) 
 (6)  If anyone can help us, it‟s John.         (Declerck and Seki (1990:19)) 
 (7) sikaku-nara Yuukyan 
  „When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.‟ 
The pairs in (3) and (4) are what Sweetser (1990) calls speech-act conditionals.  In 
(3) and (4), the (b)-sentences are the Japanese counterparts of (a)-sentences.  
Speech-act conditionals have been investigated by many researchers from different 
angles (cf. Van der Auwera (1986), Sweetser (1990), Dancyger (1998), Declerck and 
Reed (2001), Dancyger and Sweetser (2005), Sakahara (1985), Nakau (1994), Tsunoda 
(2004), to name a few).  Nevertheless, there are some interesting phenomena left 
uninvestigated.  The examples in (3) and (4) indicate that (i) the occurrence of 
speech-act verbs is optional or, more precisely, the non-occurrence of speech-act verbs 
is unmarked, in English speech-act conditionals and that (ii) Japanese speech-act 
conditionals can be divided into two classes according to the occurrence of speech-act 
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verbs.3  The question of what gives rise to phenomena (i) and (ii) has been left 
untouched.4 
     The example in (5) is referred to as adnominal conditionals in Lasersohn‟s 
(1996) term.  This example shows a marked use of conditional if-clauses:  if-clauses 
can modify nominal expressions as well as (main or matrix) clauses.  Despite their 
peculiarity, the nature of adnominal conditionals has not been investigated adequately. 
     Let us turn our attention to example (6).  This is what Meier (1988) refers to as 
the if-cleft sentence.  As is shown, the if-clause is followed by a truncated it-cleft 
sentence.  Some researchers such as Meier (1988) and Declerck and Seki (1990) 
investigate the semantics and pragmatics of if-cleft sentences, but the correlation 
between their form and discourse function has not been fully explained. 
     Example (7) is a peripheral example of conditional expressions in Japanese, i.e. 
N1-nara N2 conditionals.  The N1-nara N2 conditional has been treated as an 
exception in the study of conditionals in Japanese linguistics in that its status as a 
conditional expression is unclear.  It should be clarified what licenses the 
construction and what gives rise to its interpretation as a phrase of recommendation. 
 
1.2.2.  Aim 
To the best of my knowledge, those phenomena exemplified in (3) to (7) have 
attracted little, if any, attention of linguists.  The purpose of this thesis is to shed light 
on long-ignored or overlooked characteristics of the conditional constructions in 
semantic and pragmatic terms, whereby I verify the following hypothesis: 
                                                     
3 What I refer to as speech-act verbs in this thesis is terminologically equivalent to what is referred to 
as performative clauses (cf. Ross (1970)). 
4 A number of researchers such as Sakahara (1985), Nakau (1994), and Uchida (2001, 2005, 2011) 
notice the phenomena in (3).  However, as discussed in Chapter 4, they do not investigate in detail 
what gives rise to the difference at issue between English and Japanese. 
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 (8) Linguistic form is not independent of the meaning it conveys; it is well- 
motivated by semantic and/or pragmatic principles. 
In connection with the hypothesis in (8), let me clarify my position.  As the title of 
this thesis indicates, my primary concern is with the interaction of linguistic form, 
meaning, and discourse.  Specifically, I am concerned with how semantics and 
pragmatics influence linguistic form or grammar.  It is well accepted in the field of 
linguistics since Chomsky (1957), especially in the school of generative grammar, that 
syntax and semantics are independent systems, related only by the semantic 
component interpreting syntactic representations (i.e. interpretive semantics). 
However, my position is quite different from such a view, although I will not 
challenge the fundamental thesis of generative grammar, i.e. the existence of universal 
grammar (UG) and parametric variations:  my approach is, so to speak, 
semantic/pragmatic- based syntax, i.e. investigating linguistic form (syntax) in terms 
of semantics and pragmatics. 
In my framework, linguistic expressions are regarded as the realizations of the 
speaker‟s (conscious or unconscious) intention or meaning in a broader sense.  That 
is to say, linguistic meaning is not only to be interpreted; rather, it should be regarded 
as the raison d’être of linguistic expressions.  The speaker selects appropriate 
linguistic forms according to what s/he wants to say and how s/he wants to 
communicate it.  What is relevant here is not how linguistic forms are interpreted but 
what linguistic forms are selected by meanings (including the speaker‟s intention). 
However, my approach does not deny what is called “the autonomy of syntax” 
per se.  It is one thing that semantics and pragmatics influence linguistic form and it 
is another that we, human beings, have a certain innate mechanism to generate or 
realize a variety of linguistic expressions.  Just because linguistic form is 
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well-motivated by semantic and/or pragmatic factors, it does not mean that we do not 
need some system to combine linguistic elements properly and generate well-formed 
expressions.  Although it is not the purpose of this thesis to unveil a new theory of a 
language, or even to present a new synthesis that ties syntax-centered approaches and 
semantics/pragmatics-centered approaches together, I must stress that there is no 
contradiction between the two approaches. 
In this connection, Newmeyer‟s (1998) view is quite suggestive and compatible 
with mine.  Newmeyer illustrates the interrelationship between linguistic structures 
and their motivations as follows: 
 (9)  Structurea Motivationa 
   Structureb Autonomous Motivationb 
   Structurec system Motivationc 
   Structured Motivationd 
  A view of the structure-motivation interrelationship compatible with both 
autonomy and external explanation 
(Newmeyer (1998:163)) 
He claims that the autonomous structural system intermediates between linguistic 
structure and its motivation:  linguistic structures are generated by the autonomous 
system in response to semantic/pragmatic motivations (for more details, see 
Newmeyer (1998) and Takami (2008)).   
     For a better understanding of my approach toward the relationship between 
linguistic form and meaning, let us take the formation of adjectival passives in English 
for example: 
 (10) a.  the truck is loaded with brick 
  b.  the bricks are loaded onto the truck 
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 (11) a.  the brick-loaded truck 
  b. * the truck-loaded bricks 
(Shizawa (2008:228)) 
The examples in (11) are categorized as what is referred to as compound adjectival 
passives (CAPs).  The expressions (11a) and (11b) are derived from those in (10a) 
and (10b), respectively.  In syntax-centered or rule-based approaches, many 
researchers have tried to formulate the rule of Adjectival Passive Formation (APF).5  
For example, to explain the formation of CAPs like those in (11), Roeper and Siegel 
(1978) propose First Sister Principle and Compound Rule: 
 (12) First Sister (FS) Principle 
    All verbal compounds are formed by incorporation of a word in the first sister 
position of the verb.                      (Roeper and Siegel (1978:208)) 
 (13) Compound Rule 
  [[empty] + verb + affix][X+N +word] W ⇒[[+word] + verb + affix]  W 
           1      2    3          4           4      2     3  φ5 
  where W ranges over subcategorization frames and X+N stands for lexical 
categories N, A, Adv. 
 Example: [[empty] + make + er][N coffee] W ⇒[[coffee] + make + er] W 
(Roeper and Siegel (1978:209)) 
In terms of the rules in (12) and (13), the expression in (11a) is derived by 
incorporation of the word brick into the empty position just in front of the word loaded.  
However, the rules can neither predict nor explain the ungrammaticality of the 
example in (11b).  In fact, because the word truck can be regarded as the first sister of 
the passivized verb loaded in (10b), the rule in (13) mistakenly produces example 
                                                     
5 For more details, see Shizawa (2008). 
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(11b).   
     To explain the difference between examples (11a) and (11b), Shizawa (2008) 
proposes semantic licensing conditions like the following: 
 (14) Licensing Conditions of CAPs 
    The construction X-Ved N, where X, V, and N stand respectively for the first 
element of CAPs, the base verb, and the head noun, is subject to three 
constraints like the following: 
   a. Conceptual Subsumption Constraint 
       The following relationships must hold: X-Ved N∈Ved N∈ N 
   b. Holistic Participant Constraint 
    The referent of X (i.e. N or A) must participate or be involved in the 
whole process (including the resultant state) of the activity denoted by 
the base verb. 
   c. Whole-Part Relationship Constraint 
       X and Ved should be construed as attributes corresponding to parts of 
the entity denoted by the head noun N. 
The ungrammaticality of example (11b) can be explained succinctly.  Example (11b) 
violates all three constraints in (14): (i) the incorporated element truck does not 
contribute to the classification of the referent of the noun bricks (the violation of (14a)), 
(ii) the incorporated element truck should be construed as the goal to which bricks 
move, which means that truck is involved not in the whole process but the end-point of 
the activity denoted by the verb load (the violation of (14b)), and (iii) the referent of 
truck cannot be construed as an attribute of the referent of the noun bricks (the 
violation of (14c)).  In this way, the conditions in (14) correctly predict and exclude 
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the ungrammatical expression in (11b).6 
However, note that this approach refers to nothing about syntactic or 
morphological formal mechanisms concerning CAPs.  In a sense, the semantic 
constraints in (14) work complementarily with formal rules like (12) and (13).  Thus, 
although my central concern in this thesis is with the clarification of semantic and 
pragmatic influence on the system of grammar, it does not mean the denial of the 
existence of formal rules combining linguistic elements to generate a variety of 
linguistic expressions. 
From the perspective outlined above, I will make the following claims on the 
basis of hypothesis (8): 
 (15) a.  The difference between English and Japanese speech-act conditionals 
as to the (non-)obligatory occurrence of speech-act verbs should be 
ascribed to the difference in their unmarked modes of expression:  the 
unmarked mode of expression in English is “public expression” (Hirose 
(1995)), that is, expression for communication, while the unmarked 
mode of expression in Japanese is “private expression”, that is, 
expression for representation of thought, not communication. 
  b.  Conditional constructions can be examined in parallel with 
specificational copular sentences; that is, conditionals in general, if not 
all, have the function of specifying values for variables in a broader 
sense.  As such, the concept of specification plays an important role in 
investigating conditional constructions. 
The claims in (15) follow from the findings of the detailed investigation of the 
constructions exemplified in (3) to (7).  The discussion of each of the following 
                                                     
6 For more details and remaining problems with this explanation, see Shizawa (2008:232-233). 
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chapters will corroborate the hypothesis in (8). 
 
1.3.  Organization 
This thesis consists of ten chapters, organized into two parts to the exclusion of 
the present and the last chapters.  Part 1, which is composed of three chapters, i.e. 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4, provides evidence for the hypothesis in (8) by examining 
speech-act conditionals in Japanese and English, thus making claim (15a). 
The organization of Part 1 is as follows.  Chapter 2 gives introductory remarks 
on the phenomena examined in Part 1.  In Chapter 3, which is a revised version of 
Shizawa (2009a), I will deal with the question of what is the difference between the 
Japanese speech-act conditionals which require speech-act verbs and those which do 
not.  Put more concretely, I will focus on speech-act conditionals in Japanese and 
classify them into two types: Type 1 and Type 2 speech-act conditionals.  Roughly 
speaking, they are classified by the following criterion:  Type 1 does not require 
speech-act verbs, and Type 2 does.  Based on this classification, I will discuss the 
basic characteristics of the two types of speech-act conditionals, and clarify the 
functions to be fulfilled by speech-act verbs such as yuu „tell‟ or osieru „inform‟.  The 
underpinnings to be adopted in this chapter are Langacker‟s (1993) reference point and 
Akatsuka‟s (1998) Desirability Principle. 
     In Chapter 4, which is a substantially revised version of Shizawa (2009b), I deal 
with the question of what mechanism gives rise to the difference between Japanese 
and English speech-act conditionals as to whether the occurrence of speech-act verbs 
is obligatory or optional.  Specifically, in addition to the findings of Chapter 3, it will 
be clarified that the difference between the two languages observed in Type 2 
speech-act conditionals can be reduced to the difference of addressee-orientedness or 
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public/private-self centeredness, a fundamental characteristic differentiating between 
English and Japanese in terms of linguistic typology.  The basic assumption adopted 
here is that Japanese and English are quite contrastive in their communicativity (cf. 
Hirose (1995, 1997, 2000), Wada (2005, 2008, 2010)):  English, as a public-self 
centered language, is communicatively stronger than Japanese, as a private-self 
centered language.  Furthermore, I will point out that there seems to be a correlation 
between public-self centeredness and sensitivity to metonymic operation on the basis 
of the ideas developed by Yasui (2005) and Halliday (1994).  Lastly, I will argue that 
the analysis carried out in this chapter can be applicable to other conjunctions denoting 
causality such as because and since, and point out the possibility that the obligatory vs. 
optional occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 speech-act conditionals can serve as 
a criterion of linguistic typology. 
     Part 2, which is composed of five chapters, i.e. Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, 
provides evidence for the hypothesis in (8) by examining so-called peripheral 
conditionals in English and Japanese. 
     The organization of Part 2 is as follows.  Chapter 5 gives introductory remarks 
on the phenomena examined in Part 2.  Chapter 6, which consists of revised versions 
of Shizawa (2010a, 2011a), investigates adnominal conditionals and proposes their 
licensing conditions from a semantic and pragmatic point of view.  Chapter 7, which 
is a substantially revised version of Shizawa (2010b), examines if-cleft sentences and 
clarifies their discourse function, showing that their raison d’être is pragmatically 
motivated.  Chapter 8, which is a revised version of Shizawa (2011b, 2011c), deals 
with N1-nara N2 conditionals and proposes their semantic and pragmatic licensing 
condition.  Furthermore, I will deal with related constructions such as N1-wa N2 
constructions and N1-no N2 constructions, pointing out that all three constructions 
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share basic properties.  Based on the findings of the preceding chapters (Chapters 6 to 
8), Chapter 9 proposes a new perspective on conditional constructions; that is, it 
analyzes conditional constructions from the viewpoint of specification.  In particular, 
I will point out that conditionals and specificational copular sentences share some 
characteristics, thus making the claim in (15b).  Chapter 10 concludes the dissertation 
with a summary of the claims and an outlook for future research. 
  As stated above, conditional constructions and related phenomena have been one 
of the most intriguing topics in the field of linguistics.  One reason for this is that 
conditionals reflect our way of rational thinking in a straightforward way.  In fact, as 
Akatsuka (1997:323) states, the inquiry into “truth” and how to find “truth” through 
valid reasoning and logical argumentation has been a primary concern in Western 
academia since the time of ancient Greeks:  conditionals have been regarded as 
epitomes of human rational capacity.  Thus the conditional sentence in human 
language has been typically compared to the mathematical conditional, “p ⊃q”, where 
the relevant notions are truth-values. 
However, it should not be the case that conditionals are simply analyzed from 
the viewpoint of mathematics or logics alone.  Conditionals, as epitomes of human 
rational capacity, show many facets and characteristics that cannot be dealt with 
mathematically.  I think that some of such facets are reflected on the conditionals 
addressed in this thesis.  I hope that this thesis will shed light on some facets of the 
relationship of human thought, reason, and language beyond the traditional 
mathematical view. 
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Part 1 
 
Speech-Act Conditionals in Japanese and English 
 - 15 - 
Chapter 2 
 
Introduction of Part 1 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
 Part 1 of this dissertation is an attempt to provide a description of a certain 
fragment of the grammars of Japanese and English, namely, speech-act conditionals. 
As already stated in Chapter 1, conditionals in general can roughly be defined as 
complex sentences composed of a main clause (sometimes called q, or the apodosis) 
and a subordinate clause (p, or the protasis) (cf. Dancygier (1998:1)).  In many cases, 
the subordinate clause is introduced by a conjunction functioning as a conditional 
marker.  In English, the least marked conditional conjunction is if, while in Japanese, 
the four conjunctions (re)ba, tara, to and nara are most common.  It is generally 
acknowledged that there is interdependency between the protasis and apodosis.  In 
other words, a causal relation is assumed between the two clauses:  the fulfillment of 
the protasis, likely or unlikely, is a sufficient condition for the fulfillment of the 
apodosis (Sweetser (1990:115)). 
 However, a closer observation reveals that some conditional constructions, at 
least on their surface structures, do not clearly show such a relationship.  Let us 
observe the following examples: 
 (1) a.  If it will make you feel better, we know it wasn‟t your fault. 
   b.  If you want to know, I haven‟t seen him.       (Palmer (1988:154)) 
There seems to be no causal relation between the protases and the apodoses of the 
sentences in (1).  In (1a), the state described in the protasis it will make you feel better 
does not condition the realization of the state in the apodosis we know it wasn’t your 
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fault.  Likewise, in (1b) the state described in the protasis you want to know does not 
condition the realization of the state in the apodosis I haven’t seen him. 
  Then, a question arises:  how should the sentences in (1) be interpreted?  The 
conditional sentences in (1) are generally referred to as speech-act conditionals in the 
terminology of Sweetser (1990).  According to Sweetser (1990:121), speech-act 
conditionals are appropriately paraphrased by “If [protasis], then let us consider that I 
perform this speech act (i.e. the one represented as the apodosis).”  To put it simply, 
the paraphrase given by Sweetser can be schematized as “If X, I SAY Y”.  Thus, 
sentence (1a) can be interpreted as “If it will make you feel better, I SAY we know it 
wasn‟t your fault,” and sentence (1b) can be interpreted as “If you want to know, I SAY 
I haven‟t seen him. 
  The “If X, I SAY Y” relationship can be linguistically realized as I tell you or I 
inform you.  Let us investigate the following examples: 
 (2) a.  If it will make you feel better, I tell you we know it wasn‟t your fault. 
   b.  If you want to know, I tell you I haven‟t seen him. 
Sentences (2a) and (2b) are the counterparts to (1a) and (1b), respectively.  In (2) the 
“If X, I SAY Y” relationship is linguistically realized by virtue of the phrase I tell you.  
The intended meanings in (1a)/(1b) and (2a)/(2b) are almost the same:  the presence 
of the phrase I tell you does not usually alter the interpretation of the sentences in any 
obvious way.  In this sense, the phrase denoting a speech act, i.e. I tell you, can be 
regarded as optional. 
  Let us turn to Japanese speech-act conditionals.  Japanese speech-act 
conditionals show a contrastive behavior as to the occurrence of speech-act phrases.  
Examine the following examples:1, 2 
                                                     
1 The abbreviations used in the glosses of examples in this part are as follows: Acc = accusative case 
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 (3) a.  ki-ga raku-ni naru nara yuu kedo, sore-wa kimi-no  
     feeling-Nom good-become if  tell  but  it-Top you-Gen 
     see  dewa-nai no-wa  wakat-teiru. 
     blame  Ass-not Comp-Top know-AspV 
     „If it will make you feel better, I tell you we know it‟s not your fault.‟ 
   b.  siri tai nara yuu  ga,  watasi-wa kare-ni atte-inai 
     know want if  tell but,  I-Top  him-Dat see-Neg 
     „If you want to know, I tell you I haven‟t seen him.‟ 
The sentences in (3) are the Japanese counterparts to those in (2).  As seen in (3), the 
speech-act verb yuu „tell‟ is realized in both sentences.3  Interestingly enough, in 
contrast to English speech-act conditionals, deletion of the speech-act verb yuu renders 
the sentences in (3) ungrammatical.  Let us observe the following examples: 
 (4) a. * ki-ga raku-ni naru nara, sore-wa kimi-no see dewa-nai no-wa 
wakat-teiru. 
     „If it will make you feel better, we know it‟s not your fault.‟ 
   b. * siri tai nara, watasi-wa kare-ni atte-inai. 
     „If you want to know, I haven‟t seen him.‟ 
Sentence (4a) is a literal counterpart to sentence (1a), and (4b) is a literal counterpart 
to (1b).  Both of the sentences in (4) are rendered ungrammatical by the deletion of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
marker, Ass = assertive marker, AspV = aspectual verb, Comp = complementizer, Cop = copula, Dat = 
dative case marker, Ep = epistemic marker, Gen = genitive case marker, Hyp = hypothetical marker, 
Imp = imperative morpheme, Loc = locative case marker, Neg = Negative, Nom = nominative case 
marker, Part = sentence ending particle, Pol = politeness marker, Q = question morpheme, and Top = 
topic marker. 
2 In general, the literal translations of yuu and osieru are say and teach, respectively.  However, 
taking the semantic characteristics of the two words into account, I use tell and inform as the 
translations of yuu and osieru, respectively. 
3 The term speech-act verb is taken from Wierzbicka (1987) and May (2001).  In what follows, I will 
use the term as a cover term to refer to speech-act verbs and phrases containing them, i.e. performative 
clauses (cf. Ross (1970)). 
 - 18 - 
the speech-act verb yuu „tell‟.  This observation suggests that the occurrence of 
speech-act verbs is obligatory in Japanese speech-act conditionals. 
  However, a closer observation of Japanese speech-act conditionals reveals that a 
certain type of them does not require speech-act verbs such as yuu.  Observe the 
following pair: 
 (5) a.  If you are thirsty, there‟s some beer in the cellar.  
(Declerck and Reed (2001:3)) 
   b.  nodo-ga kawai-teiru nara, tyozooko-ni biiru-ga aru-yo. 
     throat-Nom dry-AspV if  cellar-Loc beer-Nom exist-Part 
     „If you‟re thirsty, there‟s some beer in the cellar.‟ 
In (5a), a causal relation does not arise between the apodosis and protasis.  In 
addition, sentence (5a) can be interpreted as “If you‟re thirsty, I SAY there‟s some beer 
in the cellar (, so you may drink the beer).”  Thus, the sentence in (5a) can be 
categorized into speech-act conditionals.  Needless to say, sentence (5a) does not 
demand a phrase containing a speech-act verb.  What should be noted here is that 
sentence (5b), a Japanese counterpart to (5a), does not require speech-act verbs such as 
yuu, either.  This observation leads to the assumption that speech-act conditionals 
should be divided into at least two types:  one is the type in which speech-act verbs 
obligatorily occur, and the other is the type in which they do not have to occur.  
 
2.2.  Aim 
  Although much attention has been paid to conditionals in general and related 
phenomena, to the best of my knowledge, the phenomena observed in (1) to (5) have 
long been overlooked.  To put it more precisely, some researchers (cf. Nakau (1994), 
Uchida (2001, 2005, 2011)) have already noticed the difference between Japanese and 
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English as to the obligatory/optional occurrence of speech-act verbs in speech-act 
conditionals and related constructions, but they have not dealt with the difference 
seriously. 
  Thus, the primary aim of Part 1 of this dissertation is to shed light on the 
long-ignored phenomena.  In so doing, I will address the following two questions: 
 (6) a.  What is the difference between the Japanese speech-act conditionals 
which require speech-act verbs and those which do not? 
   b.  What mechanism gives rise to the difference between Japanese and 
English speech-act conditionals as to whether the occurrence of 
speech-act verbs is obligatory or optional? 
  As already stated, few researchers have addressed these questions.  In this part, 
I would like to answer them from the viewpoint of semantic/pragmatic-based syntax.  
In particular, I would like to describe how various aspects of speech-act conditionals in 
Japanese and English map onto various aspects of their interpretation.  Furthermore, I 
would like to clarify that the difference between the two languages observed in 
speech-act conditionals can be reduced to the difference in their typologically 
fundamental characteristics. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Two Types of Speech-Act Conditionals in Japanese 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
 In this chapter, our main concern is with what is referred to as speech-act 
conditionals in Japanese (hereafter, J-SACs).1, 2  Observe the following examples: 
 (1)   nanika    tabe-tai nara, reezooko-ni tabemono-ga aru-wayo. 
     something eat-want  if   fridge-Loc food-Nom exist-Part 
     „If you want to eat something, there is food in the fridge.‟ 
 (2)   kyoomi-ga   aru nara osieru   ga,  Isida Zyun‟iti-no 
     interest-Nom  you-have if inform but   Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen 
       hommyoo-wa Isida Taro da. 
     real name-Top Ishida Taro Cop 
     „If you‟re interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro 
Ishida.‟ 
The sentences in (1) and (2) are examples of J-SACs.  These conditionals differ from 
so-called standard conditionals in that the condition expressed is not a condition for 
                                                     
1 The conditionals I refer to as SACs are named differently by different researchers: utterance 
conditionals (Haegeman (1984), Declerck and Reed (2001)), relevance-conditionals (Johnson-Laird 
(1986), Palmer (1988), Huddleston and Pullum (2002)), pseudo-conditionals (Sakahara (1985)), or 
speech-act conditionals (Sweetser (1990), Dancygier (1998), Dancygier and Sweetser (2005)).  I 
adopt Sweetser‟s (1990) terminology as a cover term in this thesis. 
2 Although there are at least four kinds of conditional markers in Japanese (i.e. nara, reba, tara, and 
to), I will focus on nara except when the other markers are used in the previous studies quoted in this 
thesis:  as Tsunoda (2004, 2006) points out, (re)ba, tara, and to are limited in their use as the 
indicator of speech-act conditionals.  In addition, although Hasegawa (1996) points out that the 
connective -te can be used as a conditional marker (e.g. zenbu tabe-te 20-doru desu „If you eat 
everything, it is 20 $‟.), I will not deal with it because it does not have the SAC use. 
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the actualization of the action or state referred to in the main clause but one for the 
relevance of uttering the main clause (cf. Huddleston and Pullum (2002)).  That is to 
say, the nara-clauses do not show causal relations with the main clauses in the sense 
that the events or states described in the nara-clauses do not cause the events or states 
described in the main clauses.  In J-SACs, the protasis (i.e. the nara-clause) expresses 
a condition under which it is pragmatically relevant for the speaker to utter (and for the 
hearer to decode) the apodosis (i.e. the main clause) (cf. Declerck and Reed 
(2001:320)).  In other words, the protasis is regarded as the proper background or 
felicity condition on which the speaker makes the utterance in the apodosis. 
  A great number of studies have been concerned with Japanese conditionals.3  
However, almost all of them have not dealt with J-SACs as a main topic.  As a result, 
an interesting fact exemplified in (3) has been overlooked: 
 (3)   * kyoomi-ga aru nara, Isida Zyun‟iti-no hommyoo-wa IsidaTaro da. 
     „If you‟re interested, Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro Ishida.‟ 
Example (3) is the counterpart of example (2), where the verb osieru „inform‟ is 
omitted.  The deletion of the verb makes the sentence unacceptable.  Note that 
sentence (1), on the other hand, is well-formed without the verb osieru.  Although a 
number of researchers (cf. Nakau (1994), Sakahara (1985), Tsubomoto (1993), 
Tsunoda (2004), and Uchida (2001, 2005, 2011)) recognize the discrepancy of the 
acceptability between (2) and (3), it has not been dealt with seriously. 
  The central purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the long-ignored or 
overlooked phenomenon of J-SACs.  In what follows, I will categorize J-SACs into 
two types on the basis of the presence or absence of speech-act verbs such as yuu „tell‟ 
or osieru „inform‟, and show that the phenomenon is relevant to a basic human 
                                                     
3 For more details, see Arita (1993). 
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cognitive ability and the functions of speech-act verbs. 
  This chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 reviews two previous studies 
relevant to SACs.  Section 3.3 points out some problems with the previous studies 
and classifies J-SACs into two types, Type 1 and Type 2.  Section 3.4 focuses on 
Type 1 J-SACs and clarifies their characteristics and the mechanisms relevant to their 
interpretation.  Section 3.5 focuses on Type 2 J-SACs and clarifies the functions to be 
fulfilled by speech-act verbs.  Section 3.6 makes some concluding remarks and 
discusses related issues. 
 
3.2.  Previous Studies 
  As stated above, a great number of researchers, including philosophers and 
logicians, have addressed various problems related to conditional constructions 
(Akatsuka (1985, 1986, 1998), Austin (1970), Comrie (1986), Dancygier (1998), 
Declerck and Reed (2001), Eilfort (1987), Haegeman (1984), Masuoka (ed.) (1993), 
Sakahara (1985), Palmer (1988), Sweetser (1990), Tsunoda (2004), Maeda (2009), 
among others).  However, to the best of my knowledge, many of them put their foci 
on the classification or typology of conditionals, and none of them notices the problem 
I lay out here, i.e. two types of J-SACs and their differences. 
  In this section, I review Sweetser (1990) and Sakahara (1985).  I take up the 
former to introduce the notion of speech-act conditionals and the latter as a 
representative analysis of J-SACs. 
 
3.2.1.  Cognitive Domains and Conditionals 
  In this subsection, I review Sweetser (1990).4  She shows that the ambiguity 
                                                     
4 Note here that Sweetser (1990) puts her focus on English conditionals.  However, this does not 
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and semantic change of various expressions (e.g. verbs of perception, modals, and 
conjunctions) result from their being interpreted in three cognitive domains: the 
content, epistemic, and speech-act domains.5  She argues that the domains themselves 
are linked via a metaphor which motivates extensions of meaning from the physical 
into the mental and social domains (cf. Lakoff and Johnson (1980)).  Bearing the 
three domains in mind, let us look at cases of conditionals in more detail below. 
 
3.2.1.1.  Content Domain Conditionals 
  Let us begin with the first domain, i.e. content domain conditionals.  The use of 
conditionals in the content domain is exemplified in (4): 
 (4) If Mary goes, (then) John will go. 
(Sweetser (1990:115), with slight modifications) 
As seen in (4), a conditional if-then conjunction indicates that the realization of the 
event or state of affairs described in the protasis is a sufficient condition for the 
realization of the event or the state of affairs described in the apodosis:  the event of 
Mary’s going will trigger or cause the event of John’s going.  This type of 
conditionals is regarded as a prototypically standard conditional construction in the 
sense that a causal relation is established or implied between the event (or state) 
described in the protasis and the one in the apodosis. 
 
3.2.1.2.  Epistemic Domain Conditionals 
  Let us move on to conditionals in the second domain, i.e. epistemic domain 
                                                                                                                                                                     
matter, because, as shown by Masuoka (1993), her analysis can be applied to Japanese conditionals. 
5 Nakau (1994) and Tsunoda (2004) also present several domain levels similar to those of Sweetser‟s.  
Nakau presents three domains: D(iscourse)-modality, S(entence)-modality, and P(roposition) domain; 
Tsunoda, on the other hand, proposes five domains: phenomenal description, speaker‟s judgment, 
personal effect, basis of speaker‟s judgment, and premise to speech acts.  With regard to the details of 
their analyses, see Nakau (1994) and Tsunoda (2004) respectively. 
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conditionals.  Observe the following example: 
 (5) If she‟s divorced, (then) she‟s been married.    (Sweetser (1990:116)) 
In the epistemic domain, a conditional if-then conjunction expresses the idea that 
knowledge of the hypothetical premise expressed in the protasis (i.e. she’s divorced) 
would be a sufficient condition for the conclusion of the speaker expressed in the 
apodosis (i.e. she’s been married).  In this case, note that no causal link is found 
between the events per se in that the event she’s divorced does not directly cause the 
event she’s been married.  In fact, the causal relation in the real world is turned 
around to yield an abductive inference relation.  To put it plainly, it is the speaker‟s 
knowledge of her divorce that draws the speaker‟s conclusion that she’s been married.  
That is, the causal link in question holds at the epistemic level in that the speaker‟s 
knowledge causes or enables him/her to draw some conclusion.   
 
3.2.1.3.  Speech-Act Domain Conditionals (SACs) 
  Let us turn to the third domain, i.e. speech-act conditionals (SACs).  Observe 
the following example:6 
 (6) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them. 
(Sweetser (1990:119)) 
In this case, one cannot interpret the sentence as “the state described in the if-clause 
(i.e. you want them) brings about the biscuits‟ existence on the sideboard.”  Nor can 
one interpret it as “the speaker draws the conclusion there are biscuits on the 
sideboard from the premise if you want them.”  According to Sweetser, it should be 
interpreted as “If you want biscuits, then (let us consider that) I inform you that there 
                                                     
6 Example (6) is originally due to Austin (1970). 
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are biscuits on the sideboard.”7  That is, what the protasis of this conditional denotes 
is not a condition for the actualization of the state described in the main clause (i.e. 
there are biscuits on the sideboard) but an introductory remark for the speaker‟s offer 
of the biscuits.  Note here that the causal link between the protasis and the apodosis 
in (6) is established at a more abstract level:  the conditional clause if you want them 
justifies, but does not realize, the speaker‟s offer of the biscuits on the sideboard.  
That is to say, the protasis provides a felicitous or proper background on which the 
speech act performed in the apodosis is based. 
  Before going into a detailed discussion, it is worth noting here that Sweetser 
(1990) recognizes that there are some variants of SACs.  Observe the following 
examples: 
 (7) a.  Take out the garbage, if I may ask you to.      (Dancygier (1998:89)) 
   b.  If you went to the party, was John there? (Sweetser (1990:120)) 
According to Sweetser, the if-clause in sentence (7a) refers more overtly to the general 
felicity condition on the relevant class of speech acts (i.e. order or direction in this 
case), while the if-clause in (7b) refers to some more specific felicity condition on the 
particular utterance (i.e. the question was John there?).  Note that sentence (7a) 
contains the fossilized, formulaic expression if I may ask you to, which is meant to 
make more appropriate the speech act in the apodosis take out the garbage.  Sentence 
(7b), on the other hand, uses the spontaneously coined assumption if you went to the 
party, which provides some background for the speech act in the apodosis.  In the 
following discussion, I restrict myself to the latter type of SACs, because in many 
cases, Japanese counterparts to the English conditionals of the former type are not 
                                                     
7 As we will see below, Sakahara (1985) gives a slightly different interpretation to the Japanese 
counterpart of the example in (6). 
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expressed in conditional forms, so the phenomenon pointed out in Section 3.1 is not 
observed: 
 (7a‟)   warui kedo, sono  gomi  dasi-te 
     sorry but the  garbage take out -Imp 
     „I‟m sorry to ask you, but take out the garbage.‟ 
 
3.2.2.  Pseudo-Conditionals 
  Let us turn our attention to our main topic, i.e. J-SACs.  In this subsection, I 
take up Sakahara (1985), who deals comprehensively with various conditionals in 
Japanese.  He refers to SACs as pseudo-conditionals.  His definition of 
pseudo-conditionals can be summarized as follows: 
 (8) A pseudo-conditional is a conditional which has the form „if p then q,‟ but 
does not have the logical structure „p⊃q‟. 
Sakahara argues that what the main clause in pseudo-conditionals represents is not a 
conclusion drawn from the premise described in the protasis but an indicator to find 
out an implicit conclusion.  By the term indicator, he refers to a kind of clue that 
leads us to the implicit conclusion.  Consider the following example: 
 (9)  mosi onozomi-desi tara, syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga  
    Hyp  want-Pol if, sideboard-Gen on-Loc biscuit-Nom 
    ari-masu-yo. 
    be-Pol-Part 
    „There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them.‟ 
                                     (Sakahara (1985:139)) 
Sentence (9) is the Japanese counterpart of sentence (6).  Sakahara claims that the 
main clause in (9) denotes the reason for the implicit conclusion (i.e. tana-no ue-no 
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bisuketto-o tabetemo ii-desu-yo „you may have biscuits on the sideboard‟), and that 
sentence (9) can be paraphrased into a standard conditional as follows: 
 (10)  syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga aru kara, onozomi-desi tara,  
    sideboard-Gen on-Loc biscuit-Nom be because want-Pol if 
    tabe-temo ii-desu-yo 
    eat-Concessive may-Pol-Part 
    „Because there are biscuits on the sideboard, you may have them if you 
want them.‟ 
(Sakahara (1985: 140)) 
In (10), the reason clause corresponds to the main clause of sentence (9), and the 
implicit conclusion (i.e. tabetemo ii-desu-yo „you may have them‟) is explicitly stated.  
According to Sakahara, the relationship between the logical structure of 
pseudo-conditionals and that of standard ones can be illustrated as follows:8 
 (11)  Standard conditional: if p, because r, q ⇔ Pseudo-conditional: if p, r 
On the basis of the logical structure in (11), he argues that pseudo-conditionals are 
generated when the speaker assumes that (i) the reason (r) for the (implicit) conclusion 
(q) is not yet known to the hearer and (ii) it is possible for the hearer to draw the 
(implicit) conclusion from the explicit if-clause (p) and the main clause (r).  In (9), 
for instance, the speaker assumes that the hearer does not know that there are biscuits 
on the sideboard.  S/he also assumes that the hearer can understand his/her intention 
to offer the biscuits without explicitly stating it.  The process can be schematically 
represented as follows: 
                                                     
8 The letters p, q, r represent condition, conclusion and reason, respectively.  In addition, the term 
standard is almost equivalent to content. 
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 (12) 
 
 
 
   
(Sakahara (1985:144), with slight modifications) 
Sakahara treats SACs as variants of standard conditionals.  His view is compatible 
with Sweetser‟s in this respect, and I will not challenge the view per se.  However, as 
will be shown below, not all SACs can be analyzed on these lines. 
 
3.3.  Problems 
  This section points out a few problems with the previous studies reviewed in 
Section 3.2.  First, Sweetser (1990) focuses almost exclusively on English 
conditionals.  It follows that she does not even notice the existence of the issue I lay 
out here (i.e. (3)), because this phenomenon cannot be observed in English SACs 
(E-SACs).  Observe the following pair: 
 (13) a.  If you‟re interested, Dick‟s coming to the party, too. 
   b.   If you‟re interested, it is worth telling you that Dick‟s coming to the 
party, too. 
                          (Huddleston and Pullum (2002:740) [italics are mine]) 
Huddleston and Pullum (2002:740) state that sentences (13a) and (13b) can be 
paraphrased by each other.  Sentence (13a) does not contain any speech-act verb, 
while sentence (13b) does.  As shown in (13), the occurrence of the speech-act verb 
tell does not influence the grammaticality judgment.  This paraphrase seems to reflect 
English native speakers‟ intuition and indicates that E-SACs are not significantly 
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affected by the presence or absence of the phrases containing speech-act verbs:  
speech-act verbs may be used, but do not have to be.9  Thus, as long as one 
concentrates on E-SACs, s/he might never notice that the presence or absence of 
speech-act verbs can affect the grammaticality of SACs. 
  Second, Sakahara (1985) deals with the problem at issue only intuitively.  
Other researchers dealing with Japanese conditionals such as Nakau (1994) and 
Tsunoda (2004) do not pay special attention to the problem, either.   Observe the 
following examples: 
 (14) a.  Your slip is showing, in case you are not aware of it. 
   b.  okizuki-de nake-reba  moosiagemasu ga,   sitaginosuso-ga 
     aware-Cop not-if  I tell you (honorific) but slip-Nom 
     mietemasu-yo. 
     showing-Part 
                (Nakau (1994:106), with slight modifications) 
 (15) a.  If you were at the party, how‟s Harry these days? 
   b.  paatii-ni  deteita  nara (kiku kedo), Harii-wa  saikin 
     party-Loc attended if (I ask you but), Harry-Top these-days 
     doo siteru-no. 
     how doing-Q.                  
(Tsunoda (2004:59), with slight modifications) 
 (16) a.  We are now at Kyoto Station, if you don‟t know. 
   b. * anata-ga  sira nai nara ima wareware-wa kyooto eki-ni 
     you-Nom know not  if now we-Top  Kyoto Station-Loc 
     orimasu. 
                                                     
9 Uchida (2001) makes a similar comment in terms of relevance theory. 
 - 30 - 
     are (Pol) 
   c.  anata-ga sira nai nara  iimasu ga, ima  wareware-wa  
     you-Nom  know  not if    I tell you but now we-Top 
     kyooto eki-ni orimasu. 
     Kyoto Station-Loc are (Pol) 
(Sakahara (1985:153-54), with slight modifications) 
In (14)-(16), the (b)/(c)-sentences are the Japanese counterparts of the (a)-sentences.  
Nakau and Tsunoda intuitively add the speech-act verbs mousiagemasu „tell 
(honorific)‟ and kiku „ask‟ respectively, but they do not deal with this matter in detail, 
which is the reason that I use the word intuitively.  Sakahara, on the other hand, 
remarks that sentence (16c) is greatly preferable to sentence (16b) as the translation of 
the sentence in (16a).  However, he does not state the reason for the preferableness at 
all, either. 
  Third, there is a serious problem with Sakahara‟s explanation of 
pseudo-conditionals:  Sakahara‟s mechanism presented in diagram (12) does not 
always work properly.  For example, none of the sentences in (14)-(16) can be 
generated, contrary to his expectation.10  Observe the following: 
 (17) * anata-ga sira nai nara, ima wareware-wa kyooto eki-ni orimasu.(= (16b)) 
   p: anata-ga sira nai nara „if you don‟t know‟ 
   r: ima wareware-wa kyooto eki-ni orimasu „we are now at Kyoto Station‟ 
   q: ?? 
As stated in 3.2.2, Sakahara assumes that in the pseudo-conditional construction 
p-nara, r „if p, r,‟ the main clause r is not a conclusion drawn from condition p, but a 
                                                     
10 Although I deal with Japanese examples ((b)/(c)-sentences in (14)-(16)) alone, the same is true of 
English examples ((a)-sentences). 
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reason (or a clue) for the implicit conclusion q.  But, in this case, no matter how hard 
one may think, the statement ima wareware-wa kyooto eki-ni orimasu „we are now at 
Kyoto Station‟ cannot be exploited as a clue to find the implicit conclusion q. 
  One might object that it is not appropriate to refute Sakahara‟s analysis by using 
the ungrammatical sentence in (17) in the first place.  However, the problem cannot 
be solved even if one applies Sakahara‟s analysis to the well-formed sentence in (16c): 
 (18) anata-ga sira nai nara iimasu ga, ima wareware-wa kyooto eki-ni orimasu. 
   p: anata-ga sira nai nara „if you don‟t know‟ 
   r: ima wareware-wa kyooto eki-ni orimasu „we are now at Kyoto Station‟ 
   q: iimasu „I tell you‟ 
It should be noted that in (18), the phrase iimasu is assumed to be the implicit 
conclusion in terms of Sakahara (1985), because it is not linguistically realized in (17).  
In addition, it is true that the state anata-ga (ima iru basyo-o) siranai „you don‟t know 
(the place where we are)‟ causes the event iimasu „I tell you.‟  Thus, it is not 
impossible to interpret the q-clause as an implicit conclusion drawn from the p-clause.  
Even so, however, the statement described in the r-clause cannot be interpreted as a 
reason for the q, as shown below: 
 (19) * anata-ga sira nai nara, ima wareware-wa kyooto eki-ni orimasu kara, 
iimasu. 
    „If you don‟t know, because we are now at Kyoto Station, I tell you.‟ 
Rather, it is much better to interpret that p (anata-ga sira nai) is the reason or felicity 
condition for the speech act iimasu „I tell you‟. 
  It is by now clear that J-SACs are not monolithic and they should be divided 
into two classes:  one is the type that follows Sakahara‟s mechanism and does not 
require speech-act verbs, and the other is the type which does not follow his 
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mechanism and requires speech-act verbs.  Let us call them Type 1 J-SACs and Type 
2 J-SACs, respectively. 
  I acknowledge that Sakahara‟s mechanism, to some degree, works well in 
analyzing Type 1 J-SACs.  However, it is not clear what motivates it.  Put more 
specifically, his idea is plausible in that the main clause of Type 1 J-SACs is a 
manifestation of the reason for an implicit conclusion, but he does not clarify why and 
how the main clause r can serve as a clue to the implicit conclusion q.  In addition, 
because Type 2 J-SACs, as well as Type 1 J-SACs, are treated as pseudo-conditionals 
in his approach, it is not clear how Type-2 J-SACs are produced and why they 
obligatorily require speech-act verbs.  In the following sections, I will propose an 
alternative solution.  In the next section, I will focus on Type 1 J-SACs and their 
characteristics, and show that Sakahara‟s analysis on Type 1 J-SACs is motivated by a 
cognitive capacity and a pragmatic principle. 
 
3.4.  Interpretation of Type 1 J-SACs: Reference Point and the Desirability 
Principle 
  In the previous section, I pointed out that Sakahara‟s (1985) explanation of what 
he calls pseudo-conditionals is valid to the extent that it deals with Type 1 J-SACs.  
In this section, I will clarify why the apodosis of Type 1 J-SACs can serve as a clue to 
find out an implicit conclusion; in other words, why one can interpret Type 1 J-SACs 
properly.  I propose a solution based on a cognitive linguistic approach in a broader 
sense.  More specifically, I will show that the reference point ability first fully 
discussed in Langacker (1993, 2008) and the Desirability Principle proposed by 
Akatsuka (1998) are involved in the interpretation of Type 1 J-SACs. 
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3.4.1.  Apodoses of Type 1 J-SACs as Reference Points 
3.4.1.1.  Reference Points 
  To answer the question raised above, first of all, the notion of reference point 
should be introduced.  According to Langacker (1993, 2008), setting the reference 
point is the cognitive ability to invoke the conception of one entity for purposes of 
establishing mental contact with another.  For example, in the expression Sally’s dog, 
the possessor Sally is invoked as a reference point for establishing mental contact with 
one of her possessions, viz. her dog.  Observe the following figure: 
 (20) 
 
 
 
(Langacker (2008:84)) 
Figure (20) sketches essential aspects of the reference-point ability.  The circled C 
represents the conceptualizer (i.e. language user), R is the reference point, and T the 
target (i.e. the entity that the conceptualizer uses the reference point to establish mental 
contact with).  The broken arrows indicate the mental path which the conceptualizer 
follows in reaching the target.  It should be noted that as the multiple dashed arrows 
from R show, a particular reference point affords potential access to many different 
targets.  The ellipse labeled D is an abstract entity called dominion, which is defined 
as the conceptual region (or the set of entities) to which a particular reference point has 
direct access. 
  We can best appreciate this notion from a perceptual example.  We often direct 
our attention to a perceptually salient entity as a reference point to help find some 
other entities, which otherwise be hard to locate.  Observe the following example: 
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 (21)   Do you see that boat out there in the lake?  There‟s a duck swimming 
right next to it.                           (Langacker (2008:83)) 
In (21), the speaker wants to direct the hearer‟s attention to the duck, but from a 
distance the boat is easier to recognize.  In this case, both the speaker and the hearer 
use the boat as a reference point to have access to their real target (duck).  Here I 
assume that this basic cognitive capacity can analogously be applied to the mechanism 
of the interpretation of Type 1 J-SACs.11 
 
3.4.1.2.  The Main Clause of a Type 1 J-SAC as a Reference Point 
  If the notion of reference point is applied to Type 1 J-SACs, the main clause of a 
Type 1 J-SAC functions as a reference-point:  one can access an implicit conclusion 
via the reference point.  Consider the example in (9), repeated here as (22): 
 (22)  mosi onozomi-desi tara, syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga ari-masu-yo. 
     „There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them.‟ 
As indicated in (10), (22) can be interpreted as “Because there are biscuits on the 
sideboard, you may have them if you want them.”  The relationship among the 
protasis (p), the apodosis (r) (explicitly stated reason), and the implicit conclusion (q) 
can be illustrated in (23): 
 (23)     p (mosi onozomidesi tara)        q (bisuketto-o tabe temo iidesuyo) 
     „if you want them‟   „you may have them‟ 
     r (syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga aru (kara)) 
     „(because) there are biscuits on the sideboard‟ 
                                                     
11 The reference point model has been applied to a variety of linguistic phenomena, including “nested 
locative” constructions, metonymy (cf. Langacker (1993)), and pronominal anaphora (cf. Van Hoek 
(1997)).  For the application of the model to person deixis and temporal deixis in indirect/direct 
speech, see Vandelanotte (2009). 
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In Figure (23), the bold arrow indicates the interpretive mechanism of standard 
conditionals:  the conclusion q is directly drawn from the premise described in the 
protasis p.  If this relation is manifested as a conditional construction, the output is 
like the following: 
 (24)  mosi onozomi-desi tara, bisuketto-o tabe temo iidesuyo. 
    „If you want biscuits, you may have them.‟ 
The arrow down to r in (23) indicates the interpretive mechanism of (22), and the 
dashed arrow denotes the mental access to the implicit conclusion q:  the explicitly 
stated r is exploited to access the implicit conclusion of the reasoning process.  In this 
case, the statement r serves as a reference point and the implicit conclusion q is a 
target, as illustrated in the following figure: 
 (25) 
 
 
 
As shown in (25), the conceptualizer C (a language user) understands or accesses the 
implicit conclusion (T), using the main clause as a reference point (R). 
  Note here that a particular reference point may potentially access many different 
targets.  In the case of (22), for example, the phrase syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga 
aru „there are biscuits on the sideboard‟ does not always lead the hearer to the intended 
conclusion bisuketto-o tabetemo iidesu-yo „you may have the biscuits‟:  in some 
cases, the hearer might infer that the speaker intends to ask the hearer to fetch the 
biscuits for other people, or that the speaker intends to show the hearer the package of 
the biscuits because its design is rare, etc.  This means that the reasoning process 
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shown in (23), i.e. r to q can be cancelled, depending on the context.12  What is 
selected as a target depends largely on contexts and the concreteness of the statement 
in the protasis.  Contexts and the statement in the protasis help the hearer limit the 
number of potential targets.  For instance, the statement onaka-ga suiteiru nara „if 
you are hungry‟ is more directly relevant to food than mosi onozomi-desi tara „if you 
want‟, and the former makes it easier for the hearer to evoke the eating act.  That is, 
Type 1 J-SACs are founded on the common understanding between the speaker and 
the hearer.   
 
3.4.2.  The Desirability Principle 
  Let us turn to the second mechanism used in interpreting Type 1 J-SACs.  As 
seen above, the reference point ability plays an important role in Type 1 J-SACs.  
However, it cannot be denied that contexts and the statement in the protasis alone are 
too weak to limit the number of potential targets.  Observe the following examples: 
 (26) * mosi onozomi-desi tara, syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga  
    Hyp  want-Pol if, sideboard-Gen on-Loc biscuits-Nom 
    ari-masu-yo (demo batu  tosite tabe tewa  ikemasen). 
    be-Pol-Part (but punishment as  eat Concessive not-Imp) 
    „There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them (but you must not 
eat them as a punishment).‟ 
In (26), the implicit conclusion or intended speech act is the prohibition tabetewa 
ikemasen „Don‟t eat‟.  In the actual world, there are many cases like (26), where one 
has biscuits but must not eat them.  Furthermore, sentence (26) is not different from 
                                                     
12 In this sense, the reasoning process in (23) can be regarded as an instance of what is called default 
inference. 
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sentence (22) in that their implicit conclusions are concerned with the act of eating the 
biscuits on the sideboard.  Thus, in principle, it is not impossible that the explicit 
apodosis functions as a reference point to the implicit prohibition. 
Nevertheless, we can properly understand that the apodosis in (22) serves as a 
clue to the implicit offer, and we never interpret it as a prohibition.  The problem 
which should be considered next is, therefore, how one can single out the proper 
implicit illocutionary force intended by the speaker out of a number of candidates such 
as offers, orders, and prohibitions.  There must be some additional mechanism which 
helps the reference point ability work more efficiently.   I argue that the additional 
mechanism is the Desirability Principle proposed by Akatsuka (1998). 
 
3.4.2.1.  Desirable Leads to Desirable/Undesirable Leads to Undesirable 
  In this subsection, let us review the notion of Desirability and the Desirability 
Principle proposed by Akatsuka (1998). 
  In everyday life, we perform various speech acts such as orders, prohibitions, 
warnings, threats and promises by using conditional constructions.  It should be 
considered what principle works behind performing such speech acts.  Let us observe 
the following example: 
 (27)   If you eat my cookies, I‟ll whip you. (Akatsuka (1998:13)) 
According to Akatsuka (1998:13), sentence (27) is ambiguous between a prohibition 
and a promise (or offer), as shown below: 
 (28) a.  Don‟t eat my cookies or I‟ll whip you.  (prohibition reading) 
   b.  Eat my cookies and I‟ll whip you.  (promise/offer reading) 
On the basis of our background knowledge, we usually interpret example (27) as a 
prohibition, as in (28a):  no ordinary person likes to be beaten with a whip.  
 - 38 - 
However, in some situations, sentence (27) can be interpreted as the speech act of 
promise or offer.  If the hearer is disposed to be whipped, and the speaker utters (27) 
with the full knowledge of the hearer‟s disposition, then such an interpretation as (28b) 
is quite natural.   
  Akatsuka assumes that there is a pragmatic principle behind the ambiguity of the 
sentence in (27).  The pragmatic principle is what she refers to as the Desirability 
Principle: 
 (29) The Desirability Principle 
   a.  DESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-DESIRABLE 
   b.  UNDESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-UNDESIRABLE 
As shown in (29), the Desirability Principle consists of two sub-principles.  Briefly, 
the sub-principle in (29a) means that if the realization of the proposition described in 
the protasis is desirable for the speaker, the realization of the proposition in the 
apodosis will also be desirable for the speaker.  As a result, the speech act intended in 
the conditional construction will be interpreted as desirable, too.  The sub-principle in 
(29b), on the other hand, means that if the realization of the proposition described in 
the protasis is undesirable for the speaker, the realization of the proposition in the 
apodosis will also be undesirable for the speaker.  As a result, the speech act intended 
in the conditional construction will be interpreted as undesirable, too. 
The relationship between the values of Desirability and the interpretation of 
conditional constructions can be diagrammatically represented as follows: 
 (30)   p  q  if p, then q 
   DESIRABLE DESIRABLE DESIRABLE 
   UNDESIRABLE UNDESIRABLE UNDESIRABLE 
(Akatsuka (1998:15), with slight modifications) 
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In table (30), p represents the proposition in the protasis and q the proposition in the 
apodosis. Akatsuka considers that the principle holds true for natural language in 
general.13  Note here that the principle lacks the relationships DESIRABLE-LEADS- 
TO-UNDESIRABLE and UNDESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-DESIRABLE. 
In this connection, Akatsuka argues that there is a contingency or dependency 
relationship between the protasis and apodosis of a conditional construction, which 
blocks the two combinations.  In fact, neither of them can be described in the form of 
conditional constructions at least in English and Japanese:14   
 (31) a. * If you do what I want, I will do what you don‟t like. 
     [DESIRABLE]  [UNDESIRABLE] 
   b. * If you do what I don‟t like, I will do what you want. 
     [UNDESIRABLE]  [DESIRABLE] 
(Akatsuka (1998:14)) 
  With the Desirability Principle in mind, let us return to the example in (27), 
repeated here as (32) for convenience of reference:   
 (32)    If you eat my cookies, I‟ll whip you. 
As seen above, sentence (32) is ambiguous between a prohibition and a promise (or 
offer).  When this sentence is interpreted as the prohibition Don’t eat my cookies, the 
values of Desirability are assigned as follows: 
 (33)   If you eat my cookies,  I‟ll whip you. 
     [UNDESIRABLE]  [UNDESIRABLE] 
      [UNDESIRABLE] 
                                                     
13 For the application of the principle to the Japanese sentence-ending particle noda, see Ikarashi 
(2011b) 
14 In English, such combinations must be expressed in even if forms, and in Japanese, they must be 
expressed by virtue of temo.   
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In (33), the proposition in the protasis you eat my cookies reflects the speaker‟s mental 
attitude UNDESIRABLE, and the proposition in the apodosis I’ll whip you also 
reflects the speaker‟s mental attitude UNDESIRABLE.  Thus the speaker‟s mental 
attitude reflected on the whole sentence is UNDESIRABLE.  The hearer reads the 
attitude and properly interprets the sentence as the prohibition Don’t eat my cookies.   
  When this sentence is interpreted as the promise I’ll whip you, the values of 
Desirability are assigned as follows: 
 (34)   If you eat my cookies,  I‟ll whip you. 
     [DESIRABLE]  [DESIRABLE] 
      [DESIRABLE] 
In contrast to (33), here the proposition in the protasis you eat my cookies reflects the 
speaker‟s mental attitude DESIRABLE, and the proposition in the apodosis I’ll whip 
you also reflects the speaker‟s mental attitude DESIRABLE.  Thus the speaker‟s 
mental attitude reflected in the whole sentence is DESIRABLE.  The hearer reads the 
speaker‟s mental attitude and properly interprets the sentence as the promise I’ll whip 
you (as a reward if you do me a favor). 
  In this subsection, I have reviewed the Desirability Principle, which is 
pragmatically relevant to the interpretation of conditionals in general.   In the 
following subsection, I will show that the Desirability Principle, in combination with 
reference points, plays a significant part in interpreting Type 1 J-SACs. 
 
3.4.2.2.  A Chain of Inferences and the Desirability Principle 
  With regard to the interpretation of Type 1 SACs, Declerck and Reed (2001) 
allude to the involvement of a chain of inferences.15  Let us examine the following 
                                                     
15 In the following explanation, I will use the Type 1 E-SAC in (35), because I assume that the 
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example: 
 (35) If you‟re hungry, the fridge is on the landing. 
(Declerck and Reed (2001:320)) 
In order to interpret sentence (35) properly, one needs to follow the proper procedures 
like the following:16 
 (36) if you‟re hungry→the fridge is on the landing→food is usually kept in the  
   [premise]          [intermediate step 1]      [intermediate step 2] 
   fridge → you may eat the food in the fridge 
                  [final conclusion] 
Figure (36) means that if the hearer is to read the proper intention of the speaker of 
(35), s/he needs to proceed step by step in the chain of inferences:  on the basis of the 
statement the fridge is on the landing, the hearer gets to the intermediate conclusion 
food is usually kept in the fridge, and then on the basis of the intermediate conclusion, 
s/he gets to the final conclusion you may eat the food in the fridge.  This process is 
what Declerck and Reed (2001) call a chain of inferences.17 
  It goes without saying that reference points are involved in this process:  the 
statement the fridge is on the landing serves as a reference point to the target food is 
usually kept in the fridge, which, in turn, serves as a reference point to the final target 
                                                                                                                                                                     
relevant inference steps are not significantly different in Japanese and English. 
16 The following explanation is my own, because Declerck and Reed themselves do not discuss the 
chain of inferences at issue in detail.  It goes without saying that there are cases wherein we proceed 
via other routes to reach the same conclusion.  The reasoning process shown in (36) only exemplifies 
what seems to be a typical case. 
17 In Type 1 J-SACs, the existence of inference steps like (36) is linguistically corroborated by the 
following example: 
 (i) onaka-ga suiteiru-nara, odoriba-ni reezooko-ga aru{-yo/*-ne}. 
  „If you‟re hungry, the fridge is on the landing.‟ 
As seen in (i), yo can be used as a sentence-ending particle in Type 1 J-SACs, but ne cannot.  The 
reason for this contrast is that the former give rise to inference, while the latter does not (cf. Nakata 
(2009)).  This means that Type 1 J-SACs require sentence-ending particles giving rise to further 
inference, which corroborates the existence of inference steps like those in (36). 
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you may eat the food in the fridge.18  As just described, the notion of a chain of 
inferences is quite compatible with reference points.  However, as pointed out in 
3.4.1.2, reference points alone do not sufficiently limit the number of potential targets. 
  Thus, let us assume that the Desirability Principle can be applied not only to the 
premise and conclusion, but also to the intermediate steps. That is, the values of 
Desirability assigned to Type 1 SACs must be consistent through the chain of 
inferences.  This point is presented in the form of a hypothesis like the following: 
 (37) Desirability Consistency Hypothesis (DCH) 
   In a speech-act conditional sentence wherein a chain of inferences is 
involved, the values of Desirability must be consistent throughout the 
chain. 
Now let us see how the DCH works in the interpretation of Type 1 SACs.  Based on 
this hypothesis, the values of Desirability assigned to the sentence in (35) are 
presented as follows: 
 (38) if you‟re hungry→the fridge is on the landing→food is usually kept in the  
   [DESIRABLE]     [DESIRABLE]            [DESIRABLE] 
   fridge → you may eat the food in the fridge 
                  [DESIRABLE] 
If the values of Desirability are assigned as in (38), it clarifies why one can properly 
understand Type 1 SACs.  Put differently, it clarifies why and how the hearer can 
properly single out the proper illocutionary force intended by the speaker:  the 
Desirability Principle, together with given contexts, helps the hearer narrow down the 
potential targets.  In the case of (35), on hearing the statement if you’re hungry, the 
hearer evokes the dominion connected to food or the act of eating.  At the same time, 
                                                     
18 Langacker (2008:85) refers to the process of this kind a chain of successive reference points. 
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with the help of the context where sentence (35) is uttered, the hearer makes a 
judgment on the value of Desirability assigned to the statement.  Once the value is 
determined, the value holds consistently throughout the chain of inferences, as shown 
in (38).  In this way, the hearer infers that the illocutionary force intended in (35) is a 
desirable one.  In this case, what is desirable for the hungry person is the permission 
or offer to eat something.  As seen above, the Desirability Principle plays an 
important part in the interpretation of Type 1 SACs. 
  In concluding this subsection, let us consider the validity of the DCH.  The 
validity of the DCH is corroborated from the viewpoint of efficiency of 
communication and language acquisition.  Observe the following table: 
 (39) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table (39) illustrates the patterns of the combinations of Desirability when a single 
intermediate step is included in a chain of inferences.  In this table, p, r, and q 
represent the proposition in an if-clause, the proposition in an apodosis (an 
intermediate step in a chain of inferences), and an implicit conclusion, respectively.  
D and UD are the abbreviations of DESIRABLE and UNDESIRABLE, respectively, 
p r q 
D 
D 
D 
UD 
UD 
D 
UD 
UD 
D 
D 
UD 
UD 
D 
UD 
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which represent a speaker‟s mental attitude toward the propositions p, r and q.   
  Here, let us tentatively assume that the values of Desirability are assigned from p 
to q.19  As shown in the table, if the values of Desirability are not consistent through a 
chain of inference, it means that there are eight routes to reach an implicit conclusion.  
If two intermediate steps are required in a chain of inferences, the number of routes 
will be sixteen.  That is, the number of routes grows exponentially.  This is 
problematic in terms of language acquisition and the efficiency of communication.  
Regarding the former, it is reported that even small children (2 or 3 years old) can 
understand the utterances in conditional constructions, including Type 1 SACs (cf. 
Akatsuka (1998)).  As for the latter, if the number of routes to reach a correct 
illocutionary force intended by a speaker grows exponentially, it imposes a heavy 
burden on the hearer in interpreting the utterance.  The patterns represented in table 
(39) are too complex. 
  On the other hand, based on the DCH, the table can be modified as follows: 
 (40)  
 
 
 
As Table (40) shows, there are only two routes to reach an implicit conclusion.  
Furthermore, if the DCH is valid, it means that only two routes are needed, no matter 
how many intermediate steps are included:  once the value of p is determined, the 
values assigned to the subsequent steps are automatically determined.  This is the 
                                                     
19 The following discussion is based on the assumption that the values of desirability are assigned in a 
sequential order, i.e. from p to r to q.  However, I am not in a position to decide whether this 
assumption is valid or not, because, as discussed below, there seem to be cases wherein the values of 
desirability are determined by the intention of the speaker conveyed in the whole utterance.  I leave 
the issue open for future research. 
p r q 
D D D 
UD UD UD 
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very reason that the hearer can single out an intended illocutionary force and even 
small children can do so.  In this way, the DCH is desirable and motivated in terms of 
language acquisition as well as the efficiency of communication. 
  One may argue that the hypothesis in (37) is invalid in the sense that the 
information in the protasis is not always enough for the hearer to read whether the 
mental attitude of the speaker is DESIRABLE or UNDESIRABLE.  For example, 
when one hears the statement if you want, s/he can relatively easily read the speaker‟s 
mental attitude DESIRABLE, because the attitude manifests itself as the word want; 
on the other hand, the statement if you’re hungry (cf. (35)) does not always evoke the 
speaker‟s DESIRABLE attitude in the mind of the hearer. 
In this connection, the following points should be taken into account.  First, the 
value of Desirability is given exclusively by the speaker, not the hearer (Akatsuka 
(1998:26)).  In other words, the Desirability Principle is not the hearer‟s logic but the 
speaker‟s logic.  Take sentence (35) for example again.  Note that the sentence is 
uttered to offer some food to the hearer.  Thus, the apodosis the fridge is on the 
landing can be paraphrased as I offer some food in the fridge by informing you of the 
fact that the fridge is on the landing.  Consider under what condition the speech act 
of offer works felicitously.  If the hearer is full or at least not hungry, the offer is not 
felicitous; on the other hand, if the hearer is hungry and wants some food, the offer is 
quite appropriate.  In this sense, the if-clause represents a felicity condition for the 
offer of food.  Therefore, the condition if you’re hungry is a DESIRABLE condition 
for the offer of food.  This means that the speaker picks out what s/he thinks is the 
most felicitous or proper condition according to her/his intention conveyed by the 
speech act.  To put it more simply, s/he picks out p on the basis of q (a related issue 
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will be discussed in Chapter 9).20  Leaving aside the question of whether or not the 
hearer can properly understand the speaker‟s intention, the speaker presents the 
condition if you’re hungry as DESIRABLE or felicitous. 
However, just because the speaker assigns the value of Desirability, leaving 
aside the question of whether or not the hearer can properly understand his/her 
intention, it does not mean that the speaker ignores the hearer.  Rather, the speaker 
gives the offer in response to the hearer‟s direct or indirect request.  This is the 
second point:  SACs are classified into what is called given conditionals (cf. Sweetser 
(1990:129)).  By the term given, I mean that the hearer gives the speaker some pieces 
of information relevant to the protasis or that a background against which the protasis 
is presented is already accepted or shared in the minds of the speaker and hearer.  In 
fact, in almost all cases, the speaker utters the statement if you want or if you’re hungry 
on the basis of the hearer‟s words or behaviors. 
Let us take sentence (35) for instance.  If the speaker utters sentence (35) 
without proper context (e.g. at the beginning of the conversation), the hearer may be 
perplexed in understanding the speaker‟s intention conveyed in the utterance.  At 
least, the hearer would not easily understand why his/her interlocutor has said so.  
Usually, sentence (35) should be interpreted as “If you‟re hungry (as you seem to be/as 
you say), the fridge is on the landing (, so you may eat some food in the fridge).”  As 
the first parenthesized expressions in the protasis indicate, the protasis expresses 
information which the speaker has just received from the hearer.  In this case, judging 
from the look of the hearer or from what s/he says (by implication), the speaker infers 
that the hearer is hungry.  It follows that in a sense, the hearer elicits the utterance 
from the speaker, and thus both the speaker and hearer know what is DESIRABLE or 
                                                     
20 See also footnote 19. 
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UNDESIRABLE.  As argued above, Desirability is given exclusively by the speaker, 
not the hearer.  However, in such a case as (35), it is probable that the hearer induces 
the speaker to make a DESIRABLE/UNDESIRABLE utterance.  Thus the hearer can 
easily read the speaker‟s mental attitude, i.e. DESIRABLE or UNDESIRABLE, even 
if it is not linguistically manifested. 
Now, I am in a position to answer the question why one can properly interpret 
Type 1 J-SACs.  The answer is summarized as follows: 
 (41) In Type 1 J-SACs, the apodosis works as a reference point for the hearer to 
access an implicit conclusion.  In addition, the Desirability Principle helps 
to limit the potential conclusions and to single out the proper illocutionary 
force intended by the speaker. 
 
3.4.2.3. Summary 
  This section has dealt with Type 1 J-SACs and the mechanism of their 
interpretation.  I have shown that Sakahara‟s (1985) analysis of Type 1 J-SACs is 
motivated by the reference point ability and the Desirability Principle.  To put it more 
precisely, it has been made clear that one can properly interpret Type 1 J-SACs by 
virtue of these two mechanisms.  Due to these mechanisms, one can properly use the 
apodosis of a Type 1 J-SAC as a clue to find an implicit conclusion.   
 
3.5.  The Nature of Type 2 J-SACs 
  Now, let us turn to the other type of speech-act domain conditionals in Japanese, 
i.e. Type 2 J-SACs.  Before a detailed discussion, recall the characteristics of Type 2 
J-SACs pointed out above: 
 (42) a.  Type 2 J-SACs require speech-act verbs. 
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   b.  The apodosis of Type 2 J-SACs does not function as a clue to reach an 
implicit conclusion. 
The characteristics in (42) give rise to the following questions: 
 (43) a.  What is the function of speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs? 
   b.  What is the status of the surface apodosis of Type 2 J-SACs? 
In the following subsections, I will address the two questions in (43).  The main 
claims are the following: (i) the apodosis of Type 2 J-SACs is fake in that the real 
apodosis is a speech-act verb, and (ii) The speech-act verb functions as a connector to 
establish and maintain the relevance between the protasis and apodosis. 
 
3.5.1.  Identity of the Apodosis of Type 2 J-SACs 
  In order to give reasonable answers to the questions in (43), the nature of the 
apodosis of Type 2 J-SACs should be considered.  As a first step, let us compare the 
apodosis of Type 1 J-SACs and that of Type 2 J-SACs.  Examine the following 
examples: 
 (44) a.  nanika    tabe-tai nara, reezooko-ni tabemono-ga aru-wayo.  
     something eat-want  if   fridge-Loc food-Nom exist-Part 
     „If you want to eat something, there is food in the fridge.‟   
(= (1)) 
   b.  kyoomi-ga   aru nara osieru   ga,  Isida Zyun‟iti-no 
     interest-Nom  you-have if inform but   Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen 
       hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da. 
     real name-Top Ishida Taro Cop 
     „If you‟re interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro 
Ishida.‟ 
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(= (2)) 
As discussed above, a chain of inferences is involved in the proper interpretation of 
sentence (44a).  In other words, the hearer of sentence (44a) uses the apodosis of the 
sentence as a reference point to access the implicit conclusion or illocutionary force 
(i.e. offer/permission in this case) with the help of the Desirability Principle.  As a 
result, s/he may eat the food in the fridge, as expected by the speaker.  That is to say, 
the surface expression (what is said) and the intended meaning (what is meant) in the 
apodosis are different (cf. Grice (1975)):  superficially, the utterance is a statement, 
but in fact, the true illocutionary force intended by the speaker is an offer.  To put it 
differently, this speech act embodies an expectation on the part of the speaker to get 
the hearer to do something.  In the case of (44a), for example, the speaker expects the 
hearer to have the food in the fridge.  Therefore, sentence (44a) is an instance of 
indirect speech acts in the sense of Searle (1979). 
  On the other hand, the apodosis of sentence (44b) is a pure statement.  The 
purpose of uttering it is to give the information conveyed by the statement.  In 
contrast to (44a), the speaker of sentence (44b) does not expect the hearer to do 
something: the speaker presents the propositional content Isida Zyun’iti-no 
hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo-da „Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro Ishida‟ as 
representing an actual state of affairs (cf. Vanparys (1996:18)).   In this sense, 
sentence (44b) has no particular illocutionary force inducing the hearer to do 
something.21 
  Furthermore, a closer examination of the examples in (44) reveals the following 
                                                     
21 In general, a statement or assertion as well as a permission or offer is included in illocutionary 
forces.  By the phrase have no particular illocutionary force, I mean that the speech act at issue does 
not embody an effort on the part of the speaker to get the hearer to take action.  For more details on 
the classification of illocutionary forces in mainstream speech-act theory, see Vanparys (1996). 
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fact.  In (44a), the statements in the protasis and apodosis are semantically relevant in 
that both clauses refer to food.  Put more specifically, one can easily notice that both 
of the statements are related to each other in terms of food, which is explicitly 
presented by the words tabe(-ru) „eat‟ and tabemono „food‟.22  In the case of (44b), 
on the other hand, there is no such direct semantic connection between the statements 
kyoomi-ga aru „be interested‟ and Isida Zyun’iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo-da 
„Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro Ishida‟.  Rather, the semantic relevance can be 
found between the statement kyoomi-ga aru and the speech-act verb osieru „inform‟:  
the semantic relation found between the two expressions, i.e. kyoomi-ga aru and 
osieru, is causality.  Because the speaker assumes that the hearer is interested in the 
topic about the actor Jun-ichi Ishida, he/she gives the information about his real name 
to the hearer.  In other words, the hearer‟s interest causes the event of the speaker‟s 
giving information, and the event is explicitly stated by the speech-act verb.  In this 
sense, Type 2 J-SACs are similar to content domain conditionals. 
  The differences in characteristics between the apodosis of Type 1 J-SACs and 
that of Type 2 J-SACs revealed in this subsection can be summarized as follows: 
 (45) a.  The apodoses of Type 1 J-SACs function as indirect speech acts, while 
those of Type 2 J-SACs do not. 
   b.  The protasis and apodosis of Type 1 J-SACs are semantically relevant 
to each other, while those of Type 2 J-SACs are not.  Instead, in Type 
2 J-SACs, it is not between the protasis and apodosis but between the 
protasis and the speech-act verb where causality is established. 
                                                     
22 In some cases, the relevance between protases and apodoses is not explicitly stated.  In sentence 
(22), for example, it appears that there is no semantic relevance between the statement mosi 
onozomi-desi tara „if you want‟ and the statement syokkidana-no ue-ni bisuketto-ga ari-masu-yo „there  
are biscuits on the sideboard‟.  However, recall that a chain of inferences is involved in this case; that 
is, the relevance of the two statements is established by virtue of the chain of inferences. 
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With these findings in mind, let me turn to the investigation of the relationships among 
the three components of Type 2 J-SACs: protases, speech-act verbs, and apodoses. 
 
3.5.2.  Fake Apodosis and Connector 
 In this subsection, I will show that Type 2 J-SACs are syntactically divided into 
two coordinated conjuncts.  In addition, I will show that their “true apodoses” are not 
the main clause but the speech-act verb.  Let us investigate the following pair: 
 (46) a. * kyoomi-ga aru nara, Isida Zyun‟iti-no hommyoo-wa IsidaTaroo da. 
    „If you‟re interested, Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro Ishida.‟ 
   b. * kyoomi-ga  aru  nara, Isida  Zyun‟iti-no hommyoo-wa 
     interest-Nom you-have if Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen real name-Top 
      Isida Taroo  da  to  osieru. 
     Ishida Taro  Cop Comp inform 
     „If you‟re interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro 
Ishida.‟ 
(46a) is not acceptable because of the absence of a speech-act verb such as osieru, as 
previously pointed out.  Interestingly enough, (46b) is also unacceptable, although a 
speech-act verb (i.e. osieru „inform‟) occurs in the unmarked word order of Japanese 
(i.e. SOV).23  Compare (46b) with the well-formed example in (44b), repeated here as 
                                                     
23 Naoaki Wada (personal communication) has pointed out to me that the following example, wherein 
the speech-act verb osieru „inform‟ occurs in the unmarked word order of Japanese, is more acceptable 
than example (46b) : 
 (i) ? kyoomi-ga  aru-nara,  Isida Zyun‟iti-no  hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da to 
   interest-Nom you-have-if Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen real name-Top Ishida Taro Cop Comp 
   osieteage-masu yo. 
  tell-and-give-Pol  Part 
  „If you‟re interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro Ishida.‟ 
A possible explanation of this phenomenon is as follows.  As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4 
(Section 4.4.1.2), the grammaticality of Type 2 J-SACs is dependent on the degree of addressee- 
orientedness.  The following three expressions render sentence (i) more acceptable than sentence 
(46b): the speech-act verb osieteageru „inform and give‟, the politeness marker masu, and the particle 
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(47): 
 (47)   kyoomi-ga aru nara osieru ga, Isida Zyun‟iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida 
Taroo da. 
     „If you‟re interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro 
Ishida.‟ 
As the translations show, the meanings intended in (46b) and (47) are identical, but 
(47) alone is a well-formed expression.  It is clear that the difference in their 
acceptability is attributed to their syntactic forms, as illustrated bellow: 
 (48) a. * kyoomi-ga aru nara,[VP[S‟[SIsida Zyun‟iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo 
da] to] osieru]. 
   b.  kyoomi-ga aru nara [Vosieru] ga, [SIsida Zyun‟iti-no hommyoo-wa 
Isida Taroo da]. 
As indicated in (48a), the reported clause S of sentence (46b) is embedded in the VP.  
In (47), on the other hand, the reported clause S is syntactically independent from the 
verb osieru „inform‟ in the nara-clause, as shown in (48b).  Note also that in sentence 
(47), the conjunction ga „but‟ occurs.  Conjunctions such as ga or kedo (see the gloss 
in (15b)) are generally categorized as coordinate conjunctions and used to combine 
two independent clauses.  Thus, the reported clause can be regarded as an 
independent clause rather than a subordinate clause.  Given this, Type 2 J-SACs are 
composed of three clauses like the following:24 
                                                                                                                                                                     
yo.  Of the three expressions, masu and yo are classified as addressee-oriented expressions, which 
semantically presuppose the existence of an addressee (cf. Hirose (1995)).  With regard to the 
speech-act verb osieteageru, note that it is composed of two parts: the main verb osieru „inform‟ and 
the light verb ageru „give‟.  That is, the literal meaning of osieteageru is “to give information to the 
addressee by telling it”.  By virtue of the three addressee-oriented expressions, the degree of 
addressee-orientedness and speaker involvement (cf. Maat and Degand (2001)) in (i) are high, which 
triggers C-gravitation (cf. Wada (2005)) : the function of linking the nara-clause and main clause is 
inherited from the speech-act verb to the C-gravitation of clause linkage.  For more details, see 
Chapter 4. 
24 Here, I regard osieru „inform‟ as a clause in which a subject and an object is omitted. 
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 (49)   [CS[CLAUSE-1kyoomi-ga aru nara] [CLAUSE-2osieru]]-ga, [CLAUSE-3Isida 
Zyun‟iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da] 
As illustrated in (49), the conditional sentence (CS) and the verb osieru constitute a 
closely connected set and the conjunction ga introduces the independent clause 
CLAUSE-3.  In addition, as discussed in the previous subsection, it is the verb osieru 
„inform‟ that makes a semantic relationship, i.e. causality, with the nara-clause.  It 
follows that the true apodosis of the nara-clause is not CLAUSE-3, but CLAUSE-2.  
Let us call such a superficial main clause, i.e. CLAUSE-3, a fake apodosis. 
  As already stated, what is directly related to the nara-clause is not the fake 
apodosis, but the speech-act verb osieru „inform‟.  That is to say, the fake apodosis is 
semantically connected to the nara-clause through the intermediation of the verb 
osieru „inform‟.  In fact, the following examples indicate that the presence of 
speech-act verbs is a crucial factor in the licensing of Type 2 J-SACs:25 
 (50) a. * kyoomi-ga aru nara   (ga), Isida Zyun‟iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida 
Taroo da.  (→osieru is eliminated) 
   b.  kyoomi-ga aru nara osieru   . Isida Zyun‟iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida 
Taroo da. (→ga is eliminated) 
My claim that the fake apodosis is an independent clause is corroborated by example 
(50b):  in (50b), a pause (indicated by the period) is inserted between the verb osieru 
and its subsequent sentence.  In this case, the conjunction ga can be omitted.  
Comparing (50a) and (50b), I conclude that in Type 2 J-SACs, speech-act verbs are 
                                                     
25 Hiroaki Konno (personal communication) has pointed out to me that the acceptability of example 
(50a) is improved by inserting the word desu between nara and the conjunction ga, as in: 
 (i) ? kyoomi-ga aru nara desu ga, Isida Zyun‟iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo desu. 
In addition to inserting desu, the particle da is replaced by its polite form desu.  The word desu is a 
polite form of the assertion marker da, and thus it can be regarded as a kind of addressee-oriented 
expression in the sense of Hirose (1995).  The relationships between the acceptability of Type 2 
J-SACs with no speech-act verbs and addressee-orientedness will be discussed at length in Chapter 4. 
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much more important than coordinate conjunctions such as ga or kedo to connect the 
nara-clause and the fake apodosis. 
  The reason for this is that the fake apodosis is the clausal argument of the 
speech-act verb osieru, and their semantic relation is still strong, even if they are 
syntactically separated.  One might argue that it is not reasonable to regard the two 
syntactically-separated elements as being in predicate-argument relation.  However, 
this is not to the point.  As already pointed out in the previous subsection, the purpose 
of uttering the fake apodosis is to give the information stated in it, and the act of giving 
information is explicitly expressed in Type 2 J-SACs.  The relationship between the 
verb osieru and the fake apodosis is that of the action of giving information and the 
information given by the action.  Thus, it is safe to say that the fake apodosis is the 
clausal argument of the speech-act verb osieru „inform‟.26 
  Now, the relationships among a nara-clause, a speech-act verb and a fake 
apodosis can be illustrated as follows: 
 (51)  
 
 
In (51), the coordinate conjunction phrase containing a speech-act verb is referred to as 
connector, because it functions as a “bridge” which semantically connects the 
nara-clause and the fake apodosis Y.  As argued earlier, a causal link in Type 2 
J-SACs is guaranteed by the nara-clause and the connector.  On the other hand, the 
semantic relation between the connector and the fake apodosis is established by the 
predicate-argument link.  That is, the connector establishes the relevance of the 
                                                     
26 Huddleston and Pullum (2002:740) make a similar comment on the apodoses of English Type 2 
SACs. 
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nara-clause and the fake apodosis by intervening between the two parts.  If the 
connector is omitted, no causal relation could be expressed, and no relation could be 
established between the protasis and the fake apodosis, especially in the hearer‟s mind.  
Because the statement in the fake apodosis is construed to be the effect or product of 
the speech act denoted by the speech-act verb, there is no direct relationship between 
the nara-clause and the fake apodosis in the first place. 
  To sum up, a speech-act verb serves as a connector relating a nara-clause with 
its fake apodosis.  In Type 2 J-SACs, a causal link is established between speech-act 
verbs and nara-clauses, while fake apodoses are semantically connected to their 
antecedent clauses with the help of the speech-act verbs.  In other words, the presence 
of the speech-act verbs as connectors makes it easy for us to find causal relations at the 
speech act level, and guarantees the relevance between nara-clauses and their fake 
apodoses. 
 
3.5.3.  From the Viewpoint of Mental Space Theory 
  As seen above, speech-act verbs such as yuu „tell‟ and osieru „inform‟ function 
as connectors relating nara-clauses and their fake apodoses.  This idea is 
corroborated in terms of Mental Space theory (Fauconnier (1985, 1997)).27  In Mental 
Space theory, a connector is defined as an element that links mental spaces:  a 
connector relates elements across spaces, and more generally, structures across spaces 
(Fauconnier (1997:39)).  Here let us assume that the speech-act verbs at issue are 
linguistic realizations of connectors in this sense. 
  For a better understanding of the relationship between mental spaces and 
conditionals, let us observe the following example: 
                                                     
27 For more details about Mental Space theory, see Fauconnier (1985, 1997). 
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 (52)   If his computer gets repaired, he‟ll finish the paper by Friday. 
(Dancygier and Sweetser (2000:114)) 
Sentence (52) is an example of content-domain conditionals.  In (52), the speaker sets 
up a space of mental content (i.e. content-domain), which is about a possible state of 
affairs in the world, namely the computer getting repaired.  Within this 
content-domain space, the speaker predicts an added aspect of the content of this 
mental space:  the paper will be finished by Friday.  This can be illustrated as 
follows: 
 (53) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Dancygier and Sweetser (2000:114)) 
As seen in figure (53), on the basis of the base space which reflects the state of affairs 
in the actual world, the if-clause builds the Future Space (= P) or hypothetical space, in 
which the speaker predicts that he will finish the paper by Friday (= Q).28  It should 
be noted that the speaker‟s prediction Q is described in the circle denoting the mental 
space built by the if-clause.  In this sense, the protasis and apodosis in sentence (52) 
belong to the same mental space.  In other words, the protasis and apodosis are 
directly or internally related. 
                                                     
28 In figure (53), Dancygier and Sweetser (2000) posit a Counter-Future Space (~Q) to illustrate a 
pragmatic phenomenon called invited inference (cf. Geis and Zwicky (1971)). 
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  Let us turn to Type 2 J-SACs.  Observe sentence (46), repeated here as (54) for 
ease of reference: 
 (54)   kyoomi-ga aru nara osieru ga, Isida Zyun‟iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida 
Taroo da. 
     „If you‟re interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro 
Ishida.‟ 
As argued earlier, sentence (54) is uttered to inform the hearer of the actor‟s real name.  
In this case, the nara-clause sets up a discourse context, a speech-act space wherein 
the hearer is interested in the actor, including his real name.  At the same time, using 
the nara-clause expresses the speaker‟s uncertainty about the hearer‟s interest in the 
topic: the speaker hypothesize that the hearer is interested in Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real 
name.  In this sense, the nara-clause sets up a hypothetical mental space.  On the 
other hand, the fake apodosis describes the fact that Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro 
Ishida.  Or at least, it describes what the speaker recognizes as a fact.  That is, in 
contrast to the case of (52), the fake apodosis belongs to a different mental space, 
namely, a factual space.29 It follows that the mental spaces H and F are not directly or 
internally related with each other.  In order to relate the two spaces, a connector 
should be required.  It is a speech-act verb that functions as a connector.  Observe 
the following figure, which clearly illustrates the point: 
 (55) kyoomi-ga aru nara osieru ga, Isida Zyun‟iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da. 
    H-Space     F-Space 
The capitals H, C and F stand for the hypothetical mental space set up by the 
nara-clause, the connector and the factual mental space to which the statement in the 
main clause belongs, respectively.  As seen in figure (55), the H-Space and F-Space 
                                                     
29 We use F to refer to a factual space in order to avoid confusion with the term base space. 
C 
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are connected to each other by the connector.  A parallelism can be seen between 
figure (55) and figure (51).  From the parallelism, it is safe to say that the speech-act 
verbs occurring in Type 2 J-SACs are the linguistic realizations of connectors in the 
sense of Mental Space theory.  As such, speech-act verbs play an important part in 
structuring mental spaces.  In this way, the view that the protases and fake apodoses 
are semantically connected by speech-act verbs is supported or endorsed by the Mental 
Space theory. 
 
3.5.4.  Is the Apodosis of Type 1 J-SACs Also Fake? 
  As seen above, the apodoses of Type 2 J-SACs are not real but fake in the sense 
that causal relations are established between their protases and speech-act verbs (e.g. 
osieru „inform‟ and yuu „tell‟).  Put more precisely, there is no immediately accessible 
knowledge which would support causal relations between the protases and fake 
apodoses.  It might be argued, however, that this idea is also applicable to the 
apodoses of Type 1 J-SACs; that is, the apodoses of Type 1 J-SACs are also fake 
apodoses.  Observe the example in (43a) again, repeated here as (56): 
 (56)   nanika    tabe-tai nara, reezooko-ni tabemono-ga aru-wayo.  
     something eat-want  if   fridge-Loc food-Nom exist-Part 
     „If you want to eat something, there is food in the fridge.‟ 
It is true that in sentence (56), there is no immediately accessible knowledge which 
would support a causal relation between the hearer‟s wish and the existence of food in 
the fridge.  In this sense, the apodosis there is food in the fridge might be regarded as 
a fake apodosis. 
  This argument is not to the point, however.  Recall here that a chain of 
inferences is involved in the interpretation of Type 1 J-SACs, as discussed in the 
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previous section.  That is, to interpret sentence (56), one has to follow a procedure 
like the following: 
 (57) nanika tabetai nara  reezooko-ni tabemono-ga aru 
   „if you want to eat something‟ „there is food in the fridge‟ 
    [premise]    [intermediate step 1] 
   tabemono-wa taberu-tameni aru  tabete-yoi / tabe-nasai 
   „food is there to be eaten‟   „you may eat it / eat it‟ 
    [intermediate step 2]    [final conclusion] 
In interpreting sentence (56), the hearer starts his/her reasoning with the premise, goes 
through the two (or more) intermediate steps, reaching the final conclusion.  In this 
process, the intermediate steps can be regarded as provisional conclusions in that they 
are drawn from the previous premises:  intermediate step 1 is drawn from the premise 
as a provisional conclusion, and in turn, intermediate step 1 works as a premise to 
draw another provisional conclusion (intermediate step 2), and then the second 
provisional conclusion functions as a premise to draw the final conclusion.30  Thus, it 
is safe to say that causality is guaranteed in each step: between the premise and 
intermediate step 1, between intermediate step 1 and intermediate step 2, and between 
intermediate step 2 and the final conclusion.  This means that the chain of inferences 
guarantees the causal relation in Type 1 J-SACs:  the intermediate steps can be 
regarded as conclusions, if not final.  
  Furthermore, the view that the apodosis of a Type 1 J-SAC should be regarded 
as real is valid from the viewpoint of Mental Space theory.  As argued above, the 
protasis and apodosis of a Type 1 J-SACs are semantically relevant to each other.  For 
                                                     
30 In this sense, Type 1 SACs are closer to epistemic conditionals.  I will discuss this matter briefly in 
Section 3.6. 
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instance, the protasis and apodosis of the statement If you want to eat something, there 
is food in the fridge are related in terms of food or eating act.  Specifically, the clause 
if you want to eat something sets up a discourse context, a speech-act space wherein 
the statement there is food in the fridge makes sense and is taken as effective.  It 
follows that the protasis and apodosis belong to the same mental space and are 
internally related, which is parallel with the case of standard predictive conditional 
sentences, i.e. content-domain conditionals, such as (52). 
  From the above discussion, it seems reasonable to conclude that the apodosis of 
Type 1 J-SACs can be regarded as a real apodosis.31  This is a crucial difference 
between Type 1 and Type 2 J-SACs in terms of the relationship between their protases 
and apodoses. 
 
3.5.5.  Why Do Type 2 J-SACs Not Allow the Unmarked Word Order of Japanese? 
  Before concluding this section, I note here that there remains a problem:  why 
should the speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs occur not after but before the fake 
apodoses, as shown in (46b)?  Observe sentence (46b), repeated here as (58): 
 (58)  * kyoomi-ga  aru  nara, Isida Zyun‟iti-no hommyoo-wa 
     interest-Nom you-have if Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen real name-Top 
      Isida Taro  da  to  osieru. 
     Ishida Taro Cop Comp inform 
     „If you‟re interested, I inform you Jun‟ichi Isida‟s real name is Taro 
Ishida.‟ 
Admittedly, I am not in a position to give any clear answer to this question.  However, 
                                                     
31 In contrast with my view, Declerck and Reed (2001) refer to the apodosis of this kind as a 
pseudo-apodosis, because it represents an intermediate step of a reasoning process, not the final 
conclusion.  However, this view is not valid for the reason just given. 
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as will be discussed in the next chapter, such verbs can be analyzed as markers of 
addressee-oriented expressions and they must occur before superficial apodoses in 
order to indicate that the fake apodoses are public expressions (speech acts given to 
addressees). 32   Without them, the fake apodoses might be interpreted as 
speaker-oriented expressions (private expressions), which is not compatible with the 
addressee-oriented characteristics of SACs. 
  This view is quite compatible with Dancygier‟s (1998:91) comment that the 
protases of speech-act conditionals in general are stylistic devices meant to ensure 
appropriateness of what is communicated in their apodoses, often, not exclusively, by 
making them more polite.  Furthermore, Tsubomoto (1993:122) states that in many 
cases, SACs are used as rhetorical expressions which represent the speaker‟s (or 
writer‟s) consideration for the hearer (or reader).  That is to say, they are used as a 
kind of introductory remark.  In fact, the form X-ga/kedo „X, but‟ is often used as an 
introductory remark, as in sumimasen ga „Excuse me, but‟, zannen desu ga „I regret to 
say‟, kokodake no hanashi dakedo „between you and me‟, and the like.33  If the 
speech-act verbs are placed in the unmarked order SOV, it means that Type 2 J-SACs 
cannot function adequately as an introductory remark.  Given this, it is expected that 
the X nara yuu (osieru / kiku) ga-clause in Type 2 J-SACs has, to some extent, become 
a fixed, grammaticalized expression, although the value of X in the frame is 
contextually assigned. 
                                                     
32 The terms addressee-oriented expression, public expression, and private expression are drawn from 
Hirose (1995).  According to Hirose (1995:226), an addressee-oriented expression is defined as a 
linguistic expression that semantically presupposes the existence of an addressee; the concepts „public 
expression‟ and „private expression‟ refer to two different levels of linguistic expression which 
correspond to two different functions of language.  The former is the level of linguistic expression 
corresponding to the communicative function of language, whereas the latter is the level of linguistic 
expression corresponding to the non-communicative, thought-expressing function of language.  For 
more details, see Hirose (1995, 1997) and Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
33 For more details about Japanese introductory remarks, see Tamon (2008). 
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3.5.6.  Summary 
  This section has focused on Type 2 J-SACs and chiefly addressed the following 
questions: 
 (59) a.  What is the function of speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs? 
   b.  What is the status of the surface apodosis of Type 2 J-SACs? 
 (= (43)) 
The respective answers to these questions are summarized as follows: 
 (60) a  The speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs function as connectors:  they 
semantically connect nara-clauses and fake apodoses, and their 
presence guarantees causality. 
   b.  The apodosis of Type 2 J-SACs is fake in that it has no direct semantic 
relationship with the protasis. 
 
3.6.  Concluding Remarks 
  In this chapter, I argued that speech-act conditionals in Japanese (J-SACs) must 
be classified on the basis of their characteristics into two types, i.e. Type 1 J-SACs and 
Type 2 J-SACs.  In Type 1 J-SACs, which do not require speech-act verbs, their 
apodoses serve as reference points to access implicit conclusions, i.e. speech acts 
intended by the speaker.  In combination with reference points, a pragmatic principle 
referred to as the Desirability Principle plays a key role in facilitating the interpretation 
of Type 1 J-SACs.  On the other hand, Type 2 J-SACs require speech-act verbs to 
explicitly express or guarantee causal relations and to establish semantic relevance 
between their protases and fake apodoses. 
  In concluding this chapter, a few further remarks should be made.  First, as 
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alluded to above, Type 1 J-SACs are similar to epistemic conditionals in that causal 
relations are guaranteed at the inference level.  Type 2 J-SACs, on the other hand, are 
similar to content domain conditionals in that causal relations are guaranteed at the 
event level.  This alludes to the possibility that Type 1 J-SACs are developed from 
epistemic-domain conditionals, while Type 2 J-SACs from content-domain 
conditionals.  The diachronic development process of J-SACs may also be an 
interesting issue, although I will not go into further detail here. 
  Second, it is worth noting that Japanese conditionals have specialized forms for 
the two types of SACs as well as for the conditionals in the other two domains.  That 
is, the forms of Japanese conditionals, in many cases, reflect the difference in the three 
domains and the two types of J-SACs.  In English, on the other hand, a single 
conditional form can be used in all the domains, according to contexts.  Take the 
following English sentence for example: 
 (61)   If Mary comes, John will go out. 
If this sentence describes an event in the real world, the most natural interpretation of 
sentence (61) is the content domain reading:  the event of Mary’s coming will trigger 
the event of John’s going out.  In some other situations, however, (61) can be 
interpreted as an epistemic conditional.  Imagine a situation where the speaker knows 
that Mary always comes when John goes out, and the speaker utters this sentence on 
hearing the news of Mary‟s coming.  In this situation, sentence (61) represents the 
speaker‟s inference or prediction.  The unmarked interpretation in this case is the 
epistemic reading: the speaker‟s knowledge of Mary‟s coming draws his/her 
conclusion John will go out. 
  Furthermore, sentence (61) can be interpreted even as a speech-act conditional in 
some contexts.  Let us assume that (61) is uttered to a third person, namely, Tom.  
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The speaker knows that Tom loves Mary, but Mary herself does not know it.  John‟s 
presence prevents Tom from confessing his love to her.  The speaker is informed of 
John‟s leaving by another person.  Also, the speaker is sure that if Tom is informed of 
John‟s going out, he will tell Mary how much he loves her.  In this situation, sentence 
(61) can be interpreted as a speech-act domain conditional, i.e. Type 1 SAC.  That is, 
the if-clause is asserted to be a felicity condition for a speech act about the apodosis, 
and the apodosis embodies an effort on the part of the speaker to get Tom to confess 
his love to Mary, i.e. encouragement. 
  In this way, with regard to English conditionals, even an alleged typical example 
of content domain conditionals can be interpreted in three ways without changing its 
form, depending on the contexts where it is uttered.34  In this light, it is reasonable to 
suppose that the difference in the domains (polysemy, by extension) is hardly, if ever, 
reflected on the forms in English. 
  As for Japanese conditionals, this kind of ambiguity is kept to the minimum with 
the help of the four conditional markers (i.e. nara, reba, tara, and to) and other 
linguistic equipment such as addressee-oriented expressions and epistemic markers 
(e.g. yuu „tell‟, -yo (an addressee-oriented expression), noda (an epistemic marker of 
assertion), and the like).  That is to say, the three domains and the forms of 
conditionals often, if not always, correspond one-to-one to each other.  Let us take, 
for example, the Japanese counterparts to the three interpretations of (61): 
 (62) a.  Mearii-ga ki-tara,  Zyon-wa  dekakeru. (= content domain) 
     Mary-Nom come-if  John-Top go out 
     „If Mary comes, John will go out.‟ 
   b.  Mearii-ga kuru-no  nara,  Zyon-wa  dekakeru-noda.(= epistemic) 
                                                     
34 A quite similar discussion is developed by Sweetser (1990:123-125). 
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     Mary-Nom come-Ep if John-Top go out-Ep 
     „If Mary comes, John will go out.‟ 
   c.  Mearii-ga kuru nara osieteageru-kedo, Zyon-wa dekakeru-yo. 
   (= speech act) 
     Mary-Nom come if I tell you-but John-Top go out-AO 
     „If Mary comes, I tell you John will go out.‟ 
As seen in (62), Japanese conditionals in the three domains are disambiguated by 
different markers, represented in italics.  For example, in (62a), the conditional 
marker tara is used.  As Masuoka (1993:3) points out, tara mainly expresses the 
temporal interdependency of the events described in protases and apodoses, and it is a 
specialized marker of content domain conditionals.35  In the same way, the epistemic 
marker noda is used to indicate that sentence (62b) is an epistemic conditional.  In 
(62c), it is apparent that the sentence is a speech act conditional by virtue of nara as a 
marker of speech-act conditionals, osieru „inform‟ and -yo (an addressee-oriented 
expression).36 
  These observations suggest that Japanese conditionals are easier than English 
ones to disambiguate, owing to the specialized makers.  It is true that Type 1 SACs in 
Japanese are similar to epistemic conditionals, and Type 2 J-SACs are similar to 
content domain conditionals in some respects; however, this raises no problem in use.  
In fact, their superficial similarities partly contribute to the disambiguation of 
                                                     
35 The content-domain conditional markers tara and reba can be used as SACs in some restricted 
situations.  However, the speech-act use of tara and reba is their secondary use.  For more details, 
see Tsunoda (2004). 
36 Note here that sentence (62c) is a Type 2 SAC syntactically and, at the same time, a Type 1 SAC in 
terms of its interpretation.  As discussed in Section 3.5, the presence of speech-act verbs such as yuu 
„tell‟ and osieru „inform‟ has a lot to do with the relevance between protases and fake apodoses.  With 
regard to this example, the relationship between the contents of the protasis and that of the fake 
apodosis seems to be as weak as in Type 2 SACs in general in that the causal relation established 
between the event in the nara-clause and the one in the (fake) apodosis is weak. 
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conditional constructions.  It should be considered where the difference between 
Japanese conditionals and English conditionals comes from. 
  Recall here that the three domains themselves are linked via conceptual 
metaphors, as argued in Section 3.2.1.  It is reasonable to attribute this difference to 
the difference between Japanese and English in the extensibility by virtue of metaphor:  
the system of grammar in English tends to be affected by metaphor, while the system 
of grammar in Japanese is not, compared with English.  Although metaphor is 
pervasive in Japanese as well as in English in terms of lexical meanings, its 
extensibility to their grammars is different.  In this connection, Yasui (2005:14) refers 
to Japanese as an “analytic-extension language,” which is disposed to expand its 
expressive variation in expression by the combination of words.  That is, Japanese is 
not very good at extending its grammatical variations via the system of metaphor, 
including metonymy.  English, on the other hand, is referred to as a “metonymic- 
extension language,” which tends to expand their grammatical variations via 
metonymy in a positive manner.  That is, English is very good at extending its 
grammatical variations via the system of metaphor as well as metonymy.37, 38 The 
ambiguity of English conditionals illustrated by example (61) can be attributed to this 
extensibility:  English is good at extending its grammatical variations via metaphor 
and metonymy, which enables a single form to express multiple meanings. 
  In light of this, using special markers to refer to particular domains is a 
realization of a kind of last resort:  in Japanese, there is no means to reflect the 
                                                     
37 Yasui (2005) himself does not refer to the influence of metaphor on grammar.  However, I assume 
that metonymy and metaphor can be regarded as variants of the similar cognitive system in a broader 
sense.  In this connection, Taniguchi (2003) points out that metaphor and metonymy are not 
incompatible, and that they sometimes overlap with each other and constitute a moderate continuum.  
In addition, Halliday (1994) deals with three figures of speech, i.e. metaphor, metonymy, and 
synecdoche, in a unified manner in terms of grammatical metaphor.  For more details, see Taniguchi 
(2003:153-170) and Halliday (1994:340-367).  
38 For more details, see Yasui (2005). 
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difference as to the domains other than to use the “analytic” approach.  Hence, the 
various relationships between the protases and apodoses in Japanese SACs (and 
epistemic conditionals) must be explicitly expressed one by one, analytically by using 
specialized linguistic equipment. 
  As discussed so far, the influence of metaphor/metonymy on the system of 
grammar is an interesting theme to be investigated.  English is affected by 
metaphor/metonymy, while Japanese is not.  In the next chapter, I will focus on Type 
2 SACs in Japanese and English, and conduct a contrastive study from the viewpoint 
of addressee-orientedness and the influence of metaphor/metonymy on the system of 
grammar. 
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Chapter 4 
 
A Contrastive Study of English and Japanese Speech-Act 
Conditionals: From the Viewpoint of 
Addressee-Orientedness 
 
4.1.  Introduction: Overview and Questions 
  To begin with, let us have a quick review of Chapter 3, because the discussion in 
this chapter is in part based on the classification and findings there. 
     In Chapter 3, I focused on speech-act conditionals (SACs) in Japanese, and 
classified them into two types.  Let us observe the following examples: 
 (1) a.  nanika    tabe-tai nara, reezooko-ni tabemono-ga aru-wayo. 
     something eat-want  if   fridge-Loc food-Nom exist-Part 
     „If you want to eat something, there is food in the fridge.‟ 
   b.  kyoomi-ga   aru nara osieru   ga,  Isida Zyun‟iti-no 
     interest-Nom  you-have if inform but   Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen 
       hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da. 
     real name-Top Ishida Taro Cop 
     „If you‟re interested, I inform you Junichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro 
Ishida.‟ 
Sentence (1a) is classified into what I refer to as Type 1 SACs (Type 1 J-SACs), and 
sentence (1b) is classified into Type 2 SACs (Type 2 J-SACs).  This classification is 
based on the following characteristics:
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 (2) In Type 1 J-SACs 
   a.  the occurrence of speech-act verbs such as yuu „tell‟ and osieru 
„inform‟ are optional; more naturally, they don‟t occur. 
   b.  their apodoses work as clues to implicit conclusions. 
 (3) In Type 2 J-SACs 
   a.  the occurrence of speech-act verbs such as yuu „tell‟ and osieru 
„inform‟ are obligatory. 
   b.  their apodoses do not work as clues to implicit conclusions. 
A closer observation has revealed the following points: 
 (4)    In Type 1 J-SACs, their apodoses work as reference points to access 
implicit conclusions.  In addition, the Desirability Principle helps to 
limit the potential conclusions and to single out the proper 
illocutionary force intended. 
 (5) a  The speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs function as connectors:  they 
semantically connect nara-clauses and fake apodoses, and their 
presence guarantees causality. 
   b.  The apodosis of Type 2 J-SACs is fake in that it has no direct semantic 
relationship with the protasis. 
As seen in (2)-(5), speech-act verbs play a key role in the differentiation of the two 
types of J-SACs. 
  The comparison of Type 2 J-SACs with English Type 2 SACs (hereafter, Type 2 
E-SACs) shows an interesting phenomenon concerning speech-act verbs in Type 2 
SACs.  Let us observe the following examples: 
 (6) a.  If you want to know, I haven‟t seen him.        (Palmer (1988:154)) 
   b.  If you are interested, Gerald Ford‟s real name is Leslie L. King. 
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(Eilfort (1987:56)) 
   c.  We are now at Kyoto Station, if you don‟t know. 
(Sakahara (1985:153)) 
Here I classify these English speech-act conditionals into Type 2 E-SACs, because 
their counterparts in Japanese require speech-act verbs, as shown below: 
 (7) a.  siri tai nara yuu ga,  watasi-wa kare-ni  atte-inai 
     know want if  tell but, I-Top  him-Dat  see-Neg 
     „If you want to know, I tell you I haven‟t seen him.‟ 
   b.  kyoomi-ga   aru nara osieru   ga,  Isida Zyun‟iti-no 
     interest-Nom  you-have if inform but   Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen 
       hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da. 
     real name-Top Ishida Taro Cop 
     „If you‟re interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro 
Ishida.‟ 
   c.  anata-ga sira nai nara  iimasu ga, ima  wareware-wa  
     you-Nom  know  not if    tell but now we-Top 
     kyooto eki-ni orimasu. 
     Kyoto Station-Loc  are (Pol) 
     „I tell you we are now at Kyoto Station, if you don‟t know.‟ 
In (7), the speech-act verbs in question are represented in italics.  As discussed in 
detail in the previous chapter, Type 2 J-SACs require them for functional reasons.  
Conversely, if the speech-act verbs are deleted, all the sentences in (7) are rendered 
ungrammatical: 
 (8) a. * siri tai nara,  watasi-wa kare-ni  atte-inai 
     know want if    I-Top  him-Dat  see-Neg 
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     „If you want to know, I haven‟t seen him.‟ 
   b. * kyoomi-ga   aru nara, Isida Zyun‟iti-no 
     interest-Nom  you-have if Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen 
       hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da. 
     real name-Top Ishida Taro Cop 
     „If you‟re interested, Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro Ishida.‟ 
   c. * anata-ga sira nai nara, ima  wareware-wa  
     you-Nom  know  not if    now we-Top  
     kyoto eki-ni orimasu. 
     Kyoto Station-Loc  are (Pol) 
     „We are now at Kyoto Station, if you don‟t know.‟ 
In this way, whether Type 2 J-SACs are acceptable or not is crucially influenced by the 
presence of speech-act verbs. 
  Let us turn to Type 2 E-SACs.  In contrast to (8), Type 2 E-SACs do not require 
the presence of speech act expressions.  Observe the examples below: 
 (9) a.  If you want to know, I tell you I haven‟t seen him. 
   b.  If you are interested, I inform you Gerald Ford‟s real name is Leslie L. 
King. 
   c.  I tell you we are now at Kyoto Station, if you don‟t know. 
The sentences in (9) are those with speech-act expressions added to the sentences in 
(6).  In (9), the speech-act verbs at issue, including their subjects and indirect objects, 
are represented in italics.1 As seen from the comparison of (6) with (9), speech-act 
                                                     
1 As shown in the examples in (9), if speech-act verbs are expressed, their subjects and indirect 
objects also have to be explicitly stated in the case of English.  In this thesis, however, we do not 
bring this matter into question. 
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verbs are optional in Type 2 E-SACs. 2 
  From the observations so far, the questions to be answered in this chapter arise, 
as presented in (10): 
 (10) a.  Why are speech-act verbs obligatory in Type 2 J-SACs? 
   b.  Why are speech-act verbs optional in Type 2 E-SACs? 
The main concern of this chapter is with the questions in (10).  Recall that the 
question in (10a) has already been answered in the previous chapter:  speech-act 
verbs are obligatorily required to explicitly express or guarantee causal relations and to 
establish semantic relevance between the protases and fake apodoses.  However, it 
should be noted that this answer is not given to explain the difference between Type 2 
J-SACs and Type 2 E-SACs.  This chapter attempts to answer the questions in (10) 
from a different perspective.  Specifically, I will address the questions in (10) mainly 
in terms of addressee-orientedness and clause linkage.  Furthermore, I will refer to 
the expectation that the property of addressee-orientedness and the extensibility of 
syntactic variations via metonymic operations are closely related to each other. 
  The organization of this chapter is as follows.  Section 4.2 reviews previous 
studies and shows the scope of this chapter.  Section 4.3, as the first step of our 
discussion, reviews the notion of addressee-orientedness on the basis of Hirose (1995, 
1997, 2000).  Section 4.4 gives answers to the questions in (10) in terms of 
addressee-orientedness.  Section 4.5 investigates Type 2 J- and E-SACs in terms of 
clause linkage, adopting the two semantic notions Speaker Involvement (cf. Maat and 
Degand (2001)) and C-gravitation (cf. Wada (2005, 2008, 2010)).  Section 4.6 deals 
                                                     
2 It is true that some native speakers of English judge that the occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 
2 E-SACs is not optional but deviant or anomalous.  Nevertheless, the difference between Type 2 J- 
and E-SACs I point out here still remains.  At the very least, speech-act verbs are required in Type 2 
J-SACs, while they are not required in Type 2 E-SACs. 
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with the mechanism which seems to underpin the addressee-orientedness of English in 
terms of metonymic extensibility (cf. Yasui (2005)) and grammatical metaphor (cf. 
Halliday (1994)).  Section 4.7 gives some concluding remarks. 
 
4.2.  Previous Studies and the Scope of this Chapter 
  Before moving on to a detailed discussion, I refer to previous studies and the 
scope of this chapter. 
 
4.2.1.  Previous Studies 
  As described in Chapter 1, numerous studies have been concerned with 
conditionals and related issues (cf. Arita (1993) and Declerck and Reed (2001)).  
Among them, Nakau (1994), Tsunoda (2004), and Sweetser (1990) study conditionals 
from the viewpoint of polysemy and clausal linkage. 
However, to the best of my knowledge, no study has paid special attention to the 
questions presented in (10).  To put it more precisely, quite a few researchers notice 
the phenomenon at issue, but do not deal with it as a main topic.  As a result, no 
study has yet answered the questions in (10). 
For instance, as seen in Chapter 3, Sakahara (1985) conducts a comprehensive 
study of conditional constructions in Japanese and their interpretations.  Although he 
deals with SACs (i.e. pseudo-conditionals, in his term) in detail, he just gives the 
following remarks on the example in (6c):  the literal translation of conditionals of 
this type into Japanese (i.e. the literal translation of (6c) into (8c)) is sometimes 
“uncomfortable.”  However, all he does in this connection is to point out that 
sentence (7c) is much more desirable or appropriate as the literal translation of (6c).  
He does not give the reason why sentence (7c) is more desirable or “comfortable” than 
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sentence (6c).  Uchida (2001, 2005, 2011) also recognizes the difference between 
English and Japanese as to the occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 SACs and 
related constructions.  From the viewpoint of relevance theory (cf. Sperber and 
Wilson (1995)), he regards the occurrence of speech-act verbs as the linguistic 
realization of higher-level explicatures (cf. Wilson and Sperber (1993)) and points out 
that higher-level explicatures are obligatorily realized in Japanese, while they are 
optional in English.3  However, he does not address the questions why higher-level 
explicatures are obligatorily realized in Japanese and why they do not have to be 
realized in English. 
 
4.2.2.  Scope 
  In this chapter, I will focus on Type 2 SACs, and will not deal with Type 1 SACs.  
The first reason is that Type 1 SACs are well-formed and acceptable without 
speech-act verbs, as in (11): 
 (11) a.  nanika tabetai nara (yuu kedo), reezooko-ni tabemono-ga aru-wayo. 
   b.  If you want to eat something, (I tell you) there is food in the fridge.  
The examples in (11) show that the presence of speech-act verbs does not influence the 
grammaticality of Type 1 SACs.  In Type 1 J-SACs, as well as in Type 1 E-SACs, 
                                                     
3 Higher-level explicatures are defined as conceptual representations constructed by embedding the 
proposition expressed by an utterance under a speech act or propositional attitude description: 
 (i) a. Seriously, I can‟t help you. 
  b. Frankly, I can‟t help you. 
  c. Confidentially, I can‟t help you. 
Following Wilson and Sperber (1993), the higher-level explicatures of the sentences in (i) can be 
represented as follows: 
 (ii) a. I tell you seriously that I can‟t help you. 
  b. I say frankly to you that I can‟t help you. 
  c. I inform you confidentially that I can‟t help you. 
From the paraphrases in (ii), we can see that the sentence adverbs in (i) represent the speaker‟s mental 
attitude toward the utterance I can’t help you.  For more details, see Wilson and Sperber (1993) and 
Uchida (2011). 
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speech-act verbs are optional:  they may be used, but do not have to be (or more 
precisely, the non-occurrence of speech-act verbs is unmarked). 
  Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter, the interpretation of this type 
of SACs demands the mechanism referred to as a chain of inferences (cf. Declerck and 
Reed (2001:320)).  Observe the following figure: 
 (12) nanika tabetai nara   → reezooko-ni tabemono-ga aru 
   „if you want to eat something‟   „there is food in the fridge‟ 
    [premise]   [intermediate step 1] 
   → tabemono-wa taberu-tameni aru → tabete-yoi / tabe-nasai 
     „food is there to be eaten‟ „you may eat it / eat it‟ 
     [intermediate step 2]   [final conclusion] 
Figure (12) represents (an example of) a chain of inferences involved in the 
interpretation of (11).  In interpreting the sentences in (11), the hearer has to follow 
the following process:  the hearer starts his/her reasoning with the premise, goes 
through the two (or more) intermediate steps, and reaches the final conclusion.  As 
already pointed out in Chapter 3, the interpretation of Type 2 SACs, in most cases, 
does not demand such a reasoning process on the part of the hearer.  From the 
observations so far, Type 1 SACs are left out of consideration in this chapter.4 
  With regard to the scope of this chapter, it should be noted that I will treat if and 
nara as the prototypical conditional markers used in E-SACs and J-SACs, respectively.  
As for English, there are few, if any, conditional markers other than if used as a marker 
of SACs (note that the phrase in case is used in the translation of sentence (13) 
below).5  The use of if is overwhelming. 
                                                     
4 As pointed out in Chapter 3, some Type 2 SACs demand a chain of inferences on the part of the 
hearer.  See footnote 36 in Chapter 3. 
5 Declerck and Reed (2001:323) point out that the use of if in SACs is restricted in some cases, as in: 
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  As for Japanese, it is widely acknowledged that there are at least four 
conditional markers: reba, tara, to, and nara.  As Tsunoda (2004) points out, among 
the four markers, nara is the specialized marker of J-SACs.6  By specialized, I do not 
mean that nara is the only conditional marker that can be used in J-SACs.  In fact, 
other markers, namely, reba can be used as in: 
 (13) okizuki-de nake-reba  moosiagemasu ga,   sitagi no suso-ga 
   aware-Cop not-if  I tell you (honorific) but slip-Nom 
   mietemasu-yo. 
   showing-Part 
   „Your slip is showing, in case you are not aware of it.‟ 
(Nakau (1994:106) [italics are mine]) 
However, in most cases, the conditional markers other than nara are not be acceptable, 
as shown below: 
 (14)   ki-ga raku-ni {naru nara /*na-reba /*nat-tara /*naru to} yuu kedo, 
sore-wa kimi-no see dewa nai. 
     „If it will make you feel better, it‟s not your fault.‟ 
The four conditional markers are represented in italics in (14).  In this example, of all 
the four markers, nara alone renders the sentence grammatical. 
  Thus, in the following discussion, I treat if and nara as representative 
conditional markers and leave the other markers out of consideration, except when 
                                                                                                                                                                     
  (i) {In case/*If} you get the wrong idea, their wives approve and get on well when the two 
leaders socialise. 
They attribute the absolute unacceptability of if replacing in case in this example to the fact that the in 
case-clause receives a preclusive (preventative) interpretation:  the speaker wants to prevent the 
addressee getting the wrong idea.  That is, the meaning of sentence (i) should be interpreted as “In 
order to prevent you from getting the wrong idea, I tell you that their wives approve and get on well 
when the two leaders socialise.”  The use of if cannot cover this interpretation.  For more details, see 
Declerck and Reed (2001:323-325). 
6 This is also pointed out by Kuno (1973) and Masuoka (1993). 
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they are used in the examples taken from previous studies. 
   
4.3.  The Addressee-Orientedness of Japanese and English 
  In this section, I will discuss the addressee-orientedness of Japanese and English.  
The following discussion is based on Hirose (1995, 1997, 2000).  Hirose claims that 
linguistic expression acts can be classified into two levels according to their functions: 
public expression act and private expression act.  He refers to linguistic expressions 
for public expression acts and those for private expression acts as public expressions 
and private expressions, respectively.  In what follows, on the basis of the distinction 
between the concepts public expression and private expression, I argue that Type 2 
SACs are public expressions presupposing the presence of an addressee, and that they 
function as markers of public expressions.  
 
4.3.1.  Public and Private Expression (Act) 
  First of all, the concepts „public expression (act)‟ and „private expression (act)‟ 
should be defined.7  Let us review Hirose (1995).  Hirose (1995) recognizes the dual 
nature of linguistic expressions: public expression and private expression.  His 
definition of these concepts is as follows: 
 (15) By the concepts „public expression‟ and „private expression‟, I mean two 
levels of linguistic expression which correspond to two different functions 
                                                     
7 In the following discussion in this section, we are almost exclusively concerned with Japanese 
sentences as examples.  The reason is that the distinction between public expression and private 
expression is more explicitly reflected in Japanese than in English.  However, this does not mean that 
the distinction is never reflected in English expressions: 
 (i) Run! 
 (ii) * I think run. 
Sentence (i) is imperative, and thus is a public expression.  As will be seen below, verbs of thinking 
such as think cannot take public expressions as their reported-clause complement, as shown in (ii).  In 
this way, the distinction between public expression and private expression is valid in English, too. 
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of language.  Public expression is the level of linguistic expression 
corresponding to the communicative function of language, whereas private 
expression is the level of linguistic expression corresponding to the 
non-communicative, thought-expressing function of language. 
(Hirose (1995:226)) 
It goes without saying that language can be used to express our thoughts and 
communicate them to others.  In this light, the act of communicating presupposes the 
act of expressing:  the former may be characterized as a special case of the latter.  In 
other words, communication of thoughts can be defined as expression of thoughts 
conveyed to others.  Hirose (1995) refers to an act of linguistic expression with the 
intention of communication as a public expression act.  Put differently, a public 
expression act is to express our thoughts in language with the intention of 
communicating them by using public expressions. 
  On the other hand, we can express our thoughts without intending to 
communicate something.  For example, suppose you are alone somewhere, thinking 
that you are lonely.  The thought I am lonely is not expressed to communicate in that 
case:  you are just thinking in language, and you should not be thereby 
communicating with anyone.8  In this way, language can be used just for thinking.  
Hirose (1995) refers to an action of thinking in language without communicating to 
anyone as a private expression act.  In other words, a private expression act is to 
express one‟s thought without intending to communicate it to others, and linguistic 
expressions realizing one‟s thoughts are private expressions. 
   
                                                     
8 Note that this does not apply when you are talking to yourself or someone you have in your mind, in 
which case you are using the expression I am lonely for communication (cf. Hirose (1995:226)). 
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4.3.2.  Public Expressions as Addressee-Oriented Expressions 
  Now let us turn to the notion of addressee-orientedness.  Hirose (1995:226) 
points out that there are linguistic expressions that semantically presuppose the 
existence of an addressee.  He refers to such expressions as addressee-oriented 
expressions.  The following is the list of typical addressee-oriented expressions in 
Japanese presented in Hirose (1995:226-227): 
 (16) a. certain sentence-final particles: yo „I tell you‟, ne „you know‟, sa „let me 
tell you‟, wa „I want you to know‟, etc. 
   b. imperative expressions like hashire „Run!‟ 
   c. vocative expressions like ooi/oi „hey‟ 
   d. response expressions like hai/iie „yes/no‟ 
   e. pragmatic adverbials of various sorts: sumimasen ga „Excuse me, but‟, 
zannenn desu ga „I regret to say‟, kokodake no hanasi dakedo „between 
you and me‟, sottyoku ni yuu to „frankly speaking‟, etc. 
   f. polite verbs like desu/masu/(de)gozaimasu 
   g. hearsay expressions like (da)soda/(da)tte „I hear‟ 
Now, the relationships between public/private expression (act) and addressee-oriented 
expressions should be considered.  Hirose (1995:227) states that addressee-oriented 
expressions are, by definition, used only as public expressions.  For example, as 
Hirose states, the polite verbs in (16f) can be said to be addressee-oriented because 
they show respect for the addressee:  showing respect linguistically for the addressee 
is a public expression act.  Thus, phrases and sentences containing addressee-oriented 
expressions function as public expressions. 
  For a better understanding of the relationship between public/private expressions 
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and addressee-orientedness, take the sentence Ame da „It‟s raining‟ for example, taken 
from Hirose (1995).  This sentence consists of the noun ame „rain‟ and the assertive 
copula da.  The sentence can be used as a private expression unless it is used by the 
speaker with the intention of communicating the information Ame da „It‟s raining‟ to 
another person, because it contains no addressee-oriented expression. 
However, just because a sentence contains no addressee-oriented expression 
does not mean that it is exclusively used as a private expression.  A sentence without 
addressee-oriented expressions can also be used as a public expression as long as the 
speaker utters it with the intention of communicating the information conveyed in it to 
others.  For example, if one uses the sentence Ame da „It‟s raining‟ without an 
addressee, whether s/he actually utters it or not, it functions as a private expression; 
because in this case, it is used exclusively to express what s/he thinks.  On the other 
hand, if one utters the sentence, realizing that it is raining, to communicate that 
information to his/her addressees, it functions as a public expression, because in this 
case, it is used for the purpose of communication.  It should be acknowledged, 
however, that it is more natural in conversational Japanese to say Ame da yo „It‟s 
raining, I tell you‟ or Ame da ne „It‟s raining, you know‟, using sentence final particles 
which serve to linguistically realize addressee-orientedness. 
  In the light of the discussion above, the relationship between the sentence Ame 
da and addressee-orientedness is schematically represented as follows: 
 (17)   〈Ame da〉+ addressee-orientedness → [Ame da] 
(Hirose (1995:228)) 
In (17), the angled brackets〈 〉represent private expression, and the square brackets [ ] 
public expression.9  Thus,〈Ame da〉is a private expression, expressing a thought of 
                                                     
9 In the subsequent discussion, I use these two brackets in the same fashion as (17). 
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the speaker or thinker, and [Ame da] is a public expression with the speaker‟s intention 
to communicate the information (i.e. it‟s raining) to others.  The schematic 
representation in (17) is meant to indicate that the private expression 〈Ame da〉turns 
into a public expression if it is given addressee-orientedness.  Conversely, the public 
expression [Ame da] can be divided into two components: the private expression 
〈Ame da〉and addressee-orientedness.  That is, the public expression [Ame da] 
contains the private expression 〈Ame da〉in it. 
  As seen from the example Ame da, a single expression can be used not only as a 
public expression but also as a private expression.  Therefore, it should be noted that 
the distinction between public and private expressions applies not to the distinction of 
linguistic expression per se, but to the distinction of language use. 
  If the addressee-orientedness given to the expression Ame da is linguistically 
realized via an addressee-oriented expression such as yo, its schematic representation 
is presented as follows: 
 (18) a.〈Ame da〉+ [yo] → [Ame da yo] 
   b.〈Ame da〉 
 
        [desu] → [Ame desu] 
(Hirose (1995:228)) 
As argued above, addressee-oriented expressions are public expressions by definition.  
They serve to turn private expressions into public expressions, as shown in (18).  In 
(18a), the sentence-final particle yo „I tell you‟ renders the private expression〈Ame 
da〉a public expression.  In (18b), on the other hand, the assertive marker da is 
replaced by the square-bracketed desu, as indicated by the downward arrow.  The 
word desu in the square brackets is a polite verb, as shown in (16f).  In this case, the 
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word desu makes the private expression〈Ame da〉a public expression. 
  So far, this subsection has dealt with Hirose‟s (1995) notion of public/private 
expression.  As seen above, private expressions are representations of the 
speaker‟s/thinker‟s thoughts.  That is, if a speaker says to a hearer, “Ame da yo,” the 
latter gets from what the former says not only information about the external world, 
but also information about the speaker‟s mental state. 
  The distinction between public and private expressions is relevant to the 
following grammatical constraint, proposed by Hirose (1995): 
 (19)  A verb of thinking allows only a private expression in its reported-clause 
complement.                (Hirose (1995:229)) 
For a better understanding of the constraint in (19), let us observe the following 
examples:10 
 (20) a.  Taro wa 〈ame da〉to   omotte-iru. 
     Taro TOP QUOT think-STAT 
     „Taro thinks it is raining.‟ 
   b. * Taro wa [ame da yo] to omotte-iru. 
     „Taro thinks “It is raining, I tell you.”‟ 
(Hirose (1995:229)) 
In sentence (20a), as indicated by the angled brackets, the private expression〈ame da〉
is allowed in the reported-clause complement.  Hence the grammaticality of sentence 
(20a).  In (20b), on the other hand, the public expression [ame da yo] occurs as the 
reported-clause complement.  Hence the ungrammaticality of sentence (20b).  These 
examples show how well the constraint in (19) works in distinguishing public 
expressions and private expressions.  As shown below, the distinction between public 
                                                     
10 In (20), QUOT stands for quotative particle and STAT for static morpheme. 
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and private expressions, together with the constraint in (19), plays a key role in 
analyzing Type 2 SACs. 
 
4.3.3.  Difference between Japanese and English in Terms of Communicativity 
  Let us move on to another significant issue pointed out by Hirose (1997): the 
difference between Japanese and English in terms of communicativity.  By the term 
communicativity, I mean the degree to which an expression in a language or, by 
extension, the language per se lends itself to communication.  Take the expressions 
Ame da „It‟s raining‟ and Ame da yo „It‟s raining, I tell you‟, for example, again.  As 
stated above, the expression Ame da can be used not only as a public expression but 
also as a private expression.  In other words, the expression Ame da is ambiguous 
between public and private expressions.  The distinction is pragmatically determined 
in the sense that it depends on the situation in which the sentence is uttered.  In this 
sense, Ame da is not so well-suited to communication.  The expression Ame da yo, on 
the other hand, is explicitly used as a public expression.  The sentence-final particle 
yo is an addressee-oriented expression, and thus Ame da yo is distinctly a public 
expression.  In this sense, Ame da yo is well-suited to communication.  In other 
words, the expression Ame da is communicatively weak, while the expression Ame da 
yo is communicatively strong. 
  By the same token, languages can be divided into two classes: communicatively 
strong and weak.  In this regard, Hirose (1997) argues that Japanese is a 
communicatively weak language by nature in the sense that its unmarked mode of 
expression is private expression, that is, not communication but rather representation 
of thoughts; on the other hand, English is a communicatively strong language by 
nature in the sense that its unmarked mode of expression is public expression, that is, 
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communication (see also Hirose (2000) and Hasegawa and Hirose (2005)). 
Hirose‟s (1997) claim is based on the following pieces of evidence.  First, 
Japanese has a special word for private self (i.e. zibun „self‟), but not any special word 
for public self, whereas English has a special word for public self (i.e. I), but not for 
any special word for private self.11  Second, as can be inferred from (16), Japanese, 
compared to English, has developed a wide variety of addressee-oriented expressions 
(i.e. expressions used exclusively for communication).  In other words, it is such 
addressee-oriented expressions that render the Japanese language and its expressions 
appropriate for various communicative purposes.  Without them, Japanese would not 
be communicative enough.  On the other hand, English is communicative enough 
without such addressee-oriented expressions.  That is, English sentences can be used 
in various communicative situations without recourse to addressee-oriented 
expressions.  To put it metaphorically, just as people wear some clothes when going 
out, Japanese expressions „wear‟ addressee-oriented expressions when they are used 
for communication; in contrast, English can go out without „wearing‟ them, because 
the notion of addressee-orientedness is intrinsically included in it.  Based on the 
pieces of evidence relevant to the characteristics above, Japanese is characterized as a 
private-self centered language, while English is characterized as a public-self centered 
language (see Hirose (2000) and Hasegawa and Hirose (2005) for related discussions). 
  The discussion so far can be summarized as follows: 
 (21)  Japanese is a communicatively weak language by nature, while English 
is a communicatively strong language by nature, because the former‟s 
unmarked mode of expression is private expression, while the latter‟s 
                                                     
11 Hirose (1995) defines public self and private self as follows:  the former is the subject of a public 
expression act, and the latter is the subject of a private expression act.  For more details, see Hirose 
(1995, 1997, 2000). 
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unmarked mode of expression is public expression. 
With the grammatical constraint in (19) and the difference between Japanese and 
English in terms of communicativity (or private/public-centeredness) in mind, I will 
now return to the issue to be considered in this chapter in (10). 
 
4.3.4.  Type 2 SACs as Public Expressions 
  In the previous subsections, I introduced the following notions:  public/private 
expression (acts) and communicativity.  As previously argued, the distinction 
between public expression and private expression deeply interacts with the notion of 
communicativity.  In this subsection, I will consider how Type 2 J- and E-SACs can 
be analyzed in terms of those notions. 
  As their name shows, SACs, including Type 1 and Type 2, are public 
expressions with addressee-orientedness.  Specifically, as discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3, the apodoses of Type 1 SACs realize efforts on the part of the speaker to get 
the hearer to do something, while most of the apodoses of Type 2 SACs are assertions 
or statements with little, if any, force to get the hearer to do something.  Then, it is 
reasonable to say that the apodoses of Type 1 SACs are addressee-oriented by nature, 
while those of Type 2 SACs are not.12  To confirm this point, first of all, let us 
consider the examples in (6) and (7), repeated here as (22) and (23) respectively: 
 (22) a.  If you want to know, I haven‟t seen him. 
   b.  If you are interested, Gerald Ford‟s real name is Leslie L. King. 
   c.  We are now at Kyoto Station, if you don‟t know. 
                                                     
12 By this statement, I do not mean that the apodoses of Type 1 SACs cannot be used as private 
expressions in any case.  As already argued, a single expression can be used not only as a public 
expression but also as a private expression.  Rather, I mean that the apodoses of Type 1 SACs are 
easier to interpret as public expressions than those of Type 2 SACs. 
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 (23) a.  siri tai nara yuu ga,  watasi-wa kare-ni  atte-inai 
     know want if  tell but, I-Top  him-Dat  see-Neg 
     „If you want to know, I haven‟t seen him.‟ 
   b.  kyoomi-ga   aru nara osieru   ga,  Isida Zyun‟iti-no 
     interest-Nom  you-have if inform but   Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen 
       hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da. 
     real name-Top Ishida Taro Cop 
     „If you‟re interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro 
Ishida.‟ 
   c.  anata-ga sira nai nara  iimasu ga, ima  wareware-wa  
     you-Nom  know  not if    tell but now we-Top 
     kyoto eki-ni orimasu. 
     Kyoto Station-Loc  are (Pol) 
     „We are now at Kyoto Station, if you don‟t know.‟ 
As argued above, speech-act conditionals are addressee-oriented by nature.  However, 
in many cases, it is difficult to find some clear illocutionary forces (in the sense of 
representing some force to get the hearer to do something) in the (fake) apodoses of 
Type 2 SACs.  Thus, it should be considered what parts or elements make Type 2 
SACs addressee-oriented. 
For a better understanding of this issue, let us apply the grammatical constraint 
in (19) to the apodoses of the examples in (22) and (23) as a test.13, 14 The results of 
the test are as follows:15 
                                                     
13 I realize that it would be fair to conduct this test on the apodoses of Type 1 SACs, too.  However, 
that the apodoses of Type 1 SACs are addressee-oriented is self-evident by the presence of 
sentence-ending particles like yo (cf. Chapter 3), so I do not conduct this test on them. 
14 Here, the apodoses refer to the fake apodoses. 
15 In (25c), the original expression orimasu „be/exist‟, a polite form of iru, is replaced by iru „be/exist‟ 
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 (24) a.  I think 〈I haven‟t seen him〉. 
   b.  I think 〈Gerald Ford‟s real name is Leslie L. King〉.  
   c.  I think 〈we are now at Kyoto Station〉. 
 (25) a.  watasi-wa 〈(zibun-wa) kare-ni atte-inai〉to omotte-iru. 
     „I think I haven‟t seen him.‟ 
   b.  watasi-wa〈 Isida Zyun‟iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da〉 to 
omotte-iru. 
     „I think Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro Ishida.‟ 
   c.  watasi-wa 〈ima zibun-tati-wa  Kyooto eki-ni iru〉to omotte-iru. 
     „I think we are now at Kyoto Station.‟ 
The angled brackets in these examples indicate that the expressions in them are private 
expressions.  The results of the test with respect to (24) and (25) show that the 
apodoses of Type 2 J-SACs, as well as those of Type 2 E-SACs, can be used as private 
expressions.  It is confirmed that the apodoses of Type 2 SACs are not 
addressee-oriented by nature.  It can then be predicted that what makes Type 2 SACs 
addressee-oriented should be the antecedent clauses.  This prediction is borne out, as 
shown below:16 
 (26) a. * I think 〈if you want to know, I haven‟t seen him〉. 
   b. * I think 〈if you are interested, Gerald Ford‟s real name is Leslie L. 
King〉. 
   c. * I think〈we are now at Kyoto Station, if you don‟t know〉. 
 (27) a. * watasi-wa 〈siri tai nara yuu ga (zibun-wa) kare-ni atte-inai〉to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
to neutralize the addressee-orientedness of the original sentence. 
16 Sentence (26c), in which the if-clause occurs in the sentence-final position, can be acceptable if the 
phrase I think is within the scope of the if-clause.  In that case, the sentence is interpreted as a SAC 
conveying the speaker‟s thought, i.e. I inform you I think we are now at Kyoto Station, if you don’t 
know. 
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omotte-iru. 
     „I think if you want to know, I haven‟t seen him.‟ 
   b. * watasi-wa 〈 kyoomi-ga aru nara osieru ga, Isida Zyun‟iti-no 
hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo da〉to omotte-iru. 
     „I think if you are interested, Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro 
Ishida.‟ 
   c. * watasi-wa 〈anata-ga sira nai nara iimasu ga, ima zibun-tati-wa 
Kyooto eki-ni iru〉to omotte-iru. 
     „I think we are now at Kyoto Station if you don‟t know.‟ 
As shown in (26) and (27), all the examples are judged ungrammatical.  This means 
that the clauses preceding the apodoses in Type 2 SACs make public expressions with 
addressee-orientedness, like the expressions listed in (16). 
  With regard to Type 2 J-SACs, however, the following question should be 
addressed: which part makes them public expressions, the nara-clause or the 
speech-act verb?  The answer seems to be very simple:  it is speech-act verbs such 
as yuu „tell‟ and osieru „inform‟ that make the whole of them public expressions.  To 
confirm this, let us consider the following example: 
 (28)   Mearii-ga kuru nara osieteageru-kedo, Zyon-wa dekakeru-nda. 
     Mary-Nom come if I tell you-but John-Top go out-Ep 
     „If Mary comes, John will go out.‟ 
Without any particular context, example (28) is interpreted as a Type 2 SAC.17  If we 
conduct the test with constraint (19) on (28), the result is as follows: 
 (29)  * watasi-wa 〈 Mearii-ga kuru nara  osieteageru kedo, Zyon-wa 
                                                     
17 For the peculiarity of this example, see Section 3.6 of Chapter 3, wherein it is pointed out that this 
example is interpreted as a Type 1 SAC. 
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dekakeru〉to omotte-iru. 
     „I think if Mary comes, I tell you John will go out.‟ 
Just as the examples shown in (27), sentence (29) is judged ungrammatical.  
Interestingly, if the phrase osieru kedo „I inform you, but‟ is deleted, the 
grammaticality of (29) is dramatically improved or impeccable: 
 (30)   watasi-wa〈Mearii-ga kuru nara, Zyon-wa dekakeru〉to omotte-iru. 
     „I think if Mary comes, John will go out.‟ 
In (30), where the phrase osieru kedo is deleted, the most natural interpretation of the 
bracketed clause is the epistemic one.  It goes without saying that epistemic 
conditionals can be used as private expressions, because they are representations of 
one‟s mental states.  From this observation, it is apparent that speech-act verbs 
contribute to the addressee-orientedness of Type 2 SACs. 
  In this subsection, I have shown that Type 2 SACs are public expression.  The 
following points have been clarified.  In English, it is the if-clause that makes Type 2 
SACs addressee-oriented.18  On the other hand, it is the speech-act verb that is 
relevant to the addressee-orientedness of Type 2 J-SACs.   
  In the next section, on the basis of the findings just above, I will give answers to 
the questions in (10), repeated here as (31) for ease of reference: 
 (31) a.  Why are speech-act verbs obligatory in Type 2 J-SACs? 
   b.  Why are speech-act verbs optional in Type 2 E-SACs? 
 
                                                     
18 To put it precisely, it is the presence of higher explicature between the if-clause and the apodosis 
that renders Type 2 E-SACs public expressions.  That is, the contrast between (24) and (26) means 
that the influence of higher explicature is dependent on whether the if-clause is present or not.  In this 
sense, ultimately, it is possible that the mechanism which guarantees the relevance between the 
if-clause and (fake) apodosis in Type 2 E-SACs is equivalent to, or at least in parallel with, that of 
Type 2 J-SACs in the sense that implicit higher explicature in E-SACs and explicit speech-act verbs in 
J-SACs fulfill the same function as connectors. 
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4.4.  From the Viewpoint of Addressee-Orientedness 
4.4.1.  On Type 2 J-SACs 
4.4.1.1.  Licensing Elements of Type 2 J-SACs 
  In this subsection, I will give an answer to the question in (31a) from the 
viewpoint of addressee-orientedness.  From the discussion in the previous section, the 
following points are clarified: 
 (32) a.  Japanese is a communicatively weak language by nature. 
   b.  The apodoses of Type 2 J-SACs are not well-suited to communication 
unless they have addressee-oriented expressions such as polite verbs 
and sentence-final particles with them. 
As already discussed, compared with English, Japanese would not be well-suited to 
communication without any addressee-oriented expressions.  In the light of (32), I 
give the following answer to the question in (31a): 
 (33) Speech-act verbs are used to indicate explicitly that the apodoses of Type 2 
J-SACs are public expressions. 
If (33) is correct, it can be predicted that speech-act verbs are not needed, if other 
addressee-oriented expressions clearly indicate that the apodoses of Type 2 SACs are 
public expressions.  As shown below, this prediction is, to some extent, borne out: 
 (34) a. * siri tai nara,  watasi-wa kare-ni  atte-inai      (= (8a)) 
     know want if    I-Top  him-Dat  see-Neg 
     „If you want to know, I haven‟t seen him.‟ 
   b. ? siri  tai  nara, watasi-wa kare-ni atte-inai  yo. 
          AOE 
   c.  siri  tai  nara ne,  watasi-wa kare-ni atte-inai  yo. 
       AOE    AOE 
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In (34b), the addressee-oriented expression (AOE) yo is added to the ungrammatical 
(a)-sentence.  It is apparent that the expression yo improves the grammaticality of the 
sentence.  Interestingly, sentence (34c), in which a further AOE (ne) is added to the 
protasis, is more acceptable than sentence (34b).  The difference among the sentences 
in (34) is the number of AOEs, which suggests that addressee-orientedness is a matter 
of degree, i.e. a gradable notion. 
  In this connection, there is another interesting example: 
 (35) a. * sira nai nara ima wareware-wa  Kyoto eki-ni  iru. 
     know not  if now we-Top  Kyoto Station-Loc be 
     „We are now at Kyoto Station, if you don‟t know.‟ 
   b.  gozonzi nai yoo desi  tara ima   wareware-wa  
     know (Pol) not seem  Ass (Pol) if   now we-Top 
     Kyooto  eki-ni  orimasu-yo. 
     Kyoto  Station-Loc  are (Pol)-AOE 
Sentence (35a) is ungrammatical because of the absence of a speech-act verb such as 
yuu „tell‟.  Interestingly enough, (35b) is impeccable in spite of the absence of such a 
verb.  Note that in (35b), the expressions of politeness gozonzi „know‟, desu, 
(assertive copula), orimasu „be (existential)‟, and the sentence-final particle yo are 
used.  All of these expressions are addressee-oriented.  In this case, too, it is safe to 
say that the degree of addressee-orientedness is high.  These examples suggest that 
what licenses Type 2 SACs is not the linguistic form of conditional constructions per 
se, but addressee-oriented expressions such as speech-act verbs and sentence-final 
particles.19 
                                                     
19  This view is supported in terms of relevance theory, wherein both speech-act verbs and 
sentence-final particles are the linguistic realizations of higher-level explicatures (cf. Uchida (2011)). 
If higher-level explicatures convey what Blakemore (1987) refers to as procedural meaning, which 
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  The discussion so far, including the discussion in Chapter 3, has made it clear 
that the obligatory occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs can be explained 
in part in terms of the following three aspects: causality, semantic relevance between 
their protases and (fake) apodoses, and addressee-orientedness.  In the next 
subsection, I will briefly discuss the matter of the degree of addressee-orientedness. 
 
4.4.1.2.  Degree of Addressee-Orientedness and the Grammaticality of Type 2 J-SACs 
  In the last subsection, I have shown that addressee-oriented expressions such as 
speech-act verbs, polite expressions and sentence-final particles influence the 
grammaticality of Type 2 J-SACs.  However, the comparison of (34) and (35) shows 
that their grammaticality is not the same.  The next issue to be considered here is why 
sentence (35b) is more grammatical than sentence (35a).  In this regard, I should 
admit that I am not in a position to give any clear answer to the issue.  However, I 
would like to give a tentative solution in the following discussion. 
  First of all, as alluded to above, I would like to point out that addressee- 
orientedness is a matter of degree.  That is to say, addressee-orientedness is a 
gradable notion.  For a better understanding of this point, let us observe the following 
example: 
 (36)   kyoomi-ga   aru nara osieru   ga,  Isida Zyun‟iti-no 
     interest-Nom  you-have if inform but   Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen 
       hommyoo-wa Isida Taro da. 
     real name-Top Ishida Taro Cop 
     „If you‟re interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro 
                                                                                                                                                                     
helps to make a processing effort smaller, it follows that speech-act verbs and sentence-final particles 
undertake that task, guaranteeing the relevance between the protasis and (fake) apodosis. 
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Ishida.‟ 
(= (23b)) 
As previously demonstrated, sentence (36) is impeccable by virtue of the presence of 
the speech-act verb osieru „inform‟.  Without the verb osieru, sentence (36) would be 
ungrammatical, as shown below: 
 (37)  * kyoomi-ga   aru nara, Isida Zyun‟iti-no 
     interest-Nom  you-have if Ishida Jun-ichi-Gen 
       hommyoo-wa Ishida Taro da. 
     real name-Top Ishida Taro Cop 
     „If you‟re interested, Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro Ishida.‟ 
 (= (8b)) 
As already seen, the grammaticality of sentence (37) can be improved by virtue of 
addressee-oriented expressions other than speech-act verbs.  Observe the following 
example: 
 (38) ?? kyoomi-ga aru nara, Isida Zyun‟iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo desu. 
Sentence (38) consists of the addressee-oriented sentence-final particle desu added to 
the sentence in (37).  As seen in this example, the particle desu clearly contributes to 
the grammaticality of (38).  Interestingly, further addition of addressee-oriented 
expressions renders sentence (38) more felicitous.  Let us examine the following 
examples:20 
 (39) a.  ? kyoomi-ga aru nara, Isida Zyun‟iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida Taroo desu 
yo. 
   b.  kyoomi-ga o-ari desi tara, Isida Zyun‟ichi-no hommyoo-wa Isida 
Taroo desu yo. 
                                                     
20 See also footnotes 23 and 25 in Chapter 3. 
 - 94 - 
Sentence (39a) consists of the sentence-final particle yo added to the example in (38).  
That is, two addressee-oriented expressions are used in (39a).21  In this sense, (39a) is 
more addressee-oriented than (38), so that the former is more acceptable than the latter.  
Furthermore, this view is more strongly supported by the example in (39b).  In (39b), 
in addition to the addressee-oriented expressions in (38) and (39a), the politeness 
prefix o-, and the polite form of assertive copula desu are used in its antecedent clause.  
That is, in all, four addressee-oriented expressions are used in (39b).  In this sense, 
example (39b) is more addressee-oriented than example (39a), and thus the former is 
impeccable.22  
  The above observation clearly shows that the grammaticality of Type 2 J-SACs 
has much to do with addressee-orientedness.  However, it is worth noting that one 
should not use addressee-oriented expressions in an offhand manner.  Let us observe 
the following pair: 
 (40) a. ??kyoomi-ga aru nara iimasu ga, Isida Zyun‟iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida 
Taroo da. 
   b.  kyoomi-ga aru nara iimasu ga, Isida Zyun‟iti-no hommyoo-wa Isida 
Taroo desu. 
     “If you are interested, I inform you Jun-ichi Ishida‟s real name is Taro 
Ishida.” 
In (40a), in spite of the presence of the speech-act verb iimasu, the grammaticality of 
this sentence is worse than that of sentence (40b).  The only difference between the 
two sentences is their copulative verbs: da and desu.  It should be noted that in (40a), 
the degree of politeness is different between the speech-act verb iimasu and the 
                                                     
21 The speaker‟s intention is not counted here. 
22  This does not mean that the more addressee-oriented expressions are stated, the better the 
grammaticality of a sentence is.  As the proverb goes, too much is as bad as too little. 
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assertive marker da:  the former is more polite than the latter.  In (40b), on the other 
hand, the degree of politeness is equal between the speech-act verb iimasu and the 
assertive marker desu.  That is, the difference in grammaticality between (40a) and 
(40b) is not a matter of addressee-orientedness.  Rather, it is a matter of the 
consistency of politeness:  the degree of politeness must be consistent in a series of 
utterances. 
  With regard to the relationship between politeness and addressee-orientedness, 
the notion of subjectivity seems to be relevant.  More specifically, what is relevant 
here is the notion of intersubjectification in the sense of Traugott (2003).23  On the 
basis of Traugott (2003), Nakau (2008:26) argues that intersubjectification means the 
grammaticalization of one‟s mental attitudes toward others, and honorifics in Japanese 
are linguistic realizations of such attitudes.  It seems that Nakau‟s view on honorifics 
can be applied to polite expressions in general.  Although the relationship between 
addressee-orientedness and (inter)subjectification per se is a tempting issue, I leave it 
open here.  It suffices here to show that addressee-orientedness, including politeness, 
interacts with the grammaticality of Type 2 J-SACs. 
 
4.4.2.  On Type 2 E-SACs 
  Let us turn to Type 2 E-SACs.  From the discussion in Section 4.3, I make the 
following points: 
 (41) a.  English is a communicatively strong language by nature. 
   b.  Due to this communicative strength, the apodoses of Type 2 E-SACs 
can serve as public expressions without speech-act verbs. 
The statements in (41) are the answers to the question in (31b).  That is, the 
                                                     
23 For more details, see Traugott (2003). 
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addressee-oriented nature of English renders the occurrence of speech-act verbs 
optional. 
  To sum up, this section has addressed the question why speech-act verbs are 
obligatory in Type 2 J-SACs, while they are optional in Type 2 E-SACs.  It has been 
clarified that their difference in the necessity of speech-act verbs is attributed to the 
difference between the two languages in communicativity:  Japanese is a 
communicatively weak language by nature, while English is a communicatively strong 
language by nature. 
     Note here that the observation above gives rise to another question: why does 
the high-degree of addressee-orientedness guarantee the clause-linkage of Type 2 
SACs?  Even in Type 2 J-SACs, which require speech-act verbs to connect the 
protasis and (fake) apodosis in default cases, the linkage of the protasis and (fake) 
apodosis is fully possible without speech-act verbs by virtue of the high-degree of 
addressee-orientedness, as discussed above.  The next section will address this issue 
in detail. 
 
4.5.  From the Viewpoint of Clause Linkage 
4.5.1.  Problem 
     In this section, I will reconsider the mechanism of the occurrence of speech-act 
verbs from the viewpoint of clause linkage.  Specifically, the purpose of this section 
is to clarify the relationship between the public/private-self centeredness and clause 
linkage. 
As discussed in detail in Section 3.5.2 of Chapter 3, speech-act verbs function as 
connectors connecting nara-clauses (i.e. protases) and main clauses (i.e. (fake) 
apodoses) in Type 2 J-SACs, as illustrated below: 
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 (42)  
 
 
(= (51) in Chapter 3) 
As illustrated, speech-act verbs relate the nara-clause and main clause by intervening 
between the two clauses.  Recall that there is no direct semantic connection between 
nara-clause and main clause.  To put it in another way, the illustration in (42) shows 
that the “conjunction” nara does not work as a conjunction in Type 2 J-SACs:  nara 
alone cannot connect two clauses with (almost) no relation to each other.  On the 
other hand, in Type 2 E-SACs, the word if properly works as a conjunction:  Type 2 
E-SACs do not need speech-act verbs as connectors, even if two clauses with (almost) 
no semantic relation are conjoined. 
So far I have addressed the difference between Type 2 J- and E-SACs from the 
viewpoint of communicativity.  Specifically, the occurrence of speech-act verbs in 
Type 2 SACs depends on the communicativity of the two languages:  Japanese is a 
communicatively weak language by nature in the sense that its unmarked mode of 
expression is private expression, that is, not communication but rather representation 
of thoughts; on the other hand, English is a communicatively strong language by 
nature in the sense that its unmarked mode of expression is public expression, that is, 
communication.  In other words, the occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 SACs 
depends on the degree of public/private self-centeredness:  English is a public 
self-centered language, while Japanese is a private self-centered language. 
     This explanation is, to some extent, valid in that it can explain why Type 2 
J-SACs require speech-act verbs:  they are used to indicate explicitly that the fake 
apodosis is a public expression and to make relevance or a connection between the 
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nara-clause and fake apodosis.  In this sense, as far as Type 2 J-SACs are concerned, 
the weak communicativity and clause linkage are closely related with each other.  As 
for Type 2 E-SACs, however, the explanation is not sufficient:  just because English 
is a public self-centered language and is communicatively strong does not mean that 
two clauses with little relevance can be easily linked or conjoined with each other.  
The same is true for Type 2 J-SACs:  the linkage of the protasis and (fake) apodosis is 
fully possible without speech-act verbs by virtue of the high-degree of 
addressee-orientedness.  Thus, it should be clarified how the strength of 
communicativity (or addressee-orientedness) and that of clause linkage correlate with 
each other.  In what follows, I will address this issue from the viewpoint of speaker 
involvement in the sense of Maat and Degand (2001) and the gravitation towards the 
speaker’s consciousness (C-gravitation, for short) proposed by Wada (2005, 2008, 
2010). 
 
4.5.2.  Speaker Involvement in Clause Linkage 
     In this subsection, let us review Maat and Degand (2001) for a better 
understanding of the concept of speaker involvement (hereafter, SI). 
     Maat and Degand (2001) reanalyze Sweetser‟s (1990) trichotomy concerning 
the cognitive domains of causal relations, i.e. the content domain, epistemic domain, 
and speech-act domain, from the viewpoint of a scale of SI, on which the inherent 
expressive power of connectives can be represented.24  SI is defined as the degree to 
which the present speaker is implicitly involved in the construal of the causal relation. 
     Two observations lay at the basis of their proposal.25  First, most connectives 
                                                     
24 Although Maat and Degand (2001) do not deal with conditional constructions, I assume that their 
approach to causal sentences is applicable to conditionals. 
25 Although Maat and Degand (2001) observe three languages contrastively, i.e. French, Dutch, and 
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that allow epistemic and speech-act uses may also express so-called volitional causal 
relations: 
 (43) a.  The snow is melting, so the temperature is above zero. 
   b.  You have been impolite, so leave the room immediately. 
   (Maat and Degand (2001:212)) 
 (44) I felt tired, so I left. 
(Maat and Degand (2001:213)) 
In example (43a), the connective so expresses the epistemic domain causality:  the 
speaker draws the conclusion that the temperature is above zero from the fact that the 
snow is melting.  In example (43b), so expresses the speech-act domain relation:  it 
can be paraphrased into “Leave the room immediately.  I demand that you do so 
because you have been impolite.”  In (44), so expresses a volitional causal relation.  
In this way, as Maat and Degand claim, the connective so can express volitional 
causality as well as epistemic and speech act linkages. 
According to Maat and Degand (2001), all previous studies concerning causal 
connectives unanimously state that volitional causality falls within the content domain, 
since it is concerned with state of affairs in the real world.  However, they point out 
that the connective so cannot express non-volitional real-world relations: 
 (45) # There was a strong wind, so three tiles fell off the roof. 
(Maat and Degand (2001:213)) 
In this example, so does not express volitional content causal relation; rather, it 
suggests that the consequence, i.e. three tiles fell off the roof, is entirely predictable 
from the cause there was a strong wind.  This indicates that some epistemic and 
speech-act connectives such as so encroach upon the content domain, but only on the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
English, here I focus on their English data. 
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volitional part of it. 
     Maat and Degand‟s (2001) second observation is concerned with the behavior of 
the connective that’s why, which they claim specifically expresses volitional causality.  
While that’s why is not acceptable in epistemic and speech-act domain contexts (as in 
(46)), it becomes impeccable as soon as speech act (e.g. I demand) or modal (e.g. I 
think) operators are inserted (as in (47)): 
 (46)  a.  The snow is melting. * That‟s why the temperature is above zero. 
   b.  You have been impolite. *That‟s why leave the room immediately. 
(Maat and Degand (2001:213-214)) 
 (47) a.  The snow is melting.  That‟s why I think the temperature is above 
zero. 
   b.  You have been impolite.  That‟s why I demand that you leave the 
room immediately. 
(Maat and Degand (2001:213-214)) 
Based on the observation of (46) and (47), they conclude that that’s why takes an 
intermediate position between the content and epistemic/speech-act relations.26  On 
the one hand, it may express a certain type of relation in the content domain; on the 
other hand, it lends itself to use in epistemic and speech-act domain as long as the 
conclusions and speech acts are an explicit part of the proposition. 
     According to Maat and Degand (2001), the two observations above indicate that 
a scalar perspective should be applied to the spectrum reaching from non-volitional 
causality in the content domain to epistemic and speech-act causality.  They 
                                                     
26 The contrast between examples (46) and (47) is intriguing in that it seems to be in parallel with the 
case of Type 2 J-SACs.  This means that speech-act verbs (and epistemic verbs) are obligatorily 
required, which cannot be seen in the case of English epistemic and speech-act conditionals.  This 
phenomena is interesting in that it shows a decisive difference between causal connectives and 
conditional connectives, which are usually regarded as “two sides of the same coin (cf. Arita (2008)).”   
However, I leave this matter open for future research, for it is beyond the scope of the present study. 
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hypothesize that the different relational interpretations can be ordered along a scale 
from minimal to maximal SI.  The criteria of SI are the following:27 
 (48) a.  The subjective involvement of a conscious participant (the speaker or 
the subject of a main clause) with causal relations. 
   b.  The degree to which a given causal relation is isomorphic with a 
causal relation in the real world:  the higher the degree is, the lower 
SI becomes. 
   c.  The distance of a given causal relation from the present speaker and 
the moment of speaking:  the closer the distance is, the higher SI 
becomes. 
   d.  The explicitness of the involvement of a conscious participant:  The 
more implicit the involvement is, the more subjectively (in the sense 
of Langacker (1990)) the participant is construed. 
According to Maat and Degand (2001), the four criteria in (48) may enhance the 
prominence of speaker‟s assumptions in the (causal) relation and hence enhance its 
level of SI.  For a better understanding of the criteria in (48), let us examine them one 
by one with concrete examples.  First, consider the following examples: 
 (49) a.  I felt tired, so I left.                                   (= (44)) 
   b.  The sun came up.  As a result, the temperature went up. 
(Maat and Degand (2001:213)) 
These examples illustrate the criterion in (48a).  Example (49a) represents a 
volitional content domain relation, while example (49b) represents a non-volitional 
content domain relation.  Both examples are in parallel with each other in that they 
represent real-world causality:  the event described in the first sentence causes the 
                                                     
27 See also Uno (2008:57). 
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event described in the second sentence.  However, since conscious participants (i.e. 
the speaker and subject of a main clause) entertain assumptions which the speaker may 
share, volitional relations carry higher degrees of SI than non-volitional ones. 
     Let us turn our attention to the criterion in (48b).  The causal relations encoded 
in linked clauses may be more or less isomorphic with those in the real world.  
Observe the following examples: 
 (50) a.  John loved her, so he came back. 
   b.  John loved her, so he probably came back. 
   c.  He came back, so he probably loved her. 
(Maat and Degand (2001:215)) 
The volitional relation in (50a) represents a real-world causal relation, while the 
relation in (50b) does not:  in example (50b) the cause-effect or reason-consequence 
relation in the real world is transposed to the mental domain of the speaker‟s 
knowledge and inference.  In this sense, the epistemic relation in (50b) carries a 
higher degree of SI than the content relation in (50a).  Example (50c) takes this 
process one step further.  In this example, the causal relation in the real world is 
turned around to yield an abductive inference relation.  In this sense, example (50c) 
carries the highest degree of SI of the three examples. 
     The following examples explain the criterion in (48c): 
 (51) a.  I felt tired.  I left. 
   b.  He felt tired.  He left. 
   c.  I feel tired.  I‟m going home. 
(Maat and Degand (2001:215)) 
First, let us compare examples (51a) and (51b).  In (51a), the subjects in the two 
sentences are the same, i.e. the first person I.  According to Maat and Degand, 
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because the speaker is more likely to accept the general assumptions underlying 
his/her own decisions than those underlying the decisions of others, the first person 
relation in (51a) exhibits a higher degree of SI than the third-person relation in (51b).  
Of the three examples, (51c) is highest in SI in that it is in the present tense:  the 
distance of the causal relation from the moment of speaking is closest. 
     Let us turn our attention to the last criterion, i.e. (48d).  Let us illustrate this 
dimension with reference to the presence of the speaker in an epistemic relation: 
 (52) a.  He is Hungarian. 
   b.  He is probably Hungarian. 
   c.  I think he is Hungarian. 
(Maat and Degand (2001:216)) 
Note that sentence (52b) and sentence (52c) contain some explicit elements referring 
to the speaker‟s perspective, while example (52a) does not.  In this sense, the degree 
of SI is lowest in (52a).  In (52b), the modal adverb probably invokes the present 
speaker as the source of the probability judgment.  This is made even more explicit in 
(52c): as seen from the phrase I think, the speaker‟s perspective is objectified or made 
part of the situation referred to in the utterance (cf. Langacker (1990)).  This means 
that example (52b) is more subjective than (52c).  In terms of SI, example (52b) 
ranks higher than (52c).   
     Besides the examples seen above, Maat and Degand (2001) analyze Dutch, 
French, and English connectives from the viewpoint of the criteria in (48).28  To 
summarize their conclusion, the relationship between the degree of SI and the 
cognitive domain can be illustrated as follows: 
 (53) The Degree of Speaker Involvement 
                                                     
28 For more details, see Maat and Degand (2001). 
 - 104 - 
   non-volitional content domain ＜volitional content domain ＜  causal 
epistemic domain ＜ non-causal epistemic domain ＜ speech-act domain  
In (53), the signs of inequality (＜) indicate that SI increases rightward:  SI increases 
from non-volitional content to volitional content to causal epistemic to non-causal 
epistemic to speech-act domains.  That is, the degree of SI is lowest in the 
non-volitional content domain, while it is highest in the speech-act domain.29 
     Maat and Degand‟s (2001) research shows that SI and the interpretation of 
connectives or clause linkage are intimately related to each other.  SI means the 
degree to which the speaker is involved in finding a causal relation between the two 
clauses connected by a connective:  if the causal relation encoded in a pair of linked 
clauses is difficult to decode, then the speaker is intimately involved in the linkage.30 
Applying Maat and Degand‟s (2001) analysis to conditional constructions, I 
expect that the degree of SI is highest in SACs, as can be inferred from (53).  Here, 
let us consider which type of SACs carries a higher degree of SI.  As far as J-SACs 
are concerned, Type 1 J-SACs seem to carry a higher degree of SI than Type 2 J-SACs, 
checked against the four criteria in (48).  Checking against the criteria in (48a-c), we 
can see that the degree of SI in Type 1 J-SACs is as high as that in Type 2 J-SACs.  In 
both types, the following points are obtained: (i) the speaker is subjectively involved in 
                                                     
29 Van Canegem-Ardijns and Van Belle (2008) take a similar view.  They address what is referred to 
as conditional perfection or invited inference (cf. Geis and Zwicky (1971)) from the viewpoint of 
“speaker‟s control over action/event in the consequent (apodosis)”, which seems to be equivalent, or at 
least close, to SI. 
30 Uno (2008) analyzes the use of the Japanese causal connectives kara „because‟ and node „because‟ 
in terms of SI.  She classifies SI into two types: Speaker Involvement Scale (SIS)-1 and SIS-2.  
According to Uno, Maat and Degand‟s (2001) SI is equivalent to Uno‟s SIS-1, which measures how 
much the speaker‟s view is involved in detecting and reporting causality.  SIS-2, on the other hand, 
has to do with the display of the intentionality of the speaker, i.e. how the speaker conceives the world 
(for more details, see Uno (2008) and Uno and Ikegami (2009)).  However, it is not clear how valid 
Uno‟s approach is to analyze English clause linkage, because she almost exclusively deals with the 
Japanese causal connective kara „because‟.  Thus, in what follows, whenever I use the term SI, it 
refers to Maat and Degand‟s (2001) original notion. 
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causal relations, (ii) given causal relations are not isomorphic with those in the real 
world, and (iii) the distance of given causal relations from the present speaker and the 
moment of speaking is close.  The criterion in (48d), however, distinguishes Type 1 
J-SACs and Type 2 J-SACs.  The obligatory occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 
J-SACs evokes the explicit involvement of the speaker, so that the degree of SI is 
higher in Type 1 J-SACs than in Type 2 J-SACs. 
On the other hand, the degree of SI in Type 1 E-SACs is as high as that in Type 
2 E-SACs in all the criteria in (48).  In both types, the following points are obtained: 
(i) the speaker is subjectively involved in causal relations, (ii) given causal relations 
are not isomorphic with those in the real world, (iii) the distance of given causal 
relations from the present speaker and the moment of speaking is close, and (iv) the 
conscious participant (i.e. the speaker) is implicit by virtue of the non-occurrence of 
speech-act verbs.  Therefore, it is safe to say that the degree of SI is equally high in 
both types in E-SACs. 
 
4.5.3.  C-Gravitation 
4.5.3.1. The Notion of C-Gravitation 
What I consider next is how SI has to do with the fact that Type 2 E-SACs do 
not require speech-act verbs to connect the protases and fake apodoses.  I will explain 
this by using the semantic notion C-gravitation, the gravitation towards the speaker‟s 
consciousness (a part of the brain activated when doing any cognitive activities 
including thinking and uttering), proposed by Wada (2005, 2008, 2010).   
Wada (2005) investigates the difference between English and German, both of 
which are regarded as public-self centered languages, as to tense phenomena such as 
perfect and progressive.  He points out that public-self centeredness is a scalar notion, 
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and clarifies that English carries a higher degree of public-self centeredness than 
German (cf. Wada (2005:126)).31  To explain what differentiates English and German, 
he introduced a semantic concept referred to as C-gravitation, which is defined as 
follows:32 
 (54) “C-gravitation” is defined as a grammatical phenomenon in which 
grammaticalized forms and their semantic content or functions 
conceptually gravitate through time towards the spatio-temporal center on 
which the speaker‟s consciousness is fixed.           (Wada (2005:121)) 
According to Wada (2010:79), when the existence of the speaker‟s consciousness 
greatly influences the system of a language, the speech time or present time, wherein 
the speaker‟s consciousness exists, produces a conceptual “magnetic field” in the 
language.  As a result of the gravitation towards the “magnetic field (Gravitational 
Field in the terminology of Wada (2005:121))”, i.e. C-gravitation, a particular 
grammatical phenomenon, which is oriented towards the speaker‟s consciousness, is 
linguistically realized.  Wada (2008, 2010) divides grammatical phenomena caused 
by C-gravitation into two classes: the C-gravitation of the form choice and the 
C-gravitation of the semantic range. 
Let us review the two types of C-gravitation in turn.  According to Wada 
(2008:285), the C-gravitation of the form choice means that some special 
grammaticalized forms are developed in linguistic environments wherein they are not 
essentially required.  Take, for example, the sentence She said that she was sick.  
                                                     
31 For his analysis of English and German tense systems from the viewpoint of C-gravitation, see 
Wada (2005). 
32 As seen from the definition, C-gravitation has to do with a diachronic or historical viewpoint.  
However, I will restrict myself to the synchronic phenomena of SACs.  In fact, in Wada (2010), 
where he compares tense phenomena of English with those of Dutch, he does not seem to adhere to 
the diachronic aspect of this notion, but rather shows that it is useful for explaining the synchronic 
difference of tense phenomena between the two languages. 
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Note here that the verb in the reported clause, i.e. was, is expressed in the indicative 
mood, which indicates the viewpoint of the reporter (i.e. public self).  As indirect 
speech is a quotation of private expression (cf. Hirose (1995, 2000)), the subordinate 
clause is not essentially relevant to the viewpoint of the reporter as a public self.  
That is, in English indirect speech, the viewpoint of public self is involved in the 
quotation of private expression.  This means that English uses the indicative mood in 
the environment wherein it does not have to be used.  In this sense, the grammar of 
English is influenced by the C-gravitation of the form choice. 
Another type of C-gravitation, i.e. the C-gravitation of the semantic range, 
means that linguistic forms referring to speech situations have developed meanings or 
functions to focalize the speaker‟s „now‟ and „here‟.  For a better understanding of 
this, let us take a tense phenomenon for example.  As is well known, the present tense 
in English, in principle, does not refer to the future (e.g. *It rains tomorrow.).33  In 
Dutch, the present tense can refer to the future (e.g. Morgen regent het „It rains 
tomorrow‟.).  The reason is that the present tense in English focalizes the speaker‟s 
„now‟ and „here‟, i.e. the speech-time.  That is, the C-gravitation restricts the 
semantic range of the simple present tense to the present time, where the speaker‟s 
consciousness is situated.  In Dutch, on the other hand, as the degree of C-gravitation 
is not so high as in English, the present tense can refer to the future. 
 
4.5.3.2.  Third Type of C-Gravitation 
So far I have reviewed the notion of C-gravitation proposed by Wada (2005, 
                                                     
33 The simple present tense with future time reference can be used in what is referred to as futurate 
constructions (cf. Huddleston and Pullum (2002:132)).  According to Huddleston and Pullum (2002), 
the futurate construction is subject to severe pragmatic constraints.  To be specific, the construction 
must involve something that can be assumed to be known already in the present.  The most common 
uses involve the following three situations: cyclic events in nature, scheduled events, and conditionals.  
For more details, see Leech (1971) and Huddleston and Pullum (2002). 
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2008, 2010).  In what follows, I will use the notion of C-gravitation from a slightly 
different point of view.  Specifically, I will use the notion with a wider scope for the 
following reasons. 
Firstly, in Wada (2005, 2008, 2010), it is assumed that C-gravitation is a notion 
peculiar to public-self centered languages such as English, Dutch, and German.  
Conversely, in his framework, C-gravitation is irrelevant to private-self centered 
languages like Japanese.  That is, C-gravitation is introduced to measure the degree 
of public-self centeredness of public-self centered languages (cf. Wada (2005)). 
However, I assume here that C-gravitation is relevant in private-self centered 
languages as well as public-self centered languages, especially when they are used in 
their marked modes of expressions, i.e. (highly) addressee-oriented expressions:  just 
because a language is private-self centered does not mean that all of its linguistic 
phenomena always show private-self centeredness. 
Recall that the SAC is a public expression, a marked mode of the Japanese 
language, presupposing the existence of the addressee.  That is, SACs are exclusively 
used for public expression acts.  In this environment, the speaker as the public self 
should necessarily be involved.  The following examples provide evidence for this 
claim: 
 (55) a.  boku/watasi/zibun-wa  kare-ni  atte-inai. 
     I. MALE/I/self-Top  he-Dat  see-Neg 
     „I haven‟t seen him.‟ 
   b. ??siri  tai-nara  yuu-kedo zibun-wa kare-ni atte-inai. 
     know  want-if  say-but  self-Top  he-Dat  see-Neg 
     „If you want to know, (I tell you) I haven‟t seen him.‟ 
   c.  siri  tai-nara yuu-kedo boku/watasi-wa kare-ni atte-inai. 
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     know  want-if  say-but  I. MALE/I-Top  he-Dat see-Neg 
     „If you want to know, (I tell you) I haven‟t seen him.‟ 
In sentence (55a), not only the markers of public self boku „I (male)‟ and watasi „I‟ but 
also zibun „self‟, the marker of private self, can be used as the topic marker.  This 
indicates that sentence (55a) is ambiguous between a public expression and a private 
expression, because the sentence does not contain any explicit addressee-oriented 
expression:  the distinction between public and private expressions applies not to the 
distinction of linguistic expression per se but to the distinction of language use. 
In (55b) and (55c), the same sentence is used as the main clause of a SAC.  
That is to say, the main clause should be interpreted as a public expression.  
Interestingly enough, in (55b), the use of zibun as the topic marker renders the 
sentence relatively odd.34  In (55c), on the other hand, the use of boku and watasi 
does not influence the grammaticality of the sentence.  The contrast between (55b) 
and (55c) shows that SACs, as public expressions, require words for public self when 
the subject or topic in the main clause refers to the speaker, which in turn indicates that 
in SACs the private-self centered nature of Japanese shifts or draws near to the 
public-self centeredness.  Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that C-gravitation is 
relevant to private-self centered languages in a special linguistic environment like 
SACs.   
Secondly, the original notion of C-gravitation is mainly concerned with the 
linguistic form and semantic range of tense phenomena, including mood (i.e. 
indicative vs. subjunctive).  On the other hand, our main concern here is with 
modality in the sense of Nakau (1992, 1994), the definition of which is presented 
                                                     
34 This is not to say that zibun can never refer to the public self.  For more details on the use of zibun 
in reference to the public self, see Hirose (2000). 
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below:35 
 (56) MODALITY is defined, prototypically, as (i) a mental attitude (ii) on the 
part of the speaker (iii) only accessible at the time of utterance, where the 
time of utterance is further characterized as the instantaneous present (as 
opposed to the durational present and the past). 
(Nakau (1992:5)) 
In Nakau‟s (1992, 1994) framework, the if-clause of SACs is classified into the marker 
of D(iscourse)-Modality (or modality of speech act manner), which conveys the 
speaker‟s subjective emotional, mental, or psychological attitude toward the message 
content or speech act itself.36  As already argued, in SACs, the if-clause expresses a 
felicity condition on a particular utterance or speech act in the main clause (see Section 
3.2.1.3 of Chapter 3).  In other words, the if-clause expresses the speaker‟s mental 
attitude at the time of utterance indicating lack of confidence that the hearer shares the 
grounds (i.e. felicity condition) on which s/he makes the utterance.  Thus, as 
Dancygier (1998:92) states, the SAC if p, q can be glossed as “I believe p and I 
communicate q on this ground.  I admit that I am not certain if you believe p.”  This 
means that it is not the hearer but the speaker who recognizes the protasis as the proper 
background on which s/he makes the utterance in the apodosis.  It follows that, in 
principle, the speaker alone recognizes the relevance between the protasis and (fake) 
apodosis.  In other words, it is the speaker‟s consciousness that links the protasis and 
apodosis.  Thus, there is a good reason to assume that C-gravitation is relevant to 
clause linkage as well. 
     To recapitulate, the notion of C-gravitaion that I will use in the subsequent 
                                                     
35 For other definitions of modality and related problems, see Klinge and Müller (eds.) (2005). 
36 See also Maynard (1993) for a related discussion. 
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argument is slightly different from Wada‟s (2005, 2008, 2010) original notion in scope:  
it is relevant to private-self centered languages and the clause linkage concerned with 
the modality of speech act manner.  For a lack of a better term, I refer to this type of 
C-gravitation as the C-gravitation of clause linkage.  Thus, in what follows, 
whenever I use the term C-gravitation, it refers to the C-gravitation of clause linkage. 
 
4.5.4.  Explanation: Interaction of Speaker Involvement and C-Gravitation 
In Section 4.5.2, I reviewed Maat and Degand (2001) and showed that speaker 
involvement (SI) and the interpretation of causality are intimately related with each 
other.  Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the degree of SI is highest in 
speech-act causal relations. 
Here I assume that the activation of the present speaker‟s consciousness is also a 
scalar notion and that the degree of the activation of the present speaker‟s 
consciousness correlates with the degree of SI:  a low degree of SI means low 
activation of the present speaker‟s consciousness, while a high degree of SI means 
high activation of the speaker‟s consciousness.  This means that if the degree of SI 
becomes high, then the “magnetic field” or Gravitation Field produced at the speech 
time also becomes strong.  To put it differently, C-gravitation is highly activated in 
the speech-act domain relation. 
     Now I am in a position to explain the clause linkage of Type 2 J- and E-SACs in 
terms of SI and C-gravitation.  Here I assume that the linkage of two clauses 
composing Type 2 SACs has a great deal to do with C-gravitation.  To put it more 
precisely, it is the degree of C-gravitation that determines whether or not SACs require 
speech-act verbs.  If the degree is high, it is not speech-act verbs but C-gravitation 
that links the two clauses.  But if C-gravitation is weak or inert, it is not C-gravitation 
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but speech-act verbs that link the two clauses.37 
Let us first deal with Type 2 J-SACs.  As repeatedly stated, Japanese is a 
communicatively weak language by nature in the sense that its unmarked mode of 
expression is private expression, i.e. representation of thoughts:  the Japanese 
language is characterized as a private-self centered language.  This means that 
C-gravitation is hardly, if ever, exerted in Japanese.  As argued above, the notion of 
C-gravitation is intimately related with the degree of public-self centeredness.  That 
is, the more linguistic phenomena relevant to C-gravitation a language has developed, 
the higher the degree of public-self centeredness is in that language (cf. Wada 
(2008:285)).  If the occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 SACs is a linguistic 
phenomenon relevant to C-gravitation, the explanation based on public/private-self 
centeredness of a language can be reinterpreted in terms of C-gravitation:  Type 2 
J-SACs require speech-act verbs as connectors linking nara-clauses and main clauses 
because of the low degree or inertness of C-gravitation. 
     A possible counterargument to this explanation is like the following.  I have 
argued that the strength of the “magnetic field” may be relative to SI: when the degree 
of SI is high, C-gravitation is also highly exerted.  Taking this into consideration, one 
may argue that the obligatory use of speech-act verbs, i.e. connectors, cannot be 
ascribed to the low degree or inertness of C-gravitation:  C-gravitation should be 
highly activated in Type 2 J-SACs as well, wherein the degree of SI is high. 
However, recall here that the degree of SI is lower in Type 2 J-SACs than in 
Type 1 J-SACs.  That is to say, the degree of SI is not so high as to evoke 
C-gravitation in Type 2 J-SACs.  Furthermore, note that the limitation of the degree 
                                                     
37 In epistemic conditionals in Japanese, wherein the degrees of SI and C-gravitaion is lower than 
those in SACs, the sentence-ending particle noda is required.  That is, it is not C-gravitation but noda 
that links the protasis and apodosis of epistemic conditionals in Japanese. 
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of C-gravitation varies from language to language:  even if the degree of 
C-gravitation reaches the maximum point in Japanese, it is relatively low, compared 
with the maximum degree of C-gravitation in English.  This can be graphically 
illustrated as follows: 
 (57)   The Degree of C-Gravitation 
   Max (E) 
 
   Max (J) 
     0 The Degree of Speaker Involvement 
The graph in (57) shows the correlation between the scale of C-gravitation and that of 
SI.  English is a public-centered language and thus has a higher limit of C-gravitation 
(Max (E)).  In contrast, Japanese, which is private-self centered, has a relatively low 
limit of C-gravitation (Max (J)).  Thus, just because the high degree of SI correlates 
with the high degree of C-gravitation does not mean that the maximum limit of 
C-gravitation is high.  In uttering speech-act domain causal relations, the degrees of 
SI and C-gravitation are relatively high; nevertheless, the maximum limit of 
C-gravitation in Japanese is low, so that C-gravitation is too weak to link the two 
clauses composing Type 2 SACs without speech-act verbs. 
     Now let us turn our attention to Type 2 E-SACs.  English, as previously 
pointed out, is a communicatively strong language by nature in the sense that its 
unmarked mode of expression is public expression, that is, communication:  the 
English language is characterized as a public-self centered language.  This means that 
C-gravitation works strongly in English.  In uttering speech-act domain causal 
relations, the degrees of SI and C-gravitation are high.  The maximum limit of the 
degree of C-gravitation in English is high, so that C-gravitation in English is strong 
 - 114 - 
enough to link the two clauses composing Type 2 SACs without speech-act verbs.   
     The explanation above can be illustrated as follows: 
 (58) a. Type 2 J-SACs 
   X-nara     speech-act verb-ga/kedo,    Y 
                     Weak C-gravitation 
                     Speaker‟s  
      Consciousness 
   b. Type 2 E-SACs 
   If X,    Strong C-gravitation      Y 
       Speaker‟s 
      Consciousness 
In figure (58), the dotted ellipse indicates that the “magnetic field” produced by the 
speaker‟s consciousness is weak, while the solid ellipse indicates that the “magnetic 
field” produced by the speaker‟s consciousness is strong.  As shown in figure (58a), 
C-gravitation in Japanese is too weak to link the two clauses composing Type 2 SACs.  
In contrast, as shown in figure (58b), C-gravitation in English is strong enough to link 
the two clauses composing Type 2 SACs without speech-act verbs.  Incidentally, the 
same is true for Type 1 J-SACs:  C-gravitation in Type 1 J-SACs is strong enough to 
link the two clauses, although it is relatively weak, compared to C-gravitation in E- 
SACs. 
In this connection, German SACs show an interesting behavior with regard to 
clause linkage, which seems to support my argument.  Let us observe the following 
examples: 
 (59) a.  Wenn du  durstig  bist,  ist Bier  im  Kühlschrank. 
     If you thirsty are is beer in-the fridge 
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     „If you are thirsty, there is beer in the fridge.‟ 
   b.  Wenn du  durstig  bist,  Bier ist  im  Kühlschrank. 
     If you thirsty are beer is in-the fridge 
(Köpcke and Panther (1989:697)) 
The sentences in (59) are German SACs corresponding to Type 1 SACs (hereafter, 
Type 1 G-SACs).  Here let us draw attention to the word orders in the apodoses of the 
examples in (59).   In (59a), for example, the finite verb ist „is‟ precedes the subject 
of the main clause Bier, i.e. VS order.  In (59b), on the other hand, ist follows Bier, 
i.e. SV order.  Köpcke and Panther (1989) refer to the former as integrative word 
order and the latter as non-integrative word order, following König and van der 
Auwera‟s (1988) terminology.  According to Köpcke and Panther (1989:686), the 
basic or unmarked word order in the apodosis of conditional constructions is the 
integrative word order, i.e. VS order.38  On the other hand, the non-integrative word 
order, i.e. SV order is the non-basic or marked word order.  As seen from the pair in 
(59), Type 1 G-SACs allow both word orders according to the discourse. 
     Turning to G-SACs corresponding to Type 2 SACs (hereafter, Type 2 G-SACs), 
one may find an interesting contrast between Type 1 and Type 2 G-SACs as to the 
word order in the apodoses: 
 (60) a. * Wenn du  es  noch nicht wußtest, ist Hans wieder im  Lande. 
     if you it yet not knew is Hans again  in-the country 
   b.  Wenn du  es  noch nicht wußtest, Hans ist wieder im  Lande. 
     if you it yet  not  knew  Hans is again  in-the country 
     „If you didn‟t know, Hans is back in town.‟ 
                                                     
38 In German, whenever a constituent, including a whole clause, is fronted, subject verb inversion 
generally takes place (Köpcke and Panther (1988:686)). 
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(Köpcke and Panther (1989:688)) 
The only difference between the examples in (60) is the word order in the apodoses.  
The sentence in (60a) is judged ungrammatical because the finite verb ist „is‟ precedes 
the subject of the main clause Hans.  This is interesting in that Type 2 G-SACs like 
(60) never allow the basic, unmarked word order of the German conditional 
construction introduced by the conjunction wenn „if‟.  In other words, the 
non-integrative word order alone is permitted in Type 2 G-SACs. 
     I assume that this phenomenon can be regarded as a piece of supporting 
evidence for the argument in this section.  As argued above, Wada (2005) concludes 
that the public-self centeredness of English is higher than that of German in terms of 
C-gravitation, because C-gravitation is not well-developed in German.  Furthermore, 
recall that the degree of SI is lower in Type 2 J-SACs than in Type 1 J-SACs.  If this 
is also true for G-SACs, it follows that Type 2 G-SACs, like Type 2 J-SACs, should 
require additional grammatical implements such as speech-act verbs to connect the 
protasis and (fake) apodosis.  As shown in (60b), although speech-act verbs are not 
required in Type 2 G-SACs, the marked word order fulfills the same function.39 
     One may argue that the contrast shown in (59) and (60) is insufficient as a piece 
of supporting evidence for the adequacy of the explanation of clause linkage in terms 
of SI and C-gravitation, because the obligatory occurrence of speech-act verbs would 
serve as much better evidence for my argument than the marked word order.  
However, what I want to emphasize here is that both Type 2 G-SACs and Type 2 
                                                     
39 Köpcke and Panther (1989) ascribe the difference of word order in G-SACs to two principles which 
they term ego involvement and speaker’s degree of certainty.  In those cases in which the speaker of a 
content domain conditional intends to convey a strong ego involvement, s/he will resort to the marked 
order (non-integrative order); conversely, a SAC may be grammaticalized as the VS-order (integrative 
order) if the speaker wishes to communicate that the content of the apodosis does not constitute an 
item of factual knowledge, but rather his/her personal opinion about the truth of some proposition (cf. 
Köpcke and Panther (1989:685)).  Although it is intriguing to investigate whether or not their 
approach is compatible with mine, I leave this issue open for future research. 
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J-SACs need marked grammatical means to establish the linkage of the protasis and 
(fake) apodosis.  Recall that a grammatical means other than speech-act verbs can be 
employed in Type 2 J-SACs, i.e. a variety of addressee-oriented expressions like 
honorifics (see Section 4.4).  In this sense, it is not unreasonable to assume that the 
marked word order is employed because of or at the cost of the low degree or inertness 
of C-gravitation. 
 
4.5.5.  Summary 
    In this section, I have investigated the occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 J- 
and E-SACs from the viewpoint of clause linkage.  To sum up, it depends on the 
strength of C-gravitation whether the two clauses composing Type 2 SACs, i.e. 
protasis and (fake) apodosis, can be conjoined without speech-act verbs.  That is, if 
C-gravitation is strong enough to link the two clauses, then speech-act verbs need not 
be required.  In contrast, if C-gravitation is too weak to link the two clauses, then 
speech-act verbs or other marked grammatical means should be required as 
connectors.40  It has been shown that my approach is, to some extent, supported by 
the phenomenon of word order in German SACs. 
 
4.6.  Appendix: Addressee-Orientedness and Metonymic Extensibility 
  So far I have addressed the occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-/E-SACs 
from the viewpoint of addressee-orientedness and related semantic concepts such as 
speaker involvement and C-gravitation.  Here let me investigate the difference 
                                                     
40 The discussion in this subsection is expected to support or corroborate Kanetani‟s (2007) argument 
about what he refers to as reasoning constructions, i.e. epistemic and speech-act because constructions.  
Kanetani hypothesizes that reasoning is a process in which the speaker subjectively connects two 
situations perceived separately.  If my argument here is on the right track, it can give a principled 
explanation for his hypothesis in terms of SI and C-gravitation. 
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between Type 2 J- and E-SACs from a slightly different point of view.  In this section, 
I will take up another linguistic phenomenon which differentiates the systems of 
grammar in Japanese and English: metonymic extensibility.  In what follows, I will 
point out that the differences between Japanese and English in the communicativity 
and in the sensitivity to metonymic operations may be related to each other. 
     Note that the discussion below is intended as a “working draft” to provide a 
possibility to apply the purely semantic notions metaphor and metonymy to the 
explanation of grammatical or syntactic variations of a language.  Thus, in what 
follows, I will use these notions in a slightly different manner from those in “main 
stream” cognitive semantic approaches such as Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff 
(1987), Croft (1993), Kövecses (2002), among others. 
 
4.6.1.  Metonymic Extension Language and Analytic Extension Language 
  To begin with, let me introduce the notions of analytic extension language and 
metonymic extension language, proposed by Yasui (2005). 
  Yasui (2005:14) argues that languages can be classified into two categories 
according to how they expand their variations in expression: analytic extension 
language and metonymic extension language.  According to Yasui, Japanese belongs 
to the former, whereas English belongs to the latter.  For a better understanding of the 
two categories, let us observe the following examples: 
 (61) a.  Cut the cooked potatoes into dice. 
   b.  Dice the cooked potatoes. 
(Yasui (2005:5)) 
In (61a), the process of cutting the potatoes and the resultant state of the potatoes are 
discretely stated.  In (61b), on the other hand, the process of cutting and the resultant 
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state of the potatoes are “compressed” into a single verb, i.e. dice.  In other words, 
the verb dice in (61b) covers not only the resultant state of the potatoes, but also the 
process of cutting them.  It is reasonable to think that the verb dice is originally 
expanded or derived from the noun dice.  Generally speaking, the extension process 
from noun to verb is referred to as denominalization, and the verbs derived from nouns 
are called denominative verbs.  According to Yasui (2005), what makes this kind of 
word-formation possible is our basic cognitive ability to express/understand something 
via metonymy. 
    Metonymy is our basic cognitive capacity based on contiguity.  Precisely, it is a 
cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access 
to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain or idealized cognitive 
model (ICM), i.e. using one entity to refer to another related entity.41 
  The metonymy which works in the derivation of the denominative verb dice is 
RESULT FOR ACTION, which allows us to mentally access an action via a resultant 
state (cf. Kövecses (2002)).  Thus the resultant state dice is the vehicle, while the 
action of cutting is the target.  This metonymy enables us to access the process of 
cutting food by referring to the resultant state dice.  Incidentally, the noun dice per se 
is also derived from the noun denoting a small square like a dice, a small cube with a 
different number of spots (1 to 6, in general) on each side.  This is an example of 
extension via metaphor. 
  Extensions via metonymy like (61b) are not uncommon in English, and there are 
numerous examples of the transition or conversion from nouns to verbs: slice „to cut 
something into slice‟, sugar „to make something sweet by adding sugar‟, pocket „to 
put something into one‟s pocket‟, bag „to put something in a bag‟ and so on (cf. 
                                                     
41 For more details about metonymy and ICM, see Lakoff (1987) and Kövecses (2002). 
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Yumoto (2011)).  It should be kept in mind that the characteristic of denominalization 
of this kind is that a single form (e.g. dice) can be used as a different part of speech.  
English is rich in variations of this kind via metonymic operations. 
  As seen above, English is very susceptible to metonymy.  On the basis of the 
metonymy-sensitive characteristics of English, Yasui (2005) refers to a language 
which expands its variations in expression via metonymy as a metonymic-extension 
language. 
  Let us turn our attention to Japanese.  In contrast to English, Japanese is not 
very susceptible to metonymic operations partly because of its morphological 
characteristics.  Let us observe the following example, a counterpart to (61b). 
 (62)  * yudeta zyagaimo-o  sainome-nasai/ro. 
     boiled potatoes-Acc dice-Imp 
     „Dice the cooked potatoes.‟ 
As is shown in (62), in Japanese, one cannot refer to the process of cutting via the 
resultant state sainome „dice‟.  If one is to describe the same event (i.e. to dice the 
cooked potatoes) in Japanese, s/he has to describe the sub-events composing the whole 
event explicitly word by word.  This is illustrated as follows: 
 (63)   yudeta zyagaimo-o  sainome-ni kiri-nasai 
     boiled potatoes-Acc dice-into  cut-Imp 
     „Cut the cooked potatoes into dice.‟ 
In example (63), the sub-events composing the whole process, i.e. the process of 
cutting the potatoes (i.e. kiru „cut‟) and the resultant state of the potatoes (i.e. 
sainome-ni „into dice‟), are described individually.  As shown in (63), to describe an 
event that covers a process and result, one has to describe it analytically; that is, 
describing the process and result of the event separately.  On the basis of the analytic 
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characteristics of Japanese, Yasui (2005) refers to a language which expands its 
variations word by word as an analytic-extension language. 
  As seen above, English and Japanese are contrastive in their affectedness by 
metonymy; hence the former is metonymic, while the latter is analytic.  One may 
argue that metonymy works in Japanese as well as in English, because there are many 
expressions in Japanese that seem to be affected by metonymy.  Take the expression 
watasi-wa Foodo-o kat-ta „I bought a Ford‟ for example.  In this example, the word 
Foodo „Ford‟ does not refer to a firm manufacturing automobiles; rather, it refers to a 
car manufactured by Ford via the metonymy PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT (cf. 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980:38)). 
  An argument of this sort seems to be quite to the point in a sense.  It is true that 
Japanese are also affected by metonymy in terms of lexical meanings.  However, it 
should be noted that the influence of metonymy on the morphology and syntax of 
Japanese is quite limited, at least in comparison with English.  At least in my opinion, 
it seems that metonymy works almost exclusively on the word meaning level in 
Japanese.42  On the other hand, as seen above, the influence of metonymy on English 
is quite extensive.  Its influence extends from the level of word meaning to the level 
of syntactic form.43  In fact, Lakoff (1987:77-78) argues that metonymy is one of the 
basic characteristics in human cognition and that since general principles that make 
our metonymic interpretation possible are not the same in all languages, one needs to 
                                                     
42 It is true that one can find denominal verbs in Japanese such as gugu-ru „to google/to search via 
Google‟ and syame-ru „to e-mail images or pictures from mobile phones‟.  These denominal verbs 
seem to be based on the metonymic operation TOOL FOR ACTION (cf. Kövecses (2002)).  However, 
a conversion of this kind is not productive in Japanese.  In this connection, Kageyama,ed. (2001:180) 
takes a similar view:  Japanese has developed compound verbs (e.g. sainome-giri-ni suru „cut 
something into dice‟), instead of using other grammatical means such as conversion or semantic 
composition.  This shows the analytic characteristics of Japanese.  See Yumoto (2011:74), who also 
points out that the noun-to-verb conversion is not so productive in Japanese. 
43 However, it cannot be denied that the influence of metonymy on the syntax level is an effect of the 
influence on the lexical meaning level. 
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distinguish which principles work for which languages.  Lakoff‟s remark suggests 
that the applicability of metonymy to the system of grammar or linguistic expressions 
varies language by language, which is quite compatible with my view.  In addition, 
with regard to the applicability of metaphorical extension, including metonymy, to the 
system of grammar, the notion of grammatical metaphor proposed in the field of 
systemic functional grammar (Halliday (1994:340-367)) seems to be quite suggestive. 
I will return to this problem later. 
  Now let us return to the issue of Type 2 E-SACs and see how metonymy affects 
their form.  As seen above, metonymy influences English in terms of its variation in 
expression.  Then it is reasonable to think that the influence of metonymy extends to 
Type 2 E-SACs. 
  Here, I assume that an utterance or speech, i.e. something that you say, is a result 
of the act of saying: an utterance cannot be produced without the act of saying it.  
With this assumption, let us consider Type 2 E-SACs.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
apodoses of Type 2 J-SACs can be regarded as complements or arguments of the 
speech-act verbs. 
In the same fashion, the apodoses of Type 2 E-SACs can be regarded as the 
complements of the speech-act verbs, even though they are not linguistically realized 
in default cases.  In this regard, English is more illustrative in that the phrases 
containing speech-act verbs (e.g. I tell you), if explicitly stated, make up the apodoses 
of Type 2 SACs with the reported clauses.  In light of this, the relationship between 
speech-act verbs, which denote the act of saying something, and apodoses, which 
denote the product of the action, can be illustrated as follows: 
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 (64)   If you want to know, I tell you      I haven‟t seen him. 
        
       ACT of SAYING  RESULT of SAYING (product) 
In figure (64), it is assumed that the phrase I tell you denotes the act of saying, while 
the reported clause I haven’t seen him denotes the result or product of saying.  From 
this perspective, a parallelism is found between the case of the verb dice in (61b) and 
the reported clause I haven’t seen him in (64):  a metonymy like RESULT FOR 
ACTION works in Type 2 E-SACs.  That is, the fact that the grammaticality of Type 
2 E-SACs is not affected by the deletion of the phrase I tell you means that one can 
access the act of saying via its product or result, i.e. its reported clause.  Conversely, 
from the speaker‟s point of view, one can refer to the act of saying via its product 
without explicitly stating the act.  This process can be illustrated as follows: 
 (65)   I  tell  you      reported clause 
 
   Deleted (Backgrounded) Vocalized (Foregrounded) 
The explanation goes as follows.  As shown in figure (65), by virtue of the metonymy 
RESULT FOR ACTION, the reported clause of the speech-act verb tell is 
foregrounded, and as a result, the phrase containing the speech-act verb I tell you is 
relatively backgrounded.  It goes without saying that addressee-orientedness is also 
involved in this process:  by the interaction of the communicativity or public-self 
centeredness of English and the addressee-orientedness presupposed in Type 2 SACs, 
the addressee you need not be expressed. 
  Given that English is communicatively strong by nature, it is predictable that 
English is likely to be affected by the metonymic operation just stated:  its 
communicativity is not impaired at all by the deletion or non-vocalization of the 
Metonymy: RESULT FOR ACTION 
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speech-act verbs, especially when the presence of an addressee is presupposed. 
  Given this, in addition to the functional reasons given above (cf. Chapter 3 and 
(33) in this chapter), the obligatory occurrence of the speech-act verbs in Type 2 
J-SACs can also be captured in terms of metonymy:  the mechanism illustrated in 
(65) never works in Japanese, because Japanese is an analytic-extension language and 
refuses such a metonymic operation on the syntax or grammar level.  Put differently, 
the deletion or non-vocalization of the speech-act verbs of Type 2 E-SACs can be 
attributed to the strong communicativity (or public-self centeredness) and the 
disposition of English language to be a metonymic-extension language; on the other 
hand, the obligatory occurrence of the speech-act verbs of Type 2 J-SACs can be 
attributed to the interaction of the communicative weakness (or private-self 
centeredness) and the disposition of Japanese to be an analytic language. 
  Here, two further questions arise.  The first question is:  what about the 
functions fulfilled by the speech-act verbs?  As revealed in Chapter 3, at least in Type 
2 J-SACs, the functions to be fulfilled by the speech-act verbs are as follows:   
 (66) The speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs function as connectors:  they 
semantically connect the protases and the fake apodoses, and their presence 
guarantees causality.     (= (5a)) 
As stated in (66), in Type 2 J-SACs, the speech-act verbs must fulfill two functions:  
they semantically connect the protases and the fake apodoses, and their presence 
guarantees causality.  It should be considered whether these functions need not be 
fulfilled in Type 2 E-SACs. 
  The answer is as follows.  These functions should also be fulfilled, even if the 
speech-act verbs are not vocalized, because at least a causal relation must be 
guaranteed between the protases and the act of speech denoted by speech-act verbs.  
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Let us consider how the functions stated in (66) are fulfilled. 
    Recall here that metonymy has much to do with the syntax of Type 2 E-SACs, 
and the relevant metonymy is RESULT FOR ACTION.  By virtue of this metonymy, 
the element designating a resultant or product can cover the action producing it.  
Given this, it stands to reason that those functions in (66) should be fulfilled by 
resultant phrases (i.e. apodoses in Type 2 E-SACs).  That is, apodoses can cover the 
functions to be fulfilled by speech-act verbs via metonymy.44  It goes without saying 
that speech-act verbs fulfill those functions, if vocalized. 
  The second question is as follows: if the speech-act verbs and their concomitants 
(i.e. subjects and indirect objects) can be suppressed or backgrounded, does it mean 
that they are redundant, superfluous elements in the first place? 
  To answer this question, the effect if they are vocalized should be taken into 
account.  In other words, we should consider what the meaning of the presence of 
speech-act verbs and their concomitants (i.e. subjects and indirect objects) is, when the 
presence of an addressee is presupposed. 
What is brought to mind here is the effect of emphasis.  Let us take the 
imperative Be quiet for example.  An imperative is a form of expression that 
presupposes the existence of an addressee, and thus is a public expression.  If the 
implicit, presupposed addressee you is vocalized in the imperative sentence, the 
expression You be quiet often implies the speaker‟s irritation (cf. Quirk et al. 
(1972:403)).  Furthermore, if the phrase I ask follows You be quiet (i.e. You be quiet, I 
ask you.), the speaker‟s emotion, such as irritation and sarcasm, is more clearly 
conveyed. 
                                                     
44 Conversely, it follows that the apodosis of Type 2 J-SACs cannot cover those functions, because a 
metonymy such as RESULT FOR ACTION does not work. 
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  In this way, the vocalization of elements which are usually considered as 
superfluous reflects some emotional state of intention of the speaker.  In the case of 
Type 2 E-SACs, it should be admitted that the effect of the vocalization of I tell you is 
obscure; however, it suffices for the moment to say that the speaker‟s intention or 
emotion may be reflected on the vocalization of I tell you.45 
  In this subsection, I have shown that there is an intimate relationship between 
metonymy and Type 2 J- and E-SACs.  Specifically, the omissibility of speech-act 
verbs in Type 2 E-SACs can be attributed to the communicative strength of English 
and the disposition to use metonymy actively; by contrast, the obligatory occurrence of 
the speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs can be attributed to the communicative 
weakness of Japanese and lack of the disposition to use metonymy on the syntax level. 
Based on the above argument, I would like to propose the following hypothesis: 
 (67) The public/private-self centeredness and the extensibility via metonymy of a 
language may be two sides of the same coin:  public-self centered languages 
like English are more sensitive to metonymic operations than private-self 
centered languages like Japanese. 
Admittedly, more evidence is required to corroborate the hypothesis in (67).  To 
confirm the hypothesis, I have to investigate other public-self centered languages and 
private-self centered languages from the viewpoint of metonymic extension.  
However, it is true that extensibility via metonymy has as much influence on the 
system of grammar as public/private-self centeredness does.  If the two natures are in 
harmonious relation to each other, it would be possible that they are in implicational 
relation in terms of linguistic universals (cf. Greenberg (1963)).  That is, if a 
                                                     
45 In this sense, the phrase I tell you can possibly be regarded as a modal expression like I insist in I 
insist that you leave the room immediately (cf. Nuyts (2005:9)). 
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language is public-self centered, then it is relatively sensitive to metonymic 
operations; if a language is private-self centered, then it is relatively insensitive to 
metonymic operations. 
 
4.6.2.  Grammatical Metaphor 
  It might be argued that it is too much to say that a semantic mechanism like 
metonymy works on the syntax or grammar level.  However, I will show that such a 
view is, to some degree, supported in terms of grammatical metaphor (hereafter, GM) 
in Halliday‟s (1994) terminology.  In this subsection, I will take up GM as a support 
of my analysis of Type 2 E-SACs in terms of metonymy. 
  It is generally supposed that figures of speech such as metaphor, metonymy and 
synecdoche are matters of lexicosemantics.46  However, Halliday (1994:341) points 
out that lexical selection via METAPHOR (i.e. metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche) 
is just one aspect of lexicogrammatical selection, or wording; and that metaphorical 
variation is lexicogrammatical rather than simply lexical.  He refers to the 
lexicogrammatical aspect of METAPHOR as GM. 
 
4.6.2.1.  Perspective of Grammatical Metaphor 
  For a better understanding of the difference between traditional METAPHOR 
and GM, let us take the sentence Protests flooded in for example, taken from Halliday 
(1994:341).  In this sentence, the verb flood does not designate a moving mass of 
water; rather, what it means is a large number of people like a flood.  Thus, 
according to Halliday (1994:341-342), the sentence can be interpreted or paraphrased 
                                                     
46 Hereafter, I will use the term METAPHOR (in capitals) as a cover term to refer to a set of these 
three traditional „figures of speech‟.  
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as Protests came in in large quantities, Protests were received in large quantities, or 
even Very many people protested. 
  As seen from this example, traditional METAPHOR is defined as the means to 
understand something by reference to something else on the basis of similarity 
(metaphor), contiguity (metonymy), and whole-part relationship (synecdoche).  
Traditional METAPHOR in general is intrinsically a “second-order” phenomenon in 
language.  In this regard, Halliday (1994:342) states that this is usually presented as a 
one-way relationship where to some metaphorical meaning of a word there 
corresponds another, non-metaphorical meaning that is said to be “literal”:  a 
linguistic expression can only be labeled metaphorical by virtue of there being a 
comparable non-metaphorical expression (cf. Taverniers (2006:326)).  To put it 
plainly, if a linguistic expression has some metaphorical meaning, then it necessarily 
has a core, primary meaning from which it is derived or extended.  Metaphorical 
meanings always presuppose non-metaphorical meanings. 
For example, the word flood above has at least two meanings: (i) a moving mass 
of water and (ii) a large number of people.  In this case, the former meaning is 
referred to as the non-metaphorical or literal meaning of flood, while the latter 
meaning is referred to as metaphorical meaning of flood.  This relationship is, as it 
were, looking at METAPHOR „from below‟, which is illustrated as follows: 
  (68)    seen „from below‟ 
    literally   metaphorically 
   „a moving mass „a moving mass of feeling 
    of water‟   or rhetoric‟ 
      flood 
                     (Halliday (1994:342)) 
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Figure (68) represents the relationship between literal and metaphorical meanings of 
the word flood.  As seen from the figure, the relationship is illustrated from the 
viewpoint of the word flood.  The word literally denotes a moving mass of water; it 
metaphorically denotes a moving mass of feeling.  That is, a single word has more 
than one meaning.  This is the traditional view of METAPHOR.  This „word to 
meaning‟ relationship is referred to by Halliday as „from below‟, looking at 
METAPHOR as variation in the meaning of a given expression. 
  On the other hand, Halliday (1994) claims that GM presents a quite different 
view of the relationship between linguistic expressions (including not only words but 
also larger units) and their meanings, looking at METAPHOR from above, as variation 
in the expression of a given meaning.  To put it plainly, this means that a given 
meaning has more than one linguistic form. 
With regard to the case of the meaning many people, for instance, the 
perspective of GM can be illustrated like the following: 
 (69)    seen „from above‟ 
      „many people‟ 
 
    a large number a flood 
    congruent  metaphorical 
(Halliday (19943:42), with slight modifications) 
In (69), to avoid confusion with the general term literal, Halliday uses the term 
congruent, which refers to the less metaphorical variant of expressions.  Thus, in this 
figure, the expression a large number is regarded as the less metaphorical of the two 
candidates for expressions meaning many people.  The relationship between the 
expressions (i.e. a large number and flood) and their target meaning (i.e. many people) 
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is illustrated from the viewpoint of the meaning.  This “meaning to expression” 
relationship is referred to by Halliday (1994) as “from above”. 
  As has been evident from the discussion so far, the notion of GM presents us a 
new perspective to the relationship between a given word or expression and its 
meaning.  In a word, traditional METAPHOR looks for meanings from a given word 
or expression, while GM looks for words or expressions from a given meaning. 
 
4.6.2.2.  Two Syntactic Forms of Type 2 SACs as Grammatical Metaphor 
  With the perspective given by GM in mind, let us return to Type 2 SACs.  In 
what follows, I focus on Type 2 E-SACs for the convenience of explanation. 
  In the light of GM and its perspective, it is reasonable to think that the 
relationship between Type 2 SACs with speech-act verbs and ones without them can 
be understood from the viewpoint of GM.  As Yasui (2008) states, when more than 
one expression stands as a candidate for expressions to convey a given meaning, it is 
difficult to distinguish which one is metaphorical and which one is congruent.  In this 
regard, Yasui (2008) himself states that multiple possible expressions denoting a single 
meaning can be understood in terms of GM, as long as they can be paraphrased into 
one another.  He interprets a congruent form as an expression that describes what one 
wants to say in a straightforward manner.47  On the basis of Yasui‟s comment, I 
regard Type 2 SACs with speech-act verbs as congruent and ones without them as 
metaphorical, though I will not discuss the strict criteria to determine which is which.  
Here, it suffices to say that the analysis of Type 2 E-SACs via metonymy, to some 
extent, can be endorsed by GM. 
  As seen above, the Type 2 SACs with speech-act verbs and those without them 
                                                     
47 For more details, see Yasui (2008:164-189). 
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can be related to each other via metonymy.  From the viewpoint of GM, it is 
reasonable to assume that the former are congruent realizations and the latter are 
metaphorical (metonymical) realizations of Type 2 SACs.  The following figure 
illustrates this point, taking the expression If you want to know, (I tell you) I haven’t 
seen him for example:48 
 (70)  If you want to know, then let us consider that I perform 
     the following speech-act: I assert that I haven’t seen him. 
 
    If you want to know,   If you want to know, 
    I tell you I haven‟t seen him. I haven‟t seen him. 
     congruent   metaphorical 
In figure (70), the italicized phrase represents an abstract meaning to be conveyed by 
Type 2 E-SACs.49  As illustrated, the sentence If you want to know, I tell you I haven’t 
seen him is a congruent form in that it describes what the speaker wants to say in a 
straightforward manner by virtue of the phrase I tell you, which linguistically realizes 
the speech act of assertion in the apodosis.  On the other hand, the sentence If you 
want to know, I haven’t seen him is a metaphorical form in that it describes what the 
speaker wants to say in a metaphorical or metonymic manner.  In this way, my 
analysis of Type 2 E-SACs is quite compatible with the perspective of GM. 
  There is further evidence that my analysis is corroborated by GM.  Recall what 
I have argued above:  Japanese is an analytic-extension language which tends to 
                                                     
48 In (68), the term metaphorical is used as a cover term for the three figures of speech, i.e. metaphor, 
metonymy, and synecdoche.  As argued above, these three notions are treated uniformly in terms of 
GM. 
49 The meaning in (70) is based on the following paraphrase proposed by Sweetser (1990:121): If 
[protasis], then let us consider that I perform this speech act (i.e. the one represented as apodosis).  
Here I assume that this meaning should be regarded as the speaker‟s intention or mental 
representation. 
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refuse metonymic operations on the syntax level.  In other words, Japanese, as an 
analytic-extension language, is less subject to GM, at least in comparison with English.  
Although at present it is impossible to give exact data, it is predicted that Japanese 
prefers congruent forms to metaphorical forms because of its analytic characteristic.  
In this connection, the following statement by Yasui (2008) is quite compatible with 
my view: 
 (71) It is true that Japanese has both congruent and metaphorical forms.  
However, the proportion of metaphorical forms to congruent forms in 
Japanese seems to be much smaller in comparison with English, which will 
turn out to be an incontrovertible fact, no matter what statistics we may use. 
(Yasui (2008:180) [English translation is mine]) 
In this way, to some extent, my claim that the difference between Type 2 J-SACs and 
E-SACs can be attributed to the difference in their affectedness by metonymic 
operations is supported by the notion of grammatical metaphor. 
 
4.7.  Concluding Remarks 
  In this chapter, I conducted a contrastive study of Type 2 J- and E-SACs in terms 
of addressee-orientedness or public/private-self centeredness, which is mainly based 
on Hirose (1995, 1997, 2000) and related studies such as Wada (2005, 2008, 2010).  
In addition, I showed on the basis of Yasui (2005) and Halliday (1994) that the 
difference between Type 2 J-SACs and E-SACs can possibly be related to the 
difference in their affectedness by metonymic operation. 
  I have made the following points.  First of all, the obligatory occurrence of the 
speech-act verbs of Type 2 J-SACs can be attributed to the communicatively weak 
characteristics, i.e. private-self centeredness, of Japanese in combination with the 
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functional reasons given in Chapter 3.  On the other hand, the optional occurrence of 
the speech-act verbs of Type 2 E-SACs can be attributed to the communicative 
strength, i.e. public-self centeredness of English.  Specifically, it was shown that the 
semantic notions speaker involvement (SI) and C-gravitation are significantly relevant 
to the clause linkage of SACs.  I also made the hypothesis that the public/private-self 
centeredness and the extensibility via metonymy of a language may be two sides of the 
same coin, although I admit that further pieces of evidence are required to verify it. 
  In conclusion, I would like to refer to a future direction of inquiry.  With regard 
to the obligatory/optional occurrence of speech-act verbs, it is expected that my 
analysis can be applied to other conjunctions expressing causal relations such as 
because and since.  Observe the following examples: 
 (72) a.  He works hard, because he‟s at the office every morning at nine.  
(Palmer (1988:154)) 
   b.  And since I must tell you every thing in great detail, we went out 
together to send a telegram.                (Sakahara (1985:153)) 
It is widely known that because and since can also represent causal relations in the 
speech-act domain (cf. Sweetser (1990), Kanetani (2007), among others).  Thus, in 
(72a), the because-clause does not represent the cause of the state he works hard; 
rather, it explains why the speaker utters the preceding sentence.  In the same fashion, 
the since-clause in (72b) does not give the reason why the referent of we went together 
to send a telegram; rather, it describes the reason why the speaker says “we went 
together to send a telegram.”  For want of a better term, let us refer to because and 
since of this kind as speech-act because (SAB) and speech-act since (SAS), 
respectively.  As seen in (72), in English, speech-act verbs such as tell (and other 
additional grammatical means to connect the two clauses) do not have to occur.  Here 
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again, they are optional or unnecessary. 
  Now let us turn to SAB and SAS in Japanese.  The counterparts to the 
sentences in (72) are exemplified below: 
 (73) a.  kare-wa issyookenmei hatarai-teiru.  to  yuunomo mai  asa 
     he-Top  hard   work-AspV  Quot say  every morning 
     kuzi  niwa zimusyo-ni iru kara-da. 
     9 o‟clock at  office-Loc  be  because-Ass 
     „He works hard, and I say this because he‟s at the office every 
morning at nine.‟ 
   b.  anata-ni-wa  subete kotokomaka-ni hanasa  nebanaranai 
     you-Dat-Top all  detail-in  tell  must 
      izyoo, hanasi-masu ga  watasitati-wa issyoni  dempoo-o 
     since tell-Pol  but we-Top together telegram-Acc 
     uti-ni  itta  no-desu. 
     send-to (purpose) went nominalizer-Cop (Pol) 
     „And since I must tell you everything in great detail, I tell you we went 
out together to send a telegram.‟ 
(Sakahara (1985:153)) 
Sentence (73a) is a counterpart to (72a) and (73b) to (72b).  The speech-act verbs are 
italicized in those sentences.  As seen in (73), in the case of SAB and SAS, 
speech-act verbs are obligatory in Japanese.  The parallelism of Type 2 SACs and 
SAB/SAS is evident.  This suggests that the functional facets of the speech-act verbs 
of Type 2 SACs also work in the sentences in (73) and that they are analyzable in 
terms of the communicatively weakness and analytic characteristics of Japanese. 
  In concluding this chapter, one further remark should be made from a 
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crosslinguistic point of view.  It is widely acknowledged that Japanese and Korean 
are similar in many respects.  In light of the similarities between the two languages 
already pointed out in many studies, it is predicted that there is a parallelism between 
them in terms of the obligatory occurrence of speech-act verbs in Type 2 SACs.  This 
prediction is supported by the fact that Korean counterparts to Type 2 J-SACs also 
obligatorily require speech-act verbs.  Observe the following examples in Korean: 
 (74) a. * 혹시 알고 싶다면,   그의 본명은 킹이야. 
         hoksi algo siptamyeon,  geue bonmyeongeun kingiya 
  Hyp know want-if he-Gen real name-Top King-Cop 
   „If you want to know, his real name is King.‟ 
 b.  혹시 알고 싶다면   가르쳐 주겠는데,  그의 
         hoksi algo siptamyeon gareuchyeo zugeonneunde, geue 
  Hyp know want-if inform give-but he-Gen 
             본명은 킹이야. 
   bonmyeongeun kingiya. 
 real name-Top King-Cop 
     „If you want to know, I inform you his real name is King.‟ 
As in the case of Type 2 J-SACs, the phrase containing a speech-act verb gareuchyeo 
zugeonneunde „I inform you, but‟ must occur in the case of Korean Type 2 SACs.50  
This fact alludes to the possibility that this phenomenon serves as a point of reference 
for linguistic typology (including the case of German SACs discussed in Section 4.5.4).  
If the argument in this chapter is on the right track, then Korean is classified into a 
                                                     
50 As will be discussed in the last chapter, the obligatory/optional occurrence of some linguistic 
expressions can also be observed in epistemic-domain conditionals:  the epistemic marker noda is 
obligatory in Japanese epistemic conditionals, whereas its equivalents such as must and it means (that) 
are optional in English epistemic conditionals.  It is intriguing to investigate whether this 
phenomenon can also be observed in Korean epistemic conditionals, which I leave open for future 
research. 
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private-self centered and metonymic insensitive language.  A further direction of this 
study will be to provide more pieces of evidence for this prediction. 
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Part 2 
 
Peripheral Conditionals in English and Japanese 
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Chapter 5 
 
Introduction of Part 2 
 
5.1.  Introduction 
     In the following chapters, I will investigate conditional constructions that have 
been regarded as peripheral and thus have been left out of serious consideration: 
adnominal conditionals, if-cleft sentences, and N1-nara N2 conditionals. 
  (1) Adnominal Conditionals 
  a.  The price if you pay now is predictable; the price if you wait a year is 
not. 
  b.  The location if it rains and the location if it doesn‟t rain are within five 
miles of each other. 
 (2) If-Cleft Sentences 
  a.  If anyone can help us, it is John. 
  b.  If I am to find a criticism, it is in the rather erratic organisation of the 
material. 
 (3) N1-nara N2 Conditionals 
  a.  sake-nara Kosinokanbai 
    „When it comes to sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.‟ 
  b.  sikaku-nara  Yuukyan 
    „When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.‟ 
In the following chapters, I will examine these conditional constructions in terms of 
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what I call semantic/pragmatic-based syntax, focusing on the relationship or mapping 
between linguistic form and meaning. 
     In the following sections, I will point out problems to be solved about the 
constructions exemplified in (1)-(3). 
 
5.2.  Organization 
     Part 2 consists of five chapters including the present chapter.  The rest of Part 2 
is organized as follows.  In Chapter 6, I will be concerned with adnominal 
conditionals (ACs).  Observe the examples in (1), repeated here as (4): 
 (4) a.  The price if you pay now is predictable; the price if you wait a year is 
not. 
  b.  The location if it rains and the location if it doesn‟t rain are within five 
miles of each other. 
It is widely acknowledged that conditional if-clauses function as subordinate clauses 
modifying the main clauses.  Note, however, that the if-clauses in (4) modify not the 
main clauses but the nominal expressions preceding them, i.e. the price and the 
location.  In this sense, ACs have been considered as peripheral and thus have been 
ignored or overlooked.  To the best of my knowledge, the only researcher that pays 
special attention to ACs to some degree is Lasersohn (1996), who addresses them from 
the viewpoint of possible world semantics in the sense of Lewis (1976).  I will show 
that Lasersohn‟s (1996) analysis is inadequate and propose the semantic/pragmatic 
licensing conditions of ACs. 
     Chapter 7 deals with if-cleft sentences in Meier‟s (1988) terminology, 
investigating their discourse function.  Let us observe the examples in (2), repeated 
here as (5): 
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 (5) a.  If anyone can help us, it is John. 
  b.  If I am to find a criticism, it is in the rather erratic organisation of the 
material. 
It is claimed that if-cleft sentences are peculiar in the following respects: (i) the clause 
order, i.e. if p, q, cannot be reversed, i.e. *q, if p, and (ii) the protasis and apodosis lack 
interdependencies such as causality, temporal sequentiality, and logical inclusion, 
which are recognized as semantic components of conditional constructions in general.  
In this connection, I will show that the fixed clause order reflects the construction‟s 
discourse function, which differentiates it from other related constructions, i.e. general 
conditionals and it/wh-clefts. 
     Chapter 8 examines N1-nara N2 conditional expressions like those exemplified 
below: 
 (6) a.  sake-nara Kosinokanbai 
    „When it comes to sake, Koshinokanbai is best.‟ 
  b.  sikaku-nara  Yuukyan 
      „When it comes to qualifications, U-CAN is best.‟ 
N1-nara N2 constructions are usually used as phrases of recommendation.  To the 
best of my knowledge, no researchers have paid special attention to this construction.1  
Thus, I will begin with a close observation of the semantics and pragmatics of the 
construction, and propose a licensing condition.  Furthermore, I will address the 
question of how and why N1-nara N2 constructions can be interpreted as phrases of 
recommendation. 
     Chapter 9 will investigate various conditionals from the viewpoint of 
                                                     
1 The only study that deals with the N1-nara N2 construction in detail is Shizawa (2011b), on which 
Chapter 8 is based. 
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specification.  I will argue that conditional constructions can be dealt with in a 
unified manner in terms of the concept specification.  Specifically, examining 
conditionals in terms of specification, I will show that conditionals and specificational 
copular sentences share some properties, emphasizing that they are similar in the 
mental process of the speaker:  they both pick out or specify a possible item from a 
set. 
    As stated above, the constructions dealt with in Part 2 are all regarded as 
exceptional cases of conditional constructions.  This means that very few, if any, 
previous studies have been concerned with these constructions.  Therefore, the main 
purpose of Part 2 is to shed light on such overlooked constructions from my own 
perspective and to accumulate evidence for the hypothesis in (8) of Chapter 1:  
linguistic form is not independent of the meaning it conveys; it is well-motivated by 
semantic and/or pragmatic principles. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Adnominal Conditionals and Their Licensing Conditions 
 
6.1.  Introduction 
6.1.1.  Overview of Typical Conditionals 
  As argued in Chapter 1, conditional constructions are roughly defined as 
complex sentences composed of a main clause (sometimes called q, or the apodosis) 
and a subordinate clause (p, or the protasis).  In addition, it is generally 
acknowledged that there is interdependency between the protasis and apodosis such as 
cause-effect relation, premise-conclusion relation, and felicity condition-speech act 
relation.  Typical conditional constructions are exemplified below: 
  (1) a.  If Mary goes, John will go. (Sweetser (1990:115)) 
   b.   If she‟s divorced, (then) she‟s been married.     (Sweetser (1990:116)) 
   c.   If you went to the party, did you see him? (Sweetser (1990:120)) 
The example in (1a) is referred to by Sweetser (1990) as a content-domain conditional.  
The relation linking p and q in content-domain conditionals is causality in the actual 
world.  In (1a), the event described in the protasis, i.e. Mary goes, causes the event in 
the apodosis, i.e. John will go.  Sentence (1b) is an epistemic-domain conditional in 
the same terminology.  In epistemic-domain conditionals, the relation linking p and q 
is that of premise-conclusion.  Specifically, the speaker in (1b) has concluded that she 
has been married from the premise that she is divorced.  Sentence (1c) is a speech-act 
domain conditional as Sweetser calls it.  In speech-act domain conditionals, causality 
holds at the speech-act level:  protases express conditions which render speech acts in 
apodoses felicitous.  In (1c), the question did you see him would be a felicitous 
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question under the condition that the hearer had been to the party. 
  In spite of the difference in their interpretations, all these conditionals have one 
feature in common:  if-clauses usually serve as subordinate clauses adjoined to the 
main clauses, describing sufficient conditions for the fulfillment of surface apodoses or 
implicit ones.1 
 
6.1.2.  If-Clauses Modifying Nominal Expressions 
  So far I have observed so-called typical conditional constructions and shown 
that the if-clauses in those examples serve as subordinate clauses modifying their main 
clauses.  However, there are if-clauses serving, like relative clauses, as modifiers to 
noun phrases (NPs).  Observe the following examples: 
 (2) a.  No one at school knew of her birthday.  Certainly, she trusted, none of 
the pupils did, although she sensed a slight reddening under her high 
cheekbones as just for a few seconds she contemplated her 
embarrassment if one of her classes broke out into “Happy Birthday, Mrs 
Stevens!” (Declerck and Reed (2001:369) [italics are mine]) 
   b.  Harry saw, in his mind‟s eye, the expression on Hermione’s face if she 
ever heard about this abuse of house-elves, and decided never to mention 
it to her. 
(J.K. Rowling. Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince [italics are mine]) 
In these examples, the if-clauses do not condition the realization of the events 
described in the main clauses.  In (2a), the condition described in the if-clause does 
not serve as a condition of her contemplation.  Rather, it conditions her 
                                                     
1 The term implicit apodoses refers to the unexpressed parts of main clauses in epistemic and 
speech-act conditionals such as I conclude and I tell/ask you, which relevance theorists refer to as 
higher explicatures (cf. Uchida (2001)). 
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embarrassment.  Likewise, the if-clause in (2b) does not describe a sufficient 
condition for the realization of the event of Harry‟s imagination; rather, it conditions 
the facial expression which Hermione would show.  That is, sentence (2b) should be 
interpreted as “Harry imagined what expression Hermione would show if she ever 
heard about this abuse of house-elves.” 
  The main concern of this chapter is with conditionals of this sort, which is 
referred to as adnominal conditionals (hereafter, ACs) by Lasersohn (1996).  
Specifically, I reveal the semantic and pragmatic properties of ACs and propose their 
licensing conditions. 
  The organization of this chapter is as follows.  Section 6.2 takes up Lasersohn 
(1996) as the only previous study that has investigated ACs seriously.  Section 6.3 
points out a number of problems with Lasersohn‟s formulation.  Section 6.4 reveals 
the semantic and pragmatic properties of ACs that have been overlooked so far, and 
proposes two licensing conditions of ACs.  Section 6.5 makes some concluding 
remarks and discusses related issues. 
 
6.2.  The Only Previous Study: Lasersohn (1996) 
  In this section, I review Lasersohn (1996).  As discussed in Chapter 1, 
conditionals and related phenomena have been one of the most intriguing issues in the 
field of linguistics, as well as philosophy and psychology.  However, little attention 
has been paid to adnominal conditionals.  For example, standard reference books 
such as Quirk et al. (1985) and Huddleston and Pullum (2002) do not refer to ACs.  
Declerck and Reed (2001) deal with three examples of ACs including (2a), but they do 
not analyze them in detail.2  Bhatt and Pancheva (2006) briefly refer to ACs, but they 
                                                     
2 They call ACs Nominal-Q Conditionals without referring to Lasersohn (1996). 
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only review Lasersohn‟s analysis.  It goes without saying that there is no mention of 
ACs in dictionaries such as OED or Webster’s.  Therefore, to the best of my 
knowledge, Lasersohn (1996) is the only study that deals with ACs seriously.3 
 
6.2.1.  Lasersohn’s Analysis 
  Lasersohn (1996) presents three possible analyses of ACs as working drafts.  
Although his working drafts per se are not directly relevant to the analysis of mine to 
be presented below, they are worth reviewing for a better understanding of the 
semantics of ACs. 
 
6.2.1.1.  Possibility 1: Concealed Question Analysis 
  The first possible analysis Lasersohn (1996) offers treats nominal expressions 
modified by ACs as concealed questions.  Observe the following examples: 
 (3) a.  We all know the consequences if we fail. 
   b.  We all know what the consequences will be if we fail. 
(Lasersohn (1996:156)) 
In (3b), the if-clause is realized as an ordinary or sentence-modifying conditional.  It 
serves as a subordinate clause modifying the antecedent clause what the consequences 
will be.  Apparently, the logical meaning of sentence (3a) and that of sentence (3b) 
are almost equivalent.  In addition, analyzing NPs containing ACs as concealed 
questions enables us to treat sentence-modifying conditionals and ACs in a unified 
manner.  Thus it seems plausible and attractive to assume that NPs with ACs are 
rewritten at logical form (LF) as concealed questions. 
                                                     
3 Fukuchi (1997) also deals with ACs and analyzes them in terms of selectional restriction without 
referring to Lasersohn (1996).  I do not examine his analysis in this thesis, because he treats ACs as 
concealed questions, which, as will be seen, is rejected by Lasersohn. 
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  However, Lasersohn rejects this analysis because not all nominal expressions 
modified by ACs appear as complements of verbs that take interrogative complements, 
as shown below: 
 (4)    The outcome if John gets his way is sure to be unpleasant for the rest of us. 
(Lasersohn (1996:155)) 
In (4), the NP the outcome if John gets his way occurs in the subject position of the 
sentence, not as a complement clause to a verb such as know, which could take an 
interrogative complement.  Thus Lasersohn concludes that the concealed question 
analysis does not seem to be adequate. 
 
6.2.1.2.  Possibility 2: Analyzing ACs as Complements to Relational Nouns 
  The second approach that Lasersohn proposes is to treat nominal expressions 
modified by ACs as relational nouns and ACs as their complements.  Observe the 
following examples: 
 (5) a.  the consequences if we fail 
   b.  the consequences of our failure 
(Lasersohn (1996:157)) 
The of-phrase in (5b) is the complement to the relational noun consequences.  If we 
analyze ACs as complements to the NPs modified by them, we can easily grasp a 
synonymous relation between (5a) and (5b).  However, if we do so, we can no longer 
treat ACs and sentence-modifying conditionals in a unified manner. 
  Unfortunately, although this idea has plausibility for some examples such as (5a), 
it is implausible for others.  Let us consider the following example: 
 (6)   The price if you pay now is predictable; the price if you wait a year is not. 
(Lasersohn (1996:155)) 
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According to Lasersohn (1996:157), the if-clause in (6) does not describe a service for 
which the price is imposed, or any other sort of event which might plausibly be a term 
of the price relation.  Thus, unlike the pair in (5), the expressions in (7) are not 
semantically equivalent: 
 (7) a.  the price if you pay now 
   b.   the price for paying now 
The meaning of (7a) can be represented roughly as “the price that will be determined 
or required if you pay now,” while that of (7b) can be read as “the price imposed for 
your immediate payment.”   
  Furthermore, Lasersohn points out that relational nouns may appear with both 
overt complements and ACs, as shown below: 
 (8)    the consequences of our failure if John is in charge 
   (Lasersohn (1996:157)) 
This example indicates that ACs should be treated not as complements but as 
adjuncts.4 Therefore, it is not plausible to regard ACs as clausal complements to 
relational nouns. 
 
6.2.1.3.  Possibility 3: Analyzing ACs as Free Relatives 
  Lasersohn takes another approach wherein the nominal modified by ACs could 
be treated as concealed free relatives: 
 (9) a.  the consequences if we fail 
   b.  what(ever) the consequences would be if we fail 
(Lasersohn (1996:159)) 
                                                     
4 However, note that the noun phrase in (8) is ambiguous in that the if-clause can possibly modify 
both consequences and our failure, which Lasersohn seems to overlook. 
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In this approach, we might analyze NPs containing ACs as being structured at the level 
of logical form.  Specifically, we would assign the NP in (9a) a logical-form 
representation essentially like the free relative in (9b). 
  As with the first approach, i.e. concealed question analysis, the advantage of the 
third approach is to be able to treat ACs and sentence-modifying conditionals in a 
unified manner.  However, it also has disadvantages like the following.  According 
to Lasersohn, for one thing, the main cost in giving such an analysis is syntactic, not 
semantic:  we must give superfluous rules for converting noun phrases containing 
ACs into free relative clauses in the mapping from surface syntactic representation to 
logical form – and we must try to justify such rules in the context of some 
well-developed syntactic theory (cf. Lasersohn (1996:159)).  In addition, note that the 
free relative, i.e. whatever the consequences would be, replaces the NP the 
consequences.  Lasersohn deems the structure of NP containing ACs as [Det [N 
if-clause]].  If the free-relative approach is valid, this means that the structure of NPs 
with ACs must be [[Det N] if-clause], and not [Det [N if-clause]] (cf. Bhatt and 
Pancheva (2006:676)).  In this way, the third approach is proved to be invalid. 
 
6.2.2.  Lasersohn’s Solution: The Semantics of Adnominal Conditionals 
  From the above observations, Lasersohn (1996) concludes that the three 
attempts to analyze ACs are problematic both empirically and theoretically.  Instead, 
he provides a semantic formulation to interpret [X if-clause] structures directly, as is 
shown below:5 
 (10)  〚X if S〛M,w = {x∈U│for all those worlds w‟ closest to w such that there 
                                                     
5 In (10), the abbreviations X, S, U, M and w stand for variable, sentence, a set of possible individuals 
(including events), model, and a set of possible worlds, respectively. 
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exists some y∈〚S〛M,w‟, it holds that x∈〚X〛M,w} 
(Lasersohn (1996:162)) 
Roughly, the formulation in (10) can be interpreted as “the meaning of the structure [X 
if S] is that in all possible worlds closest to the actual world where S is true, X is also 
true.”  If value S is assigned to variable X, the semantic formulation is linguistically 
realized as a sentence-modifying conditional, while if value N is assigned to X, the 
formulation is realized as an AC.  By virtue of the semantic formulation in (10), 
Lasersohn claims, one can grasp the semantic parallelism between sentence-modifying 
conditionals and ACs, and handle them in a unified manner. 
 
6.3.  Problems with Lasersohn’s Formulation 
  In this section, I point out a few problems with Lasersohn (1996).  As he claims, 
the semantic formulation given in (10) seems to be plausible and desirable as an 
abstract schema in that it enables us to capture the parallelism between 
sentence-modifying conditionals and adnominal ones without any special theoretical 
apparatus.  However, it is insufficient in that it overlooks some facets of ACs on the 
usage level. 
  A few observations are in order.  First of all, his formulation focuses on the 
co-occurrence of S and X (S or N), so that it overlooks basic semantic interdependency 
found in ordinary conditionals such as causality between S and X.  According to the 
formulation in (10), it seems to be sufficient for the referents of S and X to co-occur or 
coexist in possible worlds.  This means that any combination of S and N can be 
allowed in ACs, regardless of whether or not they can be related semantically in terms 
of interdependency.  This is not the case, however.  Observe the following example: 
 (11)  * The mammal if that‟s a mouse must be smaller than the mammal if that‟s a 
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dog. 
This example is composed of two ACs derived from epistemic-domain conditionals, 
i.e. If that’s a mouse, then it’s a mammal and If that’s a dog, then it’s a mammal.  The 
relationship between a mouse/dog and a mammal is inclusion:  being a mouse/dog 
entails being a mammal (not vice versa).  So the situation of being a mouse/dog and 
that of being a mammal can co-occur in any possible worlds closest to the actual world.  
Lasersohn‟s formulation cannot account for the anomalous nature of sentence (11).  
This also means that Lasersohn takes no account of the polysemy of conditional 
constructions pointed out by Sweetser (1990).  If, as the example in (11) shows, 
protases of epistemic conditionals cannot be used as ACs, it means that of the three 
types of conditional constructions, i.e. content, epistemic and speech-act domain 
conditionals, content-domain conditionals alone can be adnominalized.6  It seems that 
the adnominal use of if-clauses is possible if and only if causal relations are 
established between the if-clauses and nominal expressions modified by them.7  That 
is, ACs are specialized for expressing causal relations between events. 
  Second, the example shown below is also problematic for Lasersohn‟s 
formulation: 
 (12)  * Please let me know his arrival if he takes a taxi. 
The intended meaning of sentence (12) is “Please let me know when he will arrive if 
he takes a taxi.”8  Although one can imagine a situation wherein the events his arrival 
                                                     
6 The other type of conditionals, i.e. speech-act domain conditionals, cannot be used as ACs, either:   
the apodoses of speech-act conditionals have to express a speech act such as an offer, promise or 
warning by definition, but nominal apodoses cannot express such speech acts. 
7 Kanetani (2011) takes a similar view, claiming that among adverbial clauses, sentence adjuncts in 
the sense of Quirk et al. (1985) alone can modify nominal expressions (for problems with his analysis, 
see footnote 15). 
8 Sentence (12) can be acceptable if the if-clause modifies the main clause, interpreted as “The 
speaker asks the hearer to inform him/her of his arrival in case he takes a taxi; if he does not take a taxi, 
the hearer need not inform the speaker of his arrival.” 
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and he takes a taxi co-occur, sentence (12) is not acceptable.  In other words, 
although sentence (12) seems to be quite compatible with Lasersohn‟s formulation, it 
is not acceptable.  To make sentence (12) acceptable without changing the intended 
meaning in a significant way, the phrase the time of must be added, as shown below: 
 (13)   Please let me know the time of his arrival if he takes a taxi. 
What the contrast between (12) and (13) means is neither that the phrase his arrival if 
he takes a taxi is never acceptable nor that the noun phrase his arrival is never 
compatible with the modification by ACs.  In fact, the phrase at issue is fully 
acceptable in certain contexts, as illustrated by the following example: 
 (14)   His arrival if he takes a taxi may be later than (his arrival) if he takes a 
train. 
The sentence in (14) can be interpreted as “The time of his arrival if he takes a taxi 
may be later than (the time of his arrival) if he takes a train.”  Although the NP the 
time is not explicitly stated, one can infer that the speaker of sentence (14) is interested 
in when he will arrive.  The difference in acceptability between (12) and (14) cannot 
be fully accounted for by Lasersohn‟s formulation.  These examples show that not 
only semantics but also pragmatics should be taken into consideration to deal with 
ACs properly. 
  Furthermore, the following examples show that his attempt to treat ACs and 
standard conditionals in a unified manner ends up not being successful: 9 
 (15) a. * We {know/imagine} no consequence if we fail. 
   b.  We {don‟t know/can‟t imagine} what consequences will follow if we fail. 
   c.  We {know/imagine} there will be no consequence if we fail. 
According to my informant, sentence (15a) seems to be very odd and cannot be 
                                                     
9 I am indebted to Takeo Kurafuji of Ritsumeikan University for example (15a). 
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interpreted properly.  If one is to express the possible meaning of (15a), s/he has to 
express it either as (15b) or as (15c).  Note here that the expressions corresponding to 
the NP no consequence in (15a) are expressed in clausal forms in (15b) and (15c).  
Contrary to Lasersohn‟s view or expectation, this contrast indicates that ACs are not 
identical with sentence-modifying conditionals:  ACs inherit some semantic features 
of sentence-modifying conditionals (e.g. causal relation at the content domain level) 
and are licensed by certain semantic and pragmatic factors. 
  The above observations show that the formal treatment given by Lasersohn 
(1996) is inadequate.  To deal with ACs properly, not only semantic but also 
pragmatic viewpoint is required.  In the next section, taking both semantic and 
pragmatic factors into account, I will propose two licensing conditions of ACs and 
show their validity using both attested and constructed examples. 
 
6.4.  Licensing Conditions of Adnominal Conditionals 
6.4.1.  Licensing Condition 1: Meanings of NPs Modified by ACs 
6.4.1.1.  Resultant-Event Type Nouns and Resultant-Value Type Nouns 
  To propose proper licensing conditions of ACs, I take into account the 
relationship between ACs and NPs modified by them.  To put it more precisely, I will 
consider what kind of NPs go well with ACs.  As the examples in (11)-(14) show, this 
is one facet of ACs that Lasersohn (1996) seems to overlook or neglect.  For this 
purpose, let us observe the semantic characteristics of NPs modified by ACs by using 
examples found in the British National Corpus (BNC).  Note that in this research I 
restrict myself to specific collocations, i.e. imagine X if Y and think of X if Y, and 
exclude examples containing NPs with prenominal modifiers (e.g. think of the usual 
responses if someone says…) and postnominal ones (e.g. imagining the effects on her 
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life if she had a daughter who was assaulted in this way) for convenience of searching.  
Let us observe two of the nineteen examples found in the BNC (the italics are all 
mine): 
 (16) a.  Think of the outcry if that had been a nuclear accident. 
   b.  Imagine the reaction if David Owen had appeared at Labour‟s 1989 
conference. 
It is worth noting that nouns such as outcry and reaction do not denote a spontaneous 
event:  they need some causing events to occur.  In fact, Cambridge Advanced 
Learner’s Dictionary (CALD) defines the noun outcry as “a strong expression of anger 
and disapproval about something, made by a group of people or by the public,” and 
gives the example The release from prison of two of the terrorists has provoked a 
public outcry.  As can be inferred from the definition (the phrase made by, in 
particular) and example, the referent of outcry does not occur autonomously without a 
trigger or causer.  Likewise, CALD defines the noun reaction as “behavior, a feeling 
or an action that is a direct result of something else,” and gives the example I love to 
watch people’s reactions when I say who I am.  As the definition (the phrase a direct 
result, in particular) and example clearly show, a reaction is usually construed as a 
result of something else.  Now, let us observe the nouns found in the BNC 
examples:10 
 (17) Nouns with ACs found in the BNC (19 examples in total) 
    outcry (5), reaction (3), uproar (3), confusion (1), consequences (1), 
difficulties (1), furore (1), result (1), situation (1), scene (1), smile (1) 
As the data in (17) show, nouns compatible with ACs tend to be ones referring to 
events that are induced or brought about by something.  In other words, most of the 
                                                     
10 The numbers in parentheses represent the number of examples found in the BNC.  
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nouns in (17) can be construed as results or effects of something, i.e. resultant events.  
This fact is quite compatible with my view that ACs are specialized for expressing 
causal relations (i.e. cause-effect relations) between events/situations.   
  However, a closer examination reveals that some of the nominal expressions 
modified by ACs are difficult to construe as resultant-event nouns.  Let us observe 
the following examples: 
 (18) a.  The price if you pay now is predictable; the price if you wait a year is not. 
(= (6)) 
   b.  The location if it rains and the location if it doesn‟t rain are within five 
miles of each other.                         (Lasersohn (1996:156)) 
In (18), the NPs the price and the location are difficult to interpret as events or 
situations brought about by the fulfillment of the conditions in the if-clauses, because 
both the price and location exist in advance of the fulfillment of the conditions.  
Rather, what sentence (18a) means is that the price will be determined in accordance 
with the hearer‟s decision as to whether s/he pays now or not.  Likewise, sentence 
(18b) implies that at least two locations are prepared for some event, and one of them 
will be chosen according to the weather.  In other words, the NPs in these examples 
contain unspecified variables (e.g. specific price and location) whose values are to be 
determined by the fulfillment of the conditions in the if-clauses. 
  On the basis of this observation, I classify nouns modified by ACs into two 
classes: resultant-event type (RE) and resultant-value type (RV) nouns, as in (19): 
 (19) Two Classes of Nouns Compatible with ACs 
   a.  RE nouns: outcry, response, reaction, and the like. 
   b.  RV nouns: location, price, time, and the like. 
As discussed above, RE nouns can be construed as resultant events brought about by 
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the fulfillment of the conditions in ACs.  RV nouns, on the other hand, have variables 
whose values are to be determined by the fulfillment of the conditions described in 
ACs.  
  In this way, two types of nouns compatible with ACs are recognized.  However, 
a closer consideration reveals that RE nouns can be regarded as equivalent to RV 
nouns in a sense.  To clarify this point, let us consider the example in (16a), repeated 
here as (20): 
 (20)   Think of the outcry if that had been a nuclear accident. 
As stated above, the noun outcry is classified as a RE noun.  Now let us consider the 
interpretation of sentence (20).  The sentence can roughly be interpreted as “Think of 
what an outcry would have happened if that had been a nuclear accident.”  This 
interpretation suggests that the noun outcry in (20) implies some variable whose value 
is to be determined.  Likewise, the expression the responses if X can be interpreted as 
what responses will be given if X.  As clearly seen from these interpretations, RE 
nouns semantically contain variables represented by the word what.11  So, it is 
reasonable to deal with RE nouns as equivalent to RV nouns in that both types contain 
variables represented by wh-words.  Taking this into consideration, I can arrive at the 
following generalization: 
 (21)   The referent of a noun modified by an if-clause must be one that can be 
construed semantically as having a resultant value to be determined by the 
fulfillment of the condition described in the if-clause. 
  Bearing the generalization in (21) in mind, let us return to the examples in 
                                                     
11 This is not to say that nominal apodoses should be treated as concealed questions.  As already seen, 
it is both theoretically and empirically problematic to treat them as concealed questions.  
Nevertheless, it is not deniable that ACs are related with wh-words.  I leave this matter for future 
research. 
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(12)-(14), repeated here as (22a-c) respectively: 
 (22) a. * Please let me know his arrival if he takes a taxi. 
   b.  Please let me know the time of his arrival if he takes a taxi. 
   c.   His arrival if he takes a taxi may be later than (his arrival) if he takes a 
train. 
The unacceptability of (22a) is attributed to the fact that the NP his arrival is difficult 
to construe as a resultant event brought about by the condition if he takes a taxi:  it 
lacks some semantic information to satisfy the generalization.  In (22b), on the other 
hand, the lacking information is supplied by the NP the time, because the noun time 
falls into RV nouns.  So the NP the time of his arrival if he takes a taxi can be 
interpreted as “what time/when he will arrive if he takes a taxi.”  Sentence (22b) is 
semantically compatible with the generalization, and thus is impeccable. 
  Sentence (22c) is the most interesting of the three examples, because the 
expression his arrival if he takes a taxi, which is unacceptable in (22a), is fully 
acceptable.  It should be considered what element or factor renders sentence (22c) 
impeccable.  Here let us focus on the adjective late.  It goes without saying that the 
word late evokes time.  Thus, with the help of the word late, the expression his 
arrival can be construed as an RV noun, whose resultant value (i.e. time) is determined 
by the fulfillment of the condition in the if-clause:  the adjective late plays the same 
role as time in (22b).  In this case, the information to satisfy the licensing condition is 
pragmatically supplied by the predicative adjective late, and thus the sentence is fully 
acceptable. 
  From the above investigation, I revise the generalization in (21) and propose the 
following as a licensing condition of ACs: 
 (23)  The Licensing Condition of Adnominal Conditionals 
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    The referent of a noun modified by the if-clause must be one that can be 
construed either semantically or pragmatically as having a resultant value to 
be determined by the fulfillment of the condition in the if-clause. 
 
6.4.1.2.  The Distinction between Semantic and Pragmatic Licensing Mechanisms 
  Here I refer to the distinction between the semantic licensing (as in example 
(22b)) and pragmatic licensing (as in example (22c)).  As discussed above, sentence 
(22a) is unacceptable because it lacks some semantic information to satisfy the 
licensing condition:  the nominal expression his arrival can be construed neither as 
an RE noun nor as an RV noun.  On the other hand, sentences (22b) and (22c) are 
fully acceptable with the help of other words such as time and late.  Thus one may 
argue that their licensing mechanisms are identical in that the expression his arrival if 
he takes a taxi is licensed by the semantic information of other words; that is, both of 
the sentences are semantically licensed. 
However, note the difference between (22b) and (22c) as to what element the 
if-clauses modify.  In (22b), the element directly modified by the if-clause is time.  
That is, sentence (22b) is licensed because the noun time can be construed 
semantically as an RV noun whose resultant value is determined by the fulfillment of 
the condition described in the if-clause.  In a word, it is the semantics of the modified 
noun time that influences the grammaticality.  In (22c), on the other hand, the element 
modified by the if-clause is his arrival, which is judged unacceptable in (22a).  From 
the word late, one can infer that the phrase his arrival metonymically refers to the time 
of his arrival.  In this case, it is the pragmatic inference invited by the word late that 
licenses the expression his arrival if he takes a taxi.  In other words, the word late 
pragmatically supplies the unacceptable expression his arrival if he takes a taxi with 
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information needed to be licensed.  In this way, the expression his arrival gains its 
status as an RV noun pragmatically. 
 
6.4.2.  Licensing Condition 2: The Desirability Principle 
  In the last subsection, I proposed a first licensing condition of ACs on the basis 
of the observation using the BNC and examples of my own.  However, a closer 
investigation reveals that this condition alone is not enough to guarantee the 
acceptability of ACs: 
 (24)  * Imagine the miserable situation if I get enough sleep every day. 
At first glance, this example satisfies the licensing condition I have proposed:  the NP 
the miserable situation can be construed as a resultant event/situation brought about by 
the fulfillment of the condition in the if-clause.  One can easily imagine such a 
situation; nevertheless, sentence (24) is judged as unacceptable or semantically odd 
without any special context.  Behind the unacceptability of (24) is another pragmatic 
condition to be satisfied.  What is relevant here is the Desirability Principle, proposed 
by Akatsuka (1998). 
 
6.4.2.1.  (UN)DESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-(UN)DESIRABLE 
     Let us briefly review Akatsuka (1998).  Although the same explanation has 
already been given in Section 3.4.2.1 of Chapter 3, I repeat it here for convenience of 
the subsequent argument. 
  In everyday life, we perform various speech acts such as orders, prohibitions, 
warnings, threats and promises by using conditional constructions.  It should be 
considered what principle works behind performing such speech acts.  Let us observe 
the following example: 
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 (25)   If you eat my cookies, I‟ll whip you.  (Akatsuka (1998:13)) 
According to Akatsuka (1998:13), sentence (25) is ambiguous between a prohibition 
and a promise (or offer), as shown below: 
 (26) a.  Don‟t eat my cookies or I‟ll whip you.  (prohibition reading) 
   b. Eat my cookies and I‟ll whip you.  (promise/offer reading) 
The default interpretation of sentence (25) is (26a).  On the basis of our background 
knowledge, we usually interpret example (25) as a prohibition, as in (26a):  no 
ordinary person likes to be beaten with a whip as a punishment.  However, in a 
certain situation, sentence (25) can also be interpreted as the speech act of promise or 
offer.  If the hearer is disposed to be whipped, and the speaker utters (25) with the full 
knowledge of the hearer‟s disposition, then such an interpretation as (26b) is quite 
natural. 
  Akatsuka (1998) assumes that there is a pragmatic principle behind the 
ambiguity of the sentence in (25).  The pragmatic principle is what she calls the 
Desirability Principle: 
 (27)   The Desirability Principle 
   a.  DESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-DESIRABLE 
   b. UNDESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-UNDESIRABLE 
(Akatsuka (1998:15)) 
As shown in (27), the Desirability Principle consists of two sub-principles.  Briefly, 
the sub-principle in (27a) means that if the realization of the proposition described in 
the protasis is desirable for the speaker, the realization of the proposition in the 
apodosis will also be desirable for him/her.  As a result, the speech act intended in the 
conditional construction will be interpreted as desirable, too.  The sub-principle in 
(27b), on the other hand, means that if the realization of the proposition described in 
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the protasis is undesirable for the speaker, the realization of the proposition in the 
apodosis will also be undesirable for him/her.  As a result, the speech act intended in 
the conditional construction as a whole will be interpreted as undesirable, too. 
 The relationship between the values of Desirability and the interpretation of 
conditional constructions can be diagrammatically represented as follows: 
 (28)  Table of Desirability  
      p q if p, then q 
    DESIRABLE DESIRABLE DESIRABLE 
    UNDESIRABLE UNDESIRABLE UNDESIRABLE 
(Akatsuka (1998:15), with slight modifications) 
In table (28), p represents the proposition in the protasis and q the proposition in 
apodosis. Akatsuka considers that this principle is true of natural language in general.  
Note here that this principle lacks relationships such as DESIRABLE-LEADS- 
TO-UNDESIRABLE or UNDESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-DESIRABLE.  In this 
connection, Akatsuka argues that there is a contingency/dependency relationship 
between the protasis and apodosis of a conditional construction, which blocks such 
combinations.  In fact, neither of them can be described in the form of conditional 
constructions, at least in English, as shown below:12 
 (29) a. * If you do what I want, I will do what you don‟t like. 
      [DESIRABLE] [UNDESIRABLE] 
   b. * If you do what I don‟t like, I will do what you want. 
      [UNDESIRABLE] [DESIRABLE] 
(Akatsuka (1998:14), with slight modifications) 
  With the Desirability Principle in mind, let us return to the example in (25), 
                                                     
12 In English, such combinations must be expressed in even if forms.   
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repeated here as (30) for convenience of reference: 
 (30)   If you eat my cookies, I‟ll whip you. 
As seen above, sentence (30) is ambiguous between a prohibition and a promise (or 
offer).  When this sentence is interpreted as the prohibition Don’t eat my cookies, the 
values of Desirability are assigned as follows: 
 (31)   If you eat my cookies,  I‟ll whip you. 
     [UNDESIRABLE] [UNDESIRABLE] 
      [UNDESIRABLE] 
In (31), the proposition in the protasis you eat my cookies reflects the speaker‟s mental 
attitude UNDESIRABLE, and the proposition in the apodosis I’ll whip you also 
reflects his/her mental attitude UNDESIRABLE.  Thus the speaker‟s mental attitude 
reflected on the whole sentence is UNDESIRABLE.  The hearer reads the attitude 
and properly interprets the sentence as the prohibition Don’t eat my cookies.   
  When this sentence is interpreted as the promise I’ll whip you, the values of 
Desirability are assigned as follows: 
 (32)   If you eat my cookies,  I‟ll whip you. 
     [DESIRABLE] [DESIRABLE] 
      [DESIRABLE] 
In contrast to (31), here the proposition in the protasis you eat my cookies reflects the 
speaker‟s mental attitude DESIRABLE, and the proposition in the apodosis I’ll whip 
you also reflects his/her mental attitude DESIRABLE.  Thus the speaker‟s mental 
attitude reflected on the whole sentence is DESIRABLE.  The hearer reads the 
speaker‟s mental attitude and properly interprets the sentence as the promise I’ll whip 
you (if you do me a favor). 
  In this subsection, I have reviewed the Desirability Principle, which is 
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pragmatically relevant to the interpretation of conditionals in general.  In what 
follows, I will show that the Desirability Principle serves as another licensing 
condition of ACs. 
 
6.4.2.2.  The Desirability Principle as a Licensing Condition of ACs 
  As argued above, the Desirability Principle is a general principle in conditional 
constructions.  If this is the case, ACs must follow it.  Let us observe the example in 
(24), repeated here as (33), from the viewpoint of the Desirability Principle: 
 (33)  * Imagine the miserable situation if I get enough sleep every day. 
In terms of lexical meanings, the adjective miserable tends to be interpreted as 
UNDESIRABLE.  In fact, OALD defines it as “very unhappy or uncomfortable.”  
On the other hand, we usually interpret the proposition I get enough sleep every day as 
DESIRABLE, because, from our daily experience, not getting enough sleep leads to 
poor performance at work, risks for injury, and poor health.  That is, the combination 
of the values of Desirability in (33) is DESIRABLE-LEADS-TO-UNDESIRABLE.  
As argued above, this combination is not allowed in conditional constructions.  To 
represent this combination, we have to use concessive constructions with even if.  
However, the conjunction even if cannot be used as an ACs, as in (34): 
 (34)  * Imagine the miserable situation even if I get enough sleep every day. 
      [UD] [D] 
In (34), the capitals D and UD are the abbreviations of DESIRABLE and UN- 
DESIRABLE, respectively.  As shown in (34), even if cannot be used as an 
adnominal concessive clause.  Furthermore, this seems to indicate that the concessive 
reading, which is possible in sentence-modifying if-clauses in certain contexts, is 
barred.  From this observation, I assume that the values of Desirability assigned in 
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nominal apodoses and adnominal protases should be consistent with each other. 
  Note that the above observation and related discussion are concerned with 
lexical meanings, i.e. semantics.  Pragmatic factors should be taken into 
consideration.  In fact, as Akatsuka (1998:19) states, the Desirability Principle per se 
is a pragmatic notion, although it is closely related with semantics and syntax.  It 
reflects the speaker‟s mental attitude, rather than lexical meanings of items. 
For example, consider the statement I will kill you.  The default or lexical 
meaning conveyed by this statement is UNDESIRABLE:  no ordinary person wishes 
to kill someone or to be killed by someone.  However, in a situation where the 
speaker could get some benefit by killing the hearer, the statement should be 
interpreted as DESIRABLE.  This means that the values of Desirability are more 
sensitive to contexts than to lexical meanings.  In fact, pragmatics takes priority over 
semantics, at least as far as the Desirability Principle is concerned.   
  If so, it is expected that sentence (33) may be accepted in some contexts wherein 
the noun phrase the miserable situation can be interpreted as DESIRABLE or the 
event I get enough sleep every day as UNDESIRABLE.  This expectation is borne 
out, as shown below: 
 (35) Of course I know it‟s important for me to sleep well, but I have a lot of parts to 
play in this plan!  Imagine the miserable situation if I get enough sleep every 
day. [UD] [UD] 
The sentence in (33) is fully acceptable when embedded in a context like (35).  As 
inferred from the first sentence, the speaker cannot sleep well now because of the 
business plan that he is engaged in.  In this context, both the miserable situation and I 
get enough sleep every day should be interpreted as UNDESIRABLE events. 
  Let us observe another example for confirmation: 
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 (36) Imagine the awful consequences if we have a good time.  I hope our boss‟ll 
         [D]    [D] 
   get really upset! 
In terms of lexical meanings, the first sentence in (36) is expected to be unacceptable:  
the phrase awful consequences is UNDESIRABLE, while the statement we have a 
good time is DESIRABLE.  However, as can be inferred from the second sentence, 
i.e. I hope our boss’ll get really upset, the speaker wants to bring about some awful 
consequences to bother his/her boss.  In this context, the NP the awful consequences 
can easily be interpreted as DESIRABLE. 
  On the basis of the above observation, I propose a second licensing condition of 
ACs like the following: 
 (37) The Pragmatic Licensing Condition of ACs 
   ACs must strictly follow the Desirability Principle:  the values of Desirability 
in the nominal apodosis and the if-clause must be consistent with each other. 
Condition (37) implies that ACs never allow concessive readings (i.e. interpreting an 
if-clause as an even if-clause) in any contexts.  Again, this shows that ACs and 
sentence-modifying if-clauses cannot be dealt with in a unified manner. 
 
6.4.2.3.  Possible Counterargument 
  One might argue that the Desirability Principle as a licensing condition of ACs 
is not reasonable in sentences describing objective events such as (38).13, 14  For 
example, lexical items such as movie seem to be neutral as to the value of Desirability: 
                                                     
13 By the word objective, I mean that the speaker is not involved with the event described in a 
sentence. 
14 Example (38) is taken from the following web site: 
 http://www.glamorati.com/celebrity/2008/20-actors-and-actresses-who-turned-down-importan
t-or-popular-roles/ 
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 (38) John Travolta?  Good thing he turned down the role of Forrest Gump…Tom 
Hanks was perfect for it, he was the one!  I couldn‟t imagine the movie if it 
was John Travolta! 
However, recall that the principle of Desirability is pragmatic in nature:  it reflects the 
speaker‟s mental attitude, rather than lexical meanings of items, although there are 
cases where they accord with each other.  As discussed above, it is a mistake to 
assume that lexical meanings directly reflect speakers‟ evaluations.  In this example, 
for instance, the statement Tom Hanks was perfect for it, he was the one clearly 
indicates that the speaker gives positive evaluation, i.e. DESIRABLE, to the actual 
movie Forrest Gump.  Then, s/he thinks that if John Travolta had accepted the offer 
and played the role given to Tom Hanks in the movie, it would have been undesirable.  
That is, the combination of the values of Desirability given to the last sentence is 
UNDESIRABLE-UNDESIRABLE, as shown below: 
 (39) I couldn‟t imagine the movie if it was John Travolta! 
      [UD] [UD] 
In this way, the speakers‟ evaluation as to desirability is reflected in ACs.  It should 
be noted that the Desirability Principle is a pragmatic principle, and thus is dependent 
on the context, i.e. in what situation an utterance is given. 
    
6.4.3.  Summary 
  In this section, I have proposed licensing conditions of ACs as shown below: 
 (40) The Licensing Conditions of Adnominal Conditionals 
   Adnominal conditionals are licensed if the following conditions are satisfied: 
   a.  The referent of a noun modified by the if-clause must be one that can be 
construed either semantically or pragmatically as having a resultant value 
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to be determined by the fulfillment of the condition in the if-clause. 
   b. ACs must strictly follow the Desirability Principle:  the values of 
Desirability in the nominal apodosis and the if-clause must be consistent 
with each other.  
Condition (40a) is a special condition imposed on ACs, while condition (40b) is based 
on a general pragmatic condition for conditional constructions in general.  As argued 
above, ACs are properly licensed by the interaction of the two conditions. 
 
6.5.  Concluding Remarks 
  In this chapter, I was concerned with adnominal conditionals (ACs) and 
proposed their licensing conditions.  I made the following points.  First, ACs are 
extended from event level or content-domain level conditionals.  That is, nominal 
expressions modified by ACs are construed as results brought about by the fulfillment 
of the conditions described in ACs.  Second, if such a construal is impossible or 
difficult by semantic information alone, pragmatic information may fill in gaps.  
Furthermore, the Desirability Principle, which holds in conditional constructions in 
general, also affects the acceptability of ACs, which means that the objectivist view 
proposed by Lasersohn (1996) is inadequate. 
  In concluding this chapter, I would like to touch upon some related issues.  
Although this chapter has proposed semantic/pragmatic licensing conditions of ACs 
from the viewpoint of causality ((40a), in particular), the conjunction because cannot 
be used adnominally: 
 (41) a.  We know the consequences if we fail. 
   b. * We know the consequences because we fail. 
As is widely acknowledged, because is a representative marker of causality in English.  
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Although the notion of causality is common between if and because, the former alone 
can be used as a marker introducing adnominal clauses, as shown in (41).15  That is, 
the unacceptability of (41b) implies that the licensing condition in (40a), which is 
based on the notion of causality, is a special condition imposed on ACs, and not a 
general condition for adnominalization of adverbial clauses.  In other words, the 
notion of causality is not relevant to adnominalization per se.  Admittedly, I am not in 
a position to give a clear solution to the problem.  However, the difference between if 
and because at issue can possibly be attributed to the difference of their basic semantic 
characteristics: hypothetical vs. factual.  The conjunction if is hypothetical in that it 
evokes hypothetical situations.  Behind the hypothetical situation that if evokes or 
builds is another situation evoked by if-not.  This contrastive nature of if seems to be 
quite compatible with the function of adnominal clauses, i.e. restriction.  This is what 
is lacking in because, which is based on factual causality and does not evoke another 
hypothetical situation. 
  However, this does not mean that if is the only adverbial conjunction that can be 
used as a marker of adnominal clauses.  Other factual conjunctions introducing 
adverbial clauses such as when, before and after may introduce adnominal clauses.  
Let us observe the following examples (the italics are all mine): 
                                                     
15 Although the adnominal use of because is not so productive as other conjunctions such as if, when, 
and while, Kanetani (2011) points out that because-clause can be used as an adnominal adjunct: 
 (i) Below the surface ran a current of intrigue that ended with the assassination of Abraham 
Lincoln because he was determined that the United States be free from the bondage of the 
inter-national bankers.                      (Kanetani (2011), with slight modifications) 
According to Kanetani, adverbial clauses can modify NPs under certain conditions.  He claims that 
“adnominal” adverbial clauses in general are the products of analogy (in the sense of Blevins and 
Blevins (2009:2)) based on the similarity between propositional phrases (PPs) and adverbial clauses.  
Kanetani argues that adverbial clauses having no PP semantically equivalent to them cannot modify 
NPs.  However, this explanation cannot properly deals with ACs, because if-clauses do not seem to 
have PPs semantically equivalent to them.  If his explanation is on the right track, it follows that 
if-clauses never allow adnominal use.  This also holds true for when, which seems to have no PP 
semantically equivalent to it.  In addition, it is problematic for his analysis that even if and although, 
which seems to have semantically equivalent PPs like in spite of or despite, do not allow adnominal 
use.  I leave further confirmation of Kanetani‟s analysis open for future research. 
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 (42)   he remembered Ron‟s expression when he had seen her kissing Dean, … 
(J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince) 
 (43) a.  Just take it as a challenge, because some of them are very hard to get, but 
the satisfaction after you complete the stage is a very valuable prize. 
(http://www.gamefaqs.com/console/snes/file/563219/10476) 
  b.? The storm after you left was terrifying.  (Ross (1973:228)) 
 (44)     the interval before she spoke was appreciable, and that was against the 
rules of the game.                             (Haan (1989:106)) 
 (45)   the period while the animal remains alive 
(http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/while?region=us) 
The adnominal use of when, before and after is not rare, although I cannot assert that it 
is established or conventionalized.  Note that all these conjunctions introduce time 
adverbial clauses.  It is often pointed out that the notion of time is contiguous with 
that of condition, and that they overlap each other and constitute a moderate 
continuum (cf. Tsubomoto (1998), Nishimitsu (2006), among others).  In fact, 
Declerck and Reed (2001:28-35) discuss time adverbial clauses with conditional 
connotations introduced by when, before and after. 
A key concept shared by them is case-specification.  All of these conjunctions, 
including if, can specify cases where some events described in main clauses occur.  It 
is expected that the adnominalization of adverbial clauses can be treated in a unified 
manner in terms of case-specification. 
Another key concept is contrastiveness.  As pointed out above, the conjunction 
if is contrastive in that behind the hypothetical situation that if evokes is another 
situation evoked by if-not.  The contrastive nature of this kind is observed in other 
conjunctions such as after and before.  In this connection, it is worth noting that the 
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acceptability of sentence (43b) is improved in contexts like the following: 
 (46)  The storm after you left was more terrifying than the storm before you left. 
In this example, the speaker compares two storms.  Other adnominalizable 
conjunctions such as when, till/until, since, and while can be regarded as being 
contrastive in that they specify a particular range of time. 
In this way, the concept of contrastiveness as well as that of case-specification 
may play a key role to licensing the adnominal use of adverbial clauses.  I leave the 
confirmation of this view for future research. 
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Chapter 7 
 
The Discourse Function of If-Cleft Sentences 
 
7.1.  Introduction 
The central concern of this chapter is with a particular type of conditional 
sentence and its use in discourse.  Conditionals in general can roughly be defined as 
complex sentences composed of a main clause (sometimes called q, or the apodosis) 
and a subordinate clause (p, or the protasis) introduced by the subordinating 
conjunction if or other equivalents such as assuming, providing, as long as and in case 
(cf. Dancygier (1998:1)).  In addition, it is generally acknowledged that there is 
interdependency between the protasis and apodosis such as cause-effect relation 
(causality), temporal sequentiality, and logical inclusion.  With this view in mind, let 
us observe the following expressions: 
 (1) a.  If anyone can help us, it‟s John. (Declerck and Seki (1990:19)) 
  b.  If John left early, it was because he felt tired.  
(Declerck and Seki (1990:42)) 
These sentences are what Meier (1988) calls if-cleft sentences (if-clefts).1  As can be 
inferred from its name, the if-cleft sentence has an if-clause followed by a truncated 
it-cleft sentence (a cleft sentence whose that/wh-clause is deleted) as its main clause.  
It is typical of this construction that the if-clause introduces a variable and that the 
                                                     
1 Declerck and Seki (1990) and Declerck and Reed (2001) refer to this construction as premodified 
reduced it-clefts (PRICs).  I adopt Meier‟s (1988) term in this chapter, because Declerck and Seki‟s 
terminology focuses on the characteristics of if-clefts as variants of it-cleft sentences and thus covers a 
wider range of constructions. 
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main clause specifies what the speaker thinks of as the only true, or at least the most 
suitable, value for that variable (cf. Declerck and Reed (2001:411)).  In (1a), a 
variable anyone is introduced in the if-clause, and its value John is assigned in the 
main clause.  Likewise, in (2a), an implicit variable such as for any/some reason is 
introduced in the if-clause, and its value because he felt tired is assigned in the 
truncated it-cleft. 
Here, I point out two deviant or marked characteristics of if-cleft sentences.  
First, they are marked in the semantic relation established between their protases and 
apodoses.  As stated above, the protases and apodoses of conditionals in general 
show interdependencies such as causality, temporal sequentiality, and logical inclusion.  
As can be understood from the above observation, no such relationship is found in 
if-clefts, though some relevance is clearly recognized.  They are marked conditional 
constructions in this respect. 
Second, it is widely known that although the unmarked order of protases and 
apodoses in conditionals in general is “if p, q,” the clause order can be reversed as long 
as the discourse allows it:2 
 (2) a.  If it stops raining, I‟ll take you to the park tomorrow morning. 
  b.  I‟ll take you to the park tomorrow morning, if it stops raining. 
(Dancygier (1998:146)) 
However, as Declerck and Seki (1990) point out, if-clefts never allow the reversed 
order.  That is, the if-clause cannot follow the main clause: 
 (3) * It‟s John, if anyone can solve this problem. (Declerck and Seki (1990:27)) 
In this way, the if-cleft construction is marked not only semantically but also 
syntactically as a conditional construction. 
                                                     
2 For more details, see Dancygier (1998:145-159). 
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In what follows, with the characteristics just stated in mind, I will clarify the 
discourse function of if-clefts.  The main claims are the following: 
 (4) a.  The interdependency between the protasis and apodosis of an if-cleft is in 
parallel with that between a wh-question and its answer. 
  b.  The discourse function of the if-cleft sentence is evoking a question in 
hearer‟s mind and attracting much attention to the focalized element in 
the main clause so that the element can serve as the topic for the 
following discourse. 
As the name stands for, if-clefts are conditionals as well as clefts.3  That is, they have 
characteristics of both constructions.  In what follows, I will refer to both 
characteristics as the need arises. 
     The organization of this chapter is as follows.  Section 7.2, as a preliminary 
discussion, reviews previous studies briefly and observes basic facts about if-clefts.  
Section 7.3 observes if-clefts from the perspective of form-meaning correspondence 
and points out the parallelism of if-clefts and wh-questions.  Section 7.4 investigates 
the use of if-clefts and clarifies their discourse functions.  Section 7.5 proposes the 
reasoning process model of the if-cleft sentence.  Section 7.6 gives concluding 
remarks. 
 
7.2.  Preliminary Discussion 
7.2.1.  Previous Studies 
Before going into a detailed discussion, let us briefly review previous studies 
regarding if-clefts.  I use briefly because, few studies, if any, have taken up or paid 
                                                     
3 In the discussion that follows, the term “(general) clefts” refers to both it-clefts and wh-clefts 
(pseudo-clefts).  
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much attention to if-clefts.  More specifically, although I can refer to a few 
researchers such as Meier (1988), Declerck and Seki (1990), and Sawada (2004), their 
respective foci are different from each other.  Thus, there is no standardized view of 
this construction.  Furthermore, while the sentence-internal semantics of if-clefts is, 
to some extent, analyzed by Declerck and Seki (1990), almost no research has been 
conducted on their discourse function.  Therefore I will develop the argument that 
follows without referring to those previous studies unless necessary. 
 
7.2.2.  Basic Observations 
     In this subsection, I will observe basic facts about if-clefts including what I have 
already taken up above, quoting Declerck and Seki (1990).  Here I restrict myself to 
data which will be significantly relevant to the discussion that follows. 
 
7.2.2.1.  Formal Aspects of If-Clefts 
According to Declerck and Seki (1990), there are two types of if-clefts.  They 
are distinguished on the basis of whether or not what they call pre-forms, i.e. 
nonassertive indefinite pronouns such as anyone and anything, are present in the 
if-clause.  Let us first observe the if-clefs with pre-forms: 
 (5) a.  If anyone can help us, it‟s John. (= (1a)) 
  b.  If he has proved anything, it is that we are all vulnerable. 
  c.  If there is one thing that he is not, it is intelligent. 
  d.  If God wants anything, it is for you to be happy, successful, and fulfilled 
as a spiritual being. 
Although it is typical of this type to have a definite NP such as John as the value to the 
variable (as in (5a)), other classes such as a that-clause (as in (5b)), an AP (as in (5c)) 
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and even a to-infinitive clause (as in (5d)) can occur as values.  As for variable NPs, 
the use of non-affirmative forms such as anybody and anything is typical, but that of 
positively-oriented forms like one thing (as in (5c)) or something is not unusual.4 
Let us turn our attention to the second type.  If-clefts like the following, at least 
superficially, do not contain pre-forms: 
 (6) a.  If she was twenty-six and still unmarried, it was not from lack of suitors. 
  b.  If such programmes travel abroad, it is invariably to Hollywood…  
  c.  If we receive good treatment, it is by accident rather than design. 
Examples like those in (6) can be thought to have implicit variables.  In (6a), the 
implicit variable refers to a reason and can be represented as for some/any reason.  In 
(6b), the implicit variable refers to a direction, e.g. some/anywhere.  In example (6c), 
the implicit variable refers to a manner and can be represented as in some way.  In 
this way, it is likely that implicit variables in this type can refer to a wide range of 
adverbials such as reason, purpose, place, manner and time. 
     Let us move on to the next data.  The clauses that specify values for variables 
introduced by if-clauses are not restricted to truncated it-clefts.  According to 
Declerck and Seki (1990:21-22), there are at least seven variations, as exemplified 
below: 
 (7) a.  If anyone can do that, John can.  
  b.  If anyone can do that, that person is John. 
  c.  If anyone can do that, John is that person. 
  d.  If he needs anything, what he needs is love. 
  e.  If he needs anything, love is what he needs. 
                                                     
4 The terms non-affirmative and positively-oriented are taken from Huddleston and Pullum (2002:423).  
Although the choice of them itself, i.e. whether one should use non-affirmative forms or 
positive-oriented forms, is an interesting issue, I will not go further into the matter here. 
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  f.  If he needs anything, love is what it is. 
  g.  If anyone can do that, John is the one. 
(Declerck and Seki (1990:21-22)) 
Since, in a strict sense, none of these constructions is an if-cleft, I will not pay much 
attention to examples like these in what follows.  However, it is worth noting that in 
any case, naturally, the type of main clause is limited to so-called specificational 
sentences (cf. Declerck (1988)).  In other words, the type of main clause is limited to 
that which specifies the value of a variable introduced in the preceding if-clause. 
     Finally, as pointed out above, if-clauses never follow main clauses: 
 (8) * It‟s John, if anyone can solve this problem. (= (3)) 
Declerck and Seki (1990:27) attribute the ungrammaticality of (8) to the fact that the 
variable is assigned a value before it is even introduced. 
 
7.2.2.2  The Semantics of If-Clefts 
     Now, let us turn our attention to the semantics of if-clefts.  As pointed out 
above, it is typical of this construction that the if-clause introduces a variable and that 
the main clause specifies what the speaker thinks of as the only true, or at least the 
most suitable, value for that variable.  Taking these characteristics into consideration, 
Declerck and Seki (1990:41) propose logical structures like the following: 
 (9) a.  If John goes somewhere, it is often to Madrid. 
  b.  Often, if x = John and if x goes to y, y = Madrid. 
 (10) a.  If John left early, it was because he felt tired. (= (1b)) 
  b.  If x = John, if x left early, and if x did so for reason y, then y = because x 
felt tired. 
Declerck and Seki claim that representations like those in (9b) and (10b) stand for the 
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logical structures of if-clefts.  It seems that the representations successfully capture 
the characteristics of if-clefts.  However, they neither predict nor explain the 
discourse functions of if-clefts, which will be discussed and analyzed in detail below.  
Thus I do not adopt those representations in what follows. 
 
7.3.  The Form-Meaning Correspondence in If-Clefts 
This section investigates the relationship between the form and meaning of 
if-clefts.  As already pointed out above, if-clefts are marked semantically and 
syntactically as conditional constructions.  Seeing if-clefts from the viewpoint of the 
form-meaning correspondence, I assume that there should be some correlation 
between their semantic and syntactic markedness.  I will investigate this issue in 
more detail below. 
 
7.3.1.  The Number of Propositions Relevant to If-Clefts 
7.3.1.1.  The Case of It-Clefts 
Before going into a detailed discussion of if-clefts, let us briefly focus on general 
it-clefts in terms of the number of propositions relevant to them.  According to 
Huddleston and Pullum (2002:1414), „cleft‟ is a process term:  the idea behind it is 
that a cleft sentence is formed by dividing a more elementary clause into two parts.  
Take the sentence It was a red wool sweater that I bought for example.  This sentence 
can be thought to be formed from the sentence I bought a red wool sweater by 
dividing it into two parts, i.e. a red wool sweater and I bought.  The former part is 
foregrounded and the latter part is backgrounded.  In other words, a cleft sentence is 
formed from a single proposition by foregrounding a particular part of it and by 
backgrounding the residue.  Thus the number of propositions relevant to general 
 - 177 - 
it-cleft sentences is one. 
 
7.3.1.2.  The Case of If-Clefts 
Now let us return to if-clefts.  As seen above, unlike the protasis and apodosis 
of general conditionals, those of an if-cleft sentence do not show interdependencies 
such as causality, temporal sequentiality and logical inclusion.  The reason for this, I 
assume, is closely related to the fact that the respective functions of the if-clause and 
main clause are to introduce a variable and to assign its value.  Let us consider 
sentence (5a), repeated here as (11).  
 (11)   If anyone can help us, it‟s John.  (= (5a)) 
In sentence (11), the foregrounded element is the NP John, which is the value assigned 
to the variable anyone in the if-clause.  To put it differently, the if-clause contains the 
open proposition x can help us (or there is x such that x can help us), and the value of x 
is John.  Therefore, the proposition relevant to (11) is John can help us.  This is the 
only proposition relevant to (11).  Thus the number of propositions relevant to if-cleft 
sentences is also one.  If-clefts are in parallel with general it-clefts in this respect. 
One may argue that sentence (1b), i.e. If John left early, it was because he felt 
tired, is not compatible with this line of argument, because the number of propositions 
relevant to it is two:  one is John left early and the other is he felt tired.  Note, 
however, that it is not an independent proposition but the subordinated, 
non-independent clause because he felt tired that is foregrounded.  What can be 
foregrounded in an it-cleft sentence is not a proposition per se but an element (i.e. 
word or phrase) that constitutes a single proposition (cf. Nakau (1994:151)).  The 
following contrast illustrates this point: 
 (12) a.  He left early because he felt tired. 
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  b.  It is because he felt tired that John left early. 
 (13) a.  He felt tired and he left early. 
  b. * It is (and) he felt tired that John left early. 
The cleft sentence in (12b) is formed from the sentence in (12a) by foregrounding the 
subordinate clause because he felt tired.  In this case, the formation of a cleft sentence 
is easily performed.  On the other hand, sentence (13a) cannot be transformed into a 
cleft sentence, as shown in (13b).  This seems to be odd, because sentence (13a) is 
semantically similar to (11a) in that the event he felt tired can be interpreted as the 
cause of the event he left early:  it is generally acknowledged that and-paratactic 
constructions like sentence (13a) can express causality (cf. Sweetser (1990:86-93)).  
It follows that the ungrammaticality of (13b) should not be ascribed to semantics. 
A crucial difference between sentence (12a) and sentence (13a) is found in the 
status of the clauses composing the respective sentences:  the former is composed of 
a main clause and a subordinate clause, while the latter is composed of two 
independent clauses conjoined by and.   Therefore, the foregrounded element 
because he felt tired in (12b) should be regarded as a part of the larger independent 
proposition John left early because he felt tired.  To put it the other way around, the 
proposition he felt tired loses its status as an independent proposition by the adjoining 
of the subordinating conjunction because.  In contrast, the foregrounded element in 
(13b), i.e. he felt tired, is an independent proposition.  In this way, the contrast 
between (12) and (13) corroborates that the number of independent propositions in 
(12b) is one, while it is two in (13b). 
Sentence (1b) can be analyzed in the same way as (12b).  Observe sentence 
(1b) again, repeated here as (14): 
 (14)   If John left early, it was because he felt tired. (= (1b)) 
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In (14), the phrase because he felt tired is interpreted as the value assigned to the 
unexpressed variable.  To put it differently, the if-clause contains the open proposition 
John left early for reason x, and the value of x is because he felt tired.  As with (12), 
because he felt tired does not have the status of an independent clause/proposition.  
Therefore, the independent proposition relevant to (14) is John left early because he 
felt tired.  At this point, it can be seen that sentence (14) is in parallel with sentence 
(12):  the number of propositions relevant to (14) can be regarded as one in terms of 
the number of larger, independent propositions. 
If this line of argument is on the right track, then it stands to reason that if-clefts 
show no such interdependencies between “propositions” as causality or temporal 
sequentiality:  there is just one proposition relevant to a single if-cleft sentence.  
Conditional constructions in general, on the other hand, represent interrelationships 
between more than one proposition, i.e. p and q.  From this, I conclude as follows:  
compared with the interconnection between the protasis and apodosis of general 
conditionals, that of if-clefts is much stronger in that general conditionals are formed 
from two independent propositions, while if-clefts are formed from a single 
proposition. 
 
7.3.2.  The Parallelism between If-Clefts and Wh-Questions 
This subsection will point out an interesting parallelism between if-clefts and 
wh-questions from a semantic viewpoint.  Here let us summarize the markedness of 
if-clefts pointed out above: 
 (15) The markedness of if-clefts as conditional constructions 
  a.  Semantic markedness: 
    1) The if-clause introduces a variable, while the main clause assigns its 
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value. 
    2) Formed from a single proposition 
  b.  Formal markedness: 
     Fixed clause order: the if-clause must precede the main clause (if p, q vs. 
*q, if p). 
As summarized in (15), the if-cleft sentence is concerned with a single proposition 
with a variable, and the variable must be introduced before its value.  This shows that 
the relationship between protases and apodoses of if-clefts is very close to that 
between wh-questions and their answers. 
Let us observe the following simple dialogue for confirmation: 
 (16) A: Who saw John? 
  B: It was Mary (that saw John). 
In this dialogue, speaker B answers speaker A‟s question by using an it-cleft sentence.  
According to Dryer (1996:448), the use of the it-cleft (i.e., It was Mary (that saw 
John).) shows that both speakers A and B pragmatically presuppose a single 
proposition, i.e. someone saw John.5, 6  This is the only proposition relevant to this 
dialogue.  In addition, a variable must be introduced first in a wh-question and its 
value must be assigned second in an answer.  In this respect, it is evident that this 
dialogue is in parallel with the if-cleft sentence If anyone saw John, it was Mary.  On 
the basis of this observation, I claim that an if-clause is to its main clause in an if-cleft 
                                                     
5 The term pragmatic presupposition here follows Levinson‟s (1983:205) definition: 
 (i)  An utterance A pragmatically presupposes a proposition B iff A is appropriate only if B is 
mutually known by participants. 
6 This means that both of the participants in the dialogue presuppose the existence of the value to the 
variable someone.  Dryer (1996:488) states that one cannot answer wh-questions with it-clefts if there 
is no value applicable to the variable: 
 (i)  A:  Who saw John? B: *It was nobody (that saw John). 
In this case, speaker B must answer, “Nobody did. / Nobody saw John.” 
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what a wh-question is to its answer.7 
Sawada (2004) takes a similar view of the expression If X, it is because Y from a 
different perspective:8  
 (17)   What occurs in X in If X, it is because Y is likely to be a proposition 
about which the speaker has some doubt. 
(Sawada (2004:178) [English translation is mine]) 
As shown in (17), Sawada states that the use of the If X, it is because Y construction 
expresses the speaker‟s doubt regarding the proposition X.  Assuming that a 
why-question is hidden in the if-clause, Sawada (2004:178) proposes the following 
paraphrase. 
 (18)   If X, it is because Y. 
   = If you ask me why X, I‟ll answer it is because Y. 
Although Sawada‟s proposal and mine are different from each other (for more details, 
see Section 7.4.2.), I agree to some degree with him on the paraphrase shown in (18) 
in that why-questions are semantically contained in if-clauses.  Taking Sawada‟s view 
for the present, let me assume that wh-questions in general are contained in if-clauses 
and that main clauses manifest themselves as their answers.  Thus, I propose the 
following paraphrase for if-clefts:9 
 (19)   If X, it is Y. 
   = If you ask me WH, I’ll answer it is Y. 
Then the examples in (1) can be paraphrased like the following: 
 (20) a.  If anyone can help us, it is John. 
                                                     
7 Declerck (1988) takes a similar view in terms of the specificational copular sentences. 
8 To be fair, Sawada (2004) focuses not on if-clefts per se but on the phrase it is because. 
9 In what follows, paraphrases such as (19) do not claim that if-clefts and paraphrased counterparts are 
the same constructions.  I use such paraphrases to make intelligible the semantic relationship between 
the if-clause and the truncated it-cleft.  
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   = If you ask me who can help us, I’ll answer it is John. 
  b.  If John left early, it was because he felt tired. 
   = If you ask me why John left early, I’ll answer it is because he felt tired. 
In this way, by assuming that the relationship between the protasis and apodosis of 
if-clefts is equivalent to that between a wh-question and its answer, one can properly 
capture the markedness of if-clefts as conditional constructions. 
 
7.4.  The Use and Function of If-Clefts in Discourse 
In the previous section, I claimed that the interconnection between the protasis 
and apodosis of if-clefts is in parallel with the relationship between wh-questions and 
their answers.  Then, the question is: why should the relation be expressed not 
directly by means of genuine question-answer pairs but indirectly by means of 
conditional forms?   In addition, it matters what differentiates if-clefts from general 
cleft constructions, i.e. it-clefts and wh-clefts.  These questions can be reduced to the 
question of why the speaker may prefer to use if-clefts rather than related constructions 
according to context.  In a way, this question is significantly relevant to the raison 
d’être of if-cleft sentences. 
 
7.4.1.  The Difference in Use between If-Clefts and Related Constructions 
In dealing with the question just raised above, I will make clear the difference 
between if-clefts and related constructions, i.e. general clefts and wh-question-answer 
pairs, in terms of contexts wherein they are used. 
As is evident from the linguistic form, if-clefts have a great deal to do with cleft 
constructions as well as conditional constructions.  In this connection, Meier 
(1988:57) points out that there is a close affinity between it-clefts like (21a) and 
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if-clefts like (21b): 
 (21) a.  It was a book that they gave him. 
  b.  If they gave him something, it was a book. 
(Meier (1988:57)) 
This observation induces Meier (1988:57) to claim that the two constructions are 
identical except for the ordering of the two clauses (i.e. if-clauses and that-clauses) 
that make up the respective constructions.  In addition, Meier (1988:58) compares 
if-clefts like (22a) and wh-clefts like (22b): 
 (22) a.  If I get anything from the Rowses…, it is only a certain pugnacity… 
  b.  What I get from the Rowses is only a certain pugnacity. 
(Meier (1988:58)) 
Meier states that the if-clause, the „relative clause‟ and the what-clause are functionally 
equivalent.10  If Meier is right, that is, if all three constructions are identical except 
for their clause orders and if the if-clause, that-clause and wh-clause are equivalent in 
their functions, then their difference is just a matter of the speaker‟s preference.  But 
in fact, neither it-clefts nor wh-clefts can be used in contexts wherein if-clefts should 
be used, as shown below:11 
 (23) a.  Pais weaves together the strands of Einstein‟s life skillfully and 
objectively.  If I am to find a criticism, it is in the rather erratic 
organisation of the material.  The book is divided into four main blocks, 
[…]                          (BNC [italics and omission are mine]) 
  b.  Pais weaves together the strands of Einstein‟s life skillfully and 
objectively.  #It is in the rather erratic organization of the material that 
                                                     
10 By the term relative clause, Meier refers to that-clauses in it-cleft sentences. 
11 The reverse is also true; that is, if-clefts cannot be used in contexts wherein it-clefts and wh-clefts 
should be used. 
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I am to find a criticism.  The book is divided into four main blocks, […] 
  c.  Pais weaves together the strands of Einstein‟s life skillfully and 
objectively.  #The place where I am to find a criticism is in the rather 
erratic organization of the material.  The book is divided into four main 
blocks, […] 
From this contrast, one can infer that these three constructions are functionally distinct, 
although they seem to be correlated with each other.  It should then be considered 
where we can find a decisive difference among them.12 
As argued above, that-clauses of it-clefts are backgrounded, which is true of 
wh-clauses of wh-clefts.  In terms of information packaging or structuring, the effect 
of backgrounding in clefts is to mark the background information as pragmatically 
presupposed (cf. Prince (1978), Huddleston and Pullum (2002), to name a few).  
Information is regarded as presupposed when (the speaker assumes) it is shared by 
both the speaker and hearer (cf. Levinson (1983)).  That is, it-clefts and wh-clefts are 
accepted as felicitous if information conveyed by the that-clause and wh-clause is 
shared by both the speaker and hearer as a presupposition (cf. Dryer (1996:479)).  
With this in mind, let us examine the contrast in (23) in more detail.  
The passage in (23) is part of a review article on Abraham Pais‟s book titled 
Subtle is the Lord: the Science and the Life of Albert Einstein.  In (23), a possible 
presupposition of the clefts is the open proposition I find a criticism somewhere.  
Thus, as a rule, the reviewer and reader should share the proposition I find a criticism 
somewhere as presupposition in order to use the it-cleft in (23b) and the wh-cleft in 
(23c).  Here let us focus on the preceding sentence Pais weaves together the strands 
                                                     
12 The main concern here is with the difference between if-clefts and the other two clefts, i.e. it-clefts 
and wh-clefts.  Thus, I will not deal with the difference in context between it-clefts and wh-clefts. 
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of Einstein’s life skillfully and objectively.  From the word skillfully, one can infer that 
the reviewer praises the author.  Conversely, at least from this sentence, the reader 
cannot infer that the reviewer intends to criticize the author or point out some defects 
of the book.  This means that the proposition I find a criticism somewhere is not 
shared between the reviewer and reader, or at least the reviewer does not suppose that 
it is shared.  This is the reason that neither it-clefts nor wh-clefts can be used in (23). 
If this is the case, then what differentiates if-clefts from the other clefts is 
whether there exists presupposed information or not.  In other words, the background 
information conveyed by that/wh-clauses in general clefts should be shared by 
speakers and hearers, but the information in if-clauses in if-clefts do not have to be 
shared in advance.  More specifically, since the apodosis of the if-cleft sentence is a 
truncated it-cleft, it is reasonable to assume that the if-clause introduces a 
presupposition necessary to use it as a main clause.  This means that if-clauses 
guarantee or license the existence of it-clefts as apodoses, which corroborates the 
strong connectedness between the protasis and apodosis pointed out in Section 7.3.1. 
Incidentally, the criterion whether or not any presupposition is required in 
advance also differentiates if-clefts and wh-question-answer pairs.  Observe the 
dialogue in (16) again, repeated here as (24), for confirmation: 
 (24) A: Who saw John? 
  B: It was Mary (that saw John).  
In this dialogue, speakers A and B share the proposition someone saw John or there is 
x such that x saw John.  Otherwise, as already shown, it-clefts cannot be used as 
answers to wh-questions.  Thus question-answer pairs cannot be used in contexts 
such as (23), wherein the reviewer and the reader do not share the proposition I find a 
criticism somewhere: 
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 (25)  # Pais weaves together the strands of Einstein‟s life skillfully and 
objectively.  Where do you find a criticism?  It is in the rather erratic 
organization of the material.  The book is divided into four main blocks, 
[…] 
The discussion so far has made it clear that if-clauses in if-clefts introduce 
presuppositions necessary to use truncated it-clefts as apodoses.13  Owing to this 
function, truncated it-clefts in the construction do not need any presupposition out of 
if-clauses, i.e. in the preceding contexts.  This makes a decisive difference between 
if-clefts and it/wh-clefts and is the raison d’être of the former.  
Here let us reconsider the paraphrase for if-clefts proposed in (18).  
Considering that general wh-question-answer pairs need presuppositions, I assume that 
the wh-question hidden in the if-clause also needs a presupposition.  Then, it is more 
reasonable to assume that there is another covert if-clause containing a wh-question 
than to assume that the overt if-clause per se is a hidden wh-question.  That is, the 
overt if-clause introduces a presupposition of both the covert if-clause containing a 
wh-question and the main clause.  Thus, the paraphrase in (18) should be revised as 
follows: 
 (26)   If X, it is Y 
   = If X and if you ask me WH, I’ll answer it is Y 
Furthermore, on the basis of the above argument and the paraphrase in (26), the 
relation among the three elements, i.e. the overt if-clause, covert if-clause containing a 
wh-question, and main clause, can be illustrated as follows: 
                                                     
13 Declerck and Reed (2001:411) state that the if-clause of if-clefts is “a device for heightening textual 
coherence:  it links up with the preceding context by resuming something that has already been said 
or implied,” drawing attention to its linking with the preceding context.  However, this comment is 
too obscure to explain the difference in the acceptability of the examples in (23). 
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 (27)   If X  and if you ask me WH,   I’ll answer it is Y 
   Presupposition              Q       –      A    
      LICENSING 
To sum up, as illustrated in (27), the if-clause of the if-cleft construction provides the 
presupposition of the wh-question in the covert if-clause and the truncated it-cleft.  
The truncated it-cleft cannot be used without the overt if-clause.  In this sense, the 
existence of if-clauses licenses the truncated it-clefts. 
 
7.4.2.  The Discourse Function of If-Clefts 
7.4.2.1.  Problems 
The discussion so far has clarified the function of (overt) if-clauses of if-clefts:  
they introduce presuppositions of covert if-clauses containing wh-questions and main 
clauses.  More specifically, if-clauses license truncated it-clefts as main clauses.  
Now I am in a position to examine the discourse function of if-clefts per se, which is 
the main concern of this chapter. 
As pointed out in Section 7.2, the discourse function of if-clefts has been left 
almost untouched by previous studies.  Sawada (2004:178) briefly refers to the 
discourse function of if-clefts, though he restricts his observation to the specific 
expression If X, it is because Y: 
 (28)    The expression it is because Y, which co-occurs with if X, has the 
discourse function of effectively making salient the statement after it is 
because by showing a certain amount of the speaker‟s doubt as to 
proposition X. 
      (Sawada (2004:178) [English translation is mine]) 
As argued above, Sawada‟s view in (28) is compatible with mine in that wh-questions 
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are hidden in if-clauses.  However, his approach is untenable for several reasons. 
First, I disagree with him in that he regards proposition X as the object of the 
speaker‟s doubt.  Consider the following example: 
 (29)   Donna didn‟t love anyone.  If she had loved someone, it would have 
been Bill.  
Note that the if-cleft in (29) is counterfactual.  This example seems to be 
incompatible with Sawada‟s view:  as the counterfactual form (had + past participle) 
indicates, the speaker knows, or at least firmly believes, that Donna did not love 
anyone.14  This is confirmed by the preceding sentence Donna didn’t love anyone.  
By this sentence, the speaker does not doubt whether Donna loved someone or not; 
rather, s/he asserts that Donna loved no one.  Furthermore, if, as Sawada states, the 
conjunction if shows a certain amount of the speaker‟s doubt regarding the proposition 
she had loved someone, then the speaker cannot assign the value Bill to the variable 
anyone by using the assertive form it would have been Bill.15  At least in the 
speaker‟s mind, the value Bill is prepared in advance, which means that the speaker 
believes that Bill is the person who Donna could have loved.  Lastly, it is not clear 
what discourse function he refers to by the “function of effectively making salient the 
statement after it is because.” 
 
7.4.2.2.  Switching the Flow of Discourse and Presenting a New Topic 
As opposed to Sawada (2004), I make the following assumption as to the 
discourse function of if-clefts: 
                                                     
14 To be fair, Sawada (2004) does not take counterfactuals into consideration, because his primary 
concern is not with if-clefts but with it is because constructions. 
15 Modal expressions such as probably, may/might, and can/could, which weaken assertion to some 
degree, can occur.  However, even if such expressions occur, the phrase it is X is still assertion. 
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 (30)   The if-cleft sentence challenges a discourse presupposition made in the 
preceding context, intending to switch the flow of discourse and provide 
a new topic for the following discourse. 
To illustrate, let us observe the example in (23) again, repeated here as (31). 
 (31)   Pais weaves together the strands of Einstein‟s life skillfully and 
objectively.  If I am to find a criticism, it is in the rather erratic 
organisation of the material.  The book is divided into four main blocks, 
each dealing with one of the four principal contributions that Einstein 
made to physical theory – statistical mechanics, special relativity, general 
relativity and the quantum theory.  Unfortunately for chronology, these 
pursuits were in some cases contemporary with each other, which means 
that the author has to jump back and forth between different epochs of 
Einstein‟s life.  This is done methodically, with elaborate cross 
referencing, but nevertheless fragments Einstein‟s personal history and 
diminishes the reader‟s empathy. 
In (31), the omitted part of (23) is recovered.  Let us first focus on the context 
preceding the if-cleft.  From the sentence Pais weaves together the strands of 
Einstein’s life skillfully and objectively, as already pointed out above, one can see that 
the reviewer praises the writer of the book. 
Now let us turn our attention to the discourse after the if-cleft, wherein the 
reviewer criticizes the author for the organization of the book.  That is, the flow of 
discourse switches from praise to criticism.  More specifically, after giving the value 
in the rather erratic organization of the book to the implicit variable, e.g. 
some/anywhere, the reviewer develops a criticism of the organization of the book.  
The contexts make a sharp contrast before and after the sentence If I am to find a 
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criticism, it is in the rather erratic organisation of the material.  This clearly shows 
that it is the if-cleft sentence that switches the discourse flow from praise to criticism 
and gives the new topic erratic organization to the following critical discourse.  That 
is, if-clefts reverse presuppositions made in the preceding discourse and provide new 
topics to the following discourse.  To put it more precisely, if-clefts switch 
presuppositions negative regarding the existence of the variable (¬X) into positive 
ones (X).16   
     For a better understanding of the explanation above, let us examine (31) more 
closely in accordance with the claim in (30).  To begin with, the first sentence Pais 
weaves together the strands of Einstein’s life skillfully and objectively makes the 
discourse presupposition there is nothing to criticize about the book (or there is no x 
such that the reviewer criticizes x about the book in another representation).  Second, 
the if-cleft sentence If I am to find a criticism is introduced to challenge the 
presupposition, which makes the readers evoke the existence of a possible object of 
criticism:  a new presupposition, i.e. the reviewer finds a criticism somewhere (or 
there is x such that the reviewer criticizes x about the book) is made at this point.  In 
other words, the former presupposition that there is nothing to criticize about the book 
is reversed.  Next, taking the new presupposition, the reviewer introduces the implicit 
wh-question if you ask me where I find a criticism and the explicit answer it is in the 
erratic organization.  Then, the answer (in) the erratic organization serves as a topic 
of the following discourse, and criticisms on the organization of the book are 
developed, as shown in the expressions jump back and forth between different epochs 
                                                     
16 Note here that neither the representation X nor ¬X is relevant to the truth condition of the relevant 
proposition.  The positive representation X means that the relevant proposition is positive as to the 
existence of the relevant variable x, while the negative representation ¬X means that the relevant 
proposition is negative as to the existence of x. 
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of Einstein’s life and fragments Einstein’s personal history and diminishes the reader’s 
empathy. 
     In terms of rhetorical strategy, developing discourse in this way seems to be 
more effective than developing criticism from the beginning of the passage.  By 
reversing the presupposition made in the preceding context and then giving a new 
topic in the assertive form it is Y, if-clefts can express the speaker‟s mental attitude I 
dare to say.17  In doing so, if-clefts increase the saliency of focus elements in 
truncated it-clefts.  In the case of (31), the reviewer uses the if-cleft to make a sharp 
contrast between the contexts before and after the if-cleft, and succeeds in increasing 
the saliency of the focus element in the erratic organization.18  In this way, the focus 
element can draw much attention from the hearer/reader, so that it serves as the topic 
of the following context.   
Now let us return to the example in (29), repeated here as (32): 
 (32)   Donna didn‟t love anyone.  If she had loved someone, it would have 
been Bill. 
As shown in (17) and (28), Sawada (2004) claims that the use of an if-clause indicates 
the speaker‟s doubt regarding the proposition in the if-clause.  Thus, on the basis of 
his claim, the if-clause in (32) is roughly interpreted as “I doubt whether she loved 
someone.”  As pointed out above, this interpretation cannot explain the use of 
if-clefts in a sufficient way. 
                                                     
17 This suggests that if-clefts might be classified as what is called speech-act conditionals (cf. 
Sweetser (1990)).  As we will see below (Section 7.4.3.2), it is also true that the if-clause should be 
regarded as a modal expression expressing the speaker‟s mental attitude toward a speech act in the 
apodosis.  However, if-clefts are not identical with speech-act conditionals in the sense of Sweetser.  
Recall that the protasis of a speech-act conditional serves as a kind of introductory remarks (cf. 
Chapter 3).  In this sense, the connection between protases and apodoses in speech-act conditionals is 
not very strong:  the apodoses can perform intended speech acts without if-clauses.  If-clefts, on the 
other hand, could not perform intended speech acts without if-clauses, because, as discussed in the 
previous section, if-clauses license apodoses. 
18 In fact, the focus position of if-clefts is always heavily stressed, unlike that of it-clefts.  
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In my framework, however, the use of the if-cleft sentence can be fully 
explained.  The explanation goes as follows.  In (32), the sentence prior to the 
if-cleft makes the contextual presupposition there was no x such that Donna loved x 
(¬X).  The if-cleft If she had loved someone, it would have been Bill reverses the 
former presupposition (switching ¬X into X), and asserts that Donna would have loved 
Bill.  To put it plainly, the if-cleft means, “So far, I have talked about the present topic 
under the presupposition (or based on the fact) that Donna didn‟t love anyone.  But if 
she had loved someone and if you ask me who it would have been, I dare to say it 
would have been Bill.”19 
On the basis of the above observations regarding (31) and (32), the functions of 
if-clefts can be diagrammatically illustrated as follows: 
  (33) The Discourse Functions of If-Clefts 
  Preceding Context              Succeeding Context 
                    If X,    it is Y        
  
       F1: Switching ¬X into X     F2: Introducing new topic Y 
 As illustrated in figure (33), if-clefts have two functions: (i) switching an old 
presupposition (¬X) into a new presupposition (X) and (ii) introducing a new topic (Y) 
for the following context. 
What the figure in (33) means is as follows.  In order to use an if-cleft, the 
speaker first gives a presupposition negative as to the existence of the variable x (¬X).  
Then, by introducing an if-cleft, s/he switches the presupposition into a new, positive 
one (X) and assigns the value Y to the variable contained in the new presupposition.  
                                                     
19 Here no context following the if-cleft is given, but we can expect that a story related to Bill will be 
developed. 
Discourse adopting Y as Topic Old Presupposition (¬X) 
If-Cleft 
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To put it more plainly, the meaning of if-clefts is “So far, we have discussed the 
present topic under the presupposition ¬X.  But if X and if you ask me WH, I answer 
it is Y.”  The value Y, which is given as an answer to the implicit wh-question, is 
presented by reversing the preceding, old presupposition.  Y draws much attention 
and thus can serve as a new topic in the following discourse. 
Let us confirm the appropriateness of this explanation by examining the 
following example: 
 (34) A:  I found she was texting him 3 times a day and hoping our marriage would 
break up.  She is a whore as far as I am concerned. 
  B:  If she was texting him, it was because he set it up.  He gave her the 
number, didn‟t he?  Keep your hate and discontent at home and direct it 
to the responsible party, HIM!  She is just as victimized as what he did 
to you. 
The dialogue in (34) is based on a personal advice column on a website.20  Speaker A 
is troubled about her husband‟s repeated extramarital affairs, and she is asking for 
advice.  Here let us draw attention to speaker A‟s utterance.  As can be inferred from 
the utterances “(she is) hoping our marriage would break up” and “she is a whore,” 
speaker A ascribes her husband‟s extramarital affairs to his lover (the referent of she).  
At this point, the presupposition relevant to the use of the if-cleft is that there is no 
cause of speaker A‟s husband‟s extramarital affairs other than his lover, i.e. there is no 
x other than his lover such that x causes A’s husband’s extramarital affairs.  With this 
presupposition in mind, let us note speaker B‟s reply.  Clearly, speaker B ascribes the 
affairs to speaker A‟s husband, not to his lover.  From speaker B‟s utterance, it can be 
inferred that s/he reverses the presupposition. 
                                                     
20 http://www.2-in-2-1.co.uk/forums/showthread.php?t=5804 
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If Sawada‟s (2004) view is correct, it means that speaker B casts some doubt on 
the proposition expressed in the if-clause.  However, as can be read from the dialogue, 
it is not the proposition she was texting him but the contextual presupposition there is 
no x other than his lover such that x causes A’s husband’s extramarital affairs that 
speaker B casts doubt on.  Certainly, speaker B does not have certain knowledge that 
the lover was texting speaker A‟s husband.  But this does not mean his/her doubt.  In 
fact, the if-clause used by speaker B indicates that the information expressed in the 
if-clause is what s/he has just received from speaker A, i.e. newly acquired information 
(cf. Akatsuka (1985, 1998)).  That is, the information she was texting him has just 
entered the consciousness of speaker B at the discourse site.  In this case, the if-clause 
just represents the speaker‟s mental attitude I don’t know whether it is true or not.  It 
should be noted that this function is not limited to the protasis of if-clefts and is 
different from the discourse functions of if-clefts per se. 
In addition, if speaker B really doubts the proposition she was texting him, then 
s/he cannot give such advice as “Keep your hate and discontent at home and direct it 
to the responsible party, HIM.”  In order to give such advice, speaker B needs to 
tentatively accept speaker A‟s allegation as true, leaving aside the question whether it 
is true or not.  Thus, it is evident that speaker B holds an idea or opinion different 
from speaker A‟s.  
Now let us see how the framework in (33) can explain the dialogue in (34).  
First, as already argued, speaker A‟s utterance makes the contextual presupposition 
there is no x other than his lover such that x causes A’s husband’s extramarital affairs.  
As is inferred from the dialogue, speaker B disagrees with speaker A, who exclusively 
blames her husband‟s lover for his extramarital affairs.  So speaker B uses the if-cleft 
sentence to reverse the presupposition, i.e. switching ¬X (there is no x other than his 
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lover such that x causes A‟s husband‟s extramarital affairs) to X (there is x other than 
his lover such that x causes A‟s husband‟s extramarital affairs).  To put it plainly, 
speaker B intends to say, “You have discussed your husband‟s extramarital affairs 
under the presupposition that there was no cause of them other than his lover, but if 
there was any other cause and if you ask me what it was, I dare to say it was because 
he set it up.”  The if-cleft switches the topic of the discourse from the lover to A‟s 
husband.  In this way, the framework proposed here can explain not only the 
discourse structure of dialogue (34) but also the mental attitudes of the participants. 
 
7.4.3.  Re-examination of the Discourse Function of If-Clefts 
7.4.3.1.  Putative Counterexamples 
So far, I have examined the discourse functions of if-cleft sentences, arguing that 
if-clefts have the following two functions: 
  (35) a.  Switching an old presupposition (¬X) into a new presupposition (X). 
  b.  Introducing a new topic for the following context. 
However, a closer observation reveals that the situation is more complex than (35) 
suggests.  Let us investigate the following text: 
 (36) If anyone understands how important it is to keep in close contact with family 
members, it‟s John Scialdone.  As Donald Nichols‟ service coordinator, John 
made sure Donald kept in close contact with his mother in Utica.  When 
Donald‟s mother died a few years ago, John was concerned about the void her 
death would leave in John‟s life.  He encouraged Donald to reconnect with 
his sister, Roxanne.  This proved to be more difficult than either of them 
expected.               (http://www.omr.state.ny.us/hp_johnscialdone.jsp) 
In (36), the if-cleft sentence, i.e. If anyone understands how important it is to keep in 
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close contact with family members, it’s John Scialdone, is used as a discourse opener.  
In this case, naturally, the if-cleft cannot be expected to reverse any preceding 
presupposition, because there is no such context.  It seems that the function in (35a) 
is not performed in this case.  On the other hand, the function in (35b) is performed, 
because the focalized NP John Scialdone functions as the topic for the following 
context. 
     Furthermore, the following pair seems to show that if-clefts do not always 
reverse the preceding presupposition: 
 (37) a.  Donna was pretty sure she couldn‟t love anyone.  (But) If she had loved 
anyone, it would have been Bill. 
  b.  Donna was pretty sure she could love someone.  (And) If she had loved 
anyone, it would have been Bill. 
In (37a), the presupposition in the sentences is there is no x such that Donna could 
love x, which is reversed in the following if-cleft.  In this sense, the if-cleft in (37a) 
fulfills the two functions in (35).  In (37b), on the other hand, the presupposition in 
the sentences is there is x such that Donna could love x, which is shared by the 
following if-cleft.  That is, the if-cleft in (37b) does not reverse the presupposition, 
and thus does not fulfill the function in (35a).  On the basis of this contrast, one may 
well argue that the functions of if-clefts proposed in (35) are wide of the mark. 
     It is true that if-clefts do not necessarily reverse the preceding presupposition, as 
shown in (36) and (37b).  Nevertheless, it is equally true that if-clefts can reverse the 
preceding presupposition, as shown in (34) and (37a).  To reconcile this contradiction, 
there are at least two possibilities to be considered: 
 (38)  There are two types of if-cleft sentences: one reverses the preceding 
presupposition, while the other does not. 
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 (39) The function of reversing the preceding presupposition should be attributed 
not to if-clefts per se but to other elements such as coordinate conjunctions. 
The possibility in (38) is problematic in that there seems to be no clear criterion to 
classify if-clefts into two types (or more). 
With regard to the possibility in (38), take the examples in (37), for instance.  
As seen above, the expression If she had loved anyone, it would have been Bill is used 
to reverse the preceding presupposition, i.e. Donna couldn’t love anyone in (37a), 
while the same expression does not reverse the presupposition, only giving a new topic 
(i.e. Bill) to the discourse in (37b).  At least in the surface linguistic form, any 
difference cannot be found between the two types. 
Let us turn to the possibility in (39).  Note that the conjunctions, i.e. but in 
(37a) and and in (37b), are parenthesized.  This means that they are optional in the 
sense that their occurrence does not significantly alter the meanings intended in those 
sentences.  Therefore, the functional difference between (37a) and (37b) cannot be 
ascribed to those parenthesized conjunctions.  In this way, neither of the possibilities 
is appealing. 
 
7.4.3.2.  If-Clause as a Marker of Modality 
     Here let us draw attention to the semantic function of the if-clause.  I assume 
that the contrast in (37) should be attributed to the modal characteristics of the 
if-clause:  the if-clause, as a modal expression, expresses the speaker‟s mental 
attitude. 
According to Nakau (1994), modal expressions such as in my opinion and in all 
probability cannot be focalized by clefting: 
 (40) a. * It is in all probability that John disagrees with you. 
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   cf.  In all probability, John disagrees with you. 
  b. * It is in my opinion that Bach is unsurpassed as a composer. 
   cf.  In my opinion, Bach is unsurpassed as a composer. 
  c. * It is because his wife told me that he‟s not coming to class. 
   cf.  He‟s not coming to class, because his wife told me. 
(cf. Nakau (1994)) 
The ungrammaticality of the sentences in (40) arises from the fact that the focalized 
elements are modal expressions: the prepositional phrases in my opinion and in all 
probability are expressions of “S-Modality” in Nakau‟s (1994) term and the 
because-phrase in (40c) is an expression of “D-Modality” in the same terminology.21 
If it is the case that the if-clause is a modal expression, then the focalization of it 
would be impossible.  This expectation is borne out: 
 (41) a.  If she had loved anyone, it would have been Bill. 
  b. * It is if she had loved someone that it would have been Bill. 
As shown in (41b), the if-clause cannot be focalized by clefting.22  One may argue 
                                                     
21 Roughly speaking, the terms S-Modality and D-Modality correspond to what Sweetser (1990) refers 
to as epistemic domain and speech-act domain, respectively.  See also Chapter 4 for Nakau‟s (1992) 
definition of Modality. 
22 I admit that if-clauses in general do not readily occur as focus in cleft sentences, as pointed out in 
Huddleston and Pullum (2002:760): 
 (i) a. If Herbert is appointed, I foresee trouble. 
  b. It‟s if Herbert is appointed that I foresee trouble. 
Although Huddleston and Pullum (2002) do not refer to the acceptability of the sentence in (ib), they 
argue that cleft sentences like (ib) tend to be avoided.  They also point out that the acceptability of 
(ib) can be greatly improved by the addition of only: 
 (ii) It‟s only if Herbert is appointed that I foresee trouble. 
In the case of if-clefts, however, the addition of only does not improve the acceptability at all, as in: 
 (iii) a.* It is only if she had loved someone that it would have been Bill. (cf. (41b)) 
  b.*It is only if anyone can do that that John can. (cf. (42b)) 
The contrast between (ii) and (iii) indicates that it is the content domain if-clause alone which can be 
focused by clefting.  The following examples further support my view: 
 (iv) a. If it rains tomorrow, the match will be cancelled. 
  b. If I drink too much, I get dizzy. 
  c. If I catch the 11:30 train, I will get to the meeting on time. 
(Wada (2011:94)) 
 (v) a. It is if it rains tomorrow that the match will be cancelled. 
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that the reason for the ungrammaticality of sentence (41b) is that it would have been 
Bill is embedded in the that-clause:  a cleft sentence (it would have been Bill) is 
further embedded in another cleft sentence.  However, this is not the case: 
 (42) a.  If anyone can do that, John can.   (= (7a)) 
  b. * It is if anyone can do that that John can. 
As argued in Section 7.2.2.1, sentence (42a) is regarded as a variant of if-clefts.  In 
this sentence, the main clause is not a truncated it-cleft sentence.  Nevertheless, the 
if-clause cannot be focalized by clefting, as seen in (42b).  Therefore, the 
ungrammaticality of sentence (42b) shows that it is not the form of the embedded 
clause that renders the sentence ungrammatical.  In this way, the phenomena in (41) 
and (42) reflect the modal status of the if-clauses. 
 
7.4.3.3.  True Discourse Function of If-Clefts 
     If this line of argument is on the right track, then I should reconsider the 
function in (35a), taking into account the modal status of the if-clause.  As a modal 
expression, the if-clause expresses the mental attitude of the speaker.  With this in 
mind, let us examine the examples in (38) again: 
 (43)  a.  Donna was pretty sure she couldn‟t love anyone.  (But) If she had loved 
anyone, it would have been Bill. 
  b.  Donna was pretty sure she could love someone.  (And) If she had loved 
anyone, it would have been Bill. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
  b. It is if I drink too much wine that I get dizzy. 
  c. It is if I catch the 11:30 train that I will get to the meeting on time. 
(Wada (2011:96)) 
The sentences in (v) are all derived from the content-domain conditionals in (iv).  In this way, it is 
true, as Huddleston and Pullum (2002) state, that the clefting of if-clauses should be avoided, but it is 
also true that there is an evident difference in acceptability between the sentences in (41b) and (42b) 
and those in (v). 
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Note that the first sentences in (43) describe Donna‟s mental attitude.  In this sense, 
the proposition she couldn’t love anyone belongs to the domain of Donna‟s belief.  
The second sentences, on the other hand, do not belong to the domain of Donna‟s 
belief:  they describe the mental attitude of the speaker.  In this sense, the second 
sentences belong to the domain of speaker‟s belief.  It follows that if-clefts express 
the speaker‟s (personal) opinion about the preceding presupposition. 
In (43a), for example, the presupposition there is no x such that she could love x 
is reversed.  This means that the presupposition and the speaker‟s personal opinion 
about it are different from each other:  contrary to Donna‟s belief, the speaker thinks 
or imagines that there was someone that Donna loved.  In this context, the speaker 
cannot provide a new topic such as Bill unless s/he reverses the presupposition, 
because the presupposition clearly denies the existence of the specified value for the 
variable anyone. 
In (43b), on the other hand, Donna‟s belief and the speaker‟s opinion are 
compatible with each other, so that the presupposition there is x such that she could 
love x need not be reversed.  In this case, the speaker can provide the focalized 
element Bill without reversing the preceding presupposition.  If this is the case, then 
the function in (35a) should be regarded as the secondary effect of providing a 
speaker‟s personal opinion. 
However, here arises a question:  why does the speaker have to provide a new 
presupposition even if the preceding presupposition is not incompatible with the new 
one?  The reason is that if-clefts are used to evoke the hearer‟s expectation or 
prediction about the value for a valuable introduced in the if-clause.  Recall here that 
the if-clause implies a wh-question, as proposed in (26):  the implicit question works 
on the hearer to answer the question.  In other words, the if-clause induces the hearer 
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to make inference regarding the focalized element provided by the main clause.  By 
doing this, if-clefts attract much attention of the hearer to the focalized element. 
Let us examine the following text for confirmation: 
 (44) Tomorrow, Harry would have to deal with a rather delicate situation.  Harriet 
Arkwright, of the St. Joseph Arkwrights, was visiting a friend in Omaha, and 
she had telephoned him to come on and take her to a dance.  He had carried 
things along pretty far with Miss Arkwright.  Her favour was flattering to a 
small-town man.  She was a person of position in St. Joe.  Her father was 
president of the oldest banking house, and she had a considerable fortune of 
her own, from her mother.  If she was twenty-six years old and still 
unmarried, it was not from lack of suitors.  She had been in no hurry to tie 
herself up.  She managed her own property very successfully, travelled a 
good deal, and liked her independence. 
(http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks02/0200481.txt [italics are mine]) 
The italicized sentence in (44) has already been exemplified in (6a).  Let us first 
focus on the context preceding the if-cleft.  From the statement her father was 
president of the oldest banking house, and she had a considerable fortune of her own, 
from her mother, the reader infers that Harriet Arkwright would be a rich person.  
The next phrase if she was twenty-six years old and still unmarried evokes the 
question of why she was unmarried, which makes the reader pay much attention to its 
answer.  The preceding context leads or helps the reader to predict that the lack of 
suitors might prevent her from getting married:  she was so rich and blessed that no 
ordinary men could propose to her.  However, the answer given by the main clause, 
i.e. it was not from lack of suitors, betrays this kind of prediction:  it was not from 
lack of suitors but for other reasons that she was unmarried.  As inferred from the 
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context that follows, the true reason is that she was enjoying her single life.  By 
evoking questions in the reader‟s/hearer‟s mind and providing unexpected answers to 
those questions, if-clefts attract much attention of the reader/hearer to the new topic. 
So far, I have made the following points: 
 (45) In if-cleft sentences, 
  a.  The if-clause is a modal marker, expressing the speaker‟s mental attitude: 
the focalized element in the main clause reflects the speaker‟s personal 
opinion. 
  b.  If-clefts are used to evoke questions, attracting the hearer‟s attention to 
the answers, i.e. the focalized element. 
Whether or not if-clefts reverse the preceding presupposition depends on whether the 
speaker‟s personal opinion agrees with the presupposition.  That is, if the speaker‟s 
opinion is incompatible with the preceding presupposition, the function in (35a) arises; 
on the other hand, if the speaker‟s opinion is compatible with the preceding 
presupposition, the function in (35a) does not arise.  In either case, what is important 
is the function of evoking questions in the hearer‟s/reader‟s mind.  By virtue of this 
function, if-clefts succeed in making the focalized element salient, so that the element 
serves as the topic for the context that follows. 
     One may argue that if if-clefts are used to evoke questions in hearer‟s mind, it 
means that the distinction between if-clefts and wh-questions is more obscure than I 
argued in Section 7.4.1.  It is true that if-clefts and wh-questions are closely related to 
each other, as pointed out in Section 7.3.  However, recall here that wh-questions 
require the interlocutors to share pieces of information as presuppositions, while 
if-clefts do not.  Therefore, it does not undermine the raison d’être of if-clefts at all to 
claim that the discourse function of if-clefts is evoking questions in hearer‟s mind. 
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7.4.3.4.  The Question of Where the Presupposition-Reversing Function Comes from 
     Note here that the presupposition-reversing function is limited to the case where 
the preceding presupposition clearly denies the existence of the value for a variable.  
One of the key factors lies in the fact that the main clause of an if-cleft is a truncated 
it-cleft sentence:  it cannot be used unless the existence of the relevant variable (x) in 
the open proposition, i.e. the deleted that-clause, is presupposed.  In terms of truth 
conditions, a presupposition is an unaffected, constant element or proposition (cf. May 
(2001:27), Huddleston and Pullum (2002:40), to name a few).  It follows that the 
truth condition of the existence of x is constant whether the relevant proposition is true 
or false.  For example, in the sentence It is John (that saw Mary), the relevant open 
proposition is x saw Mary or there is x such that x saw Mary.  Even if one negates the 
sentence (e.g. It is not John (that saw Mary).), the truth of the existence of x is 
unaffected.  In this way, the use of it-clefts always requires that x should exist. 
In this connection, it crucially matters what guarantees the truth of the existence 
of x:  another key factor is the existence of the if-clause.  As stated above, the 
if-clause licenses the use of the truncated it-cleft (cf. Section 7.4.1 and figure (27)):  it 
is the if-clause that introduces information or a proposition that can serve as a 
presupposition of the truncated it-cleft.  In the case of (43a), for example, the cleft it 
would have been Bill (that she had loved) cannot be used without the if-clause if she 
had loved someone, as in: 
 (46) Donna was pretty sure she couldn‟t love anyone.  # It would have been Bill. 
(cf. (43a)) 
Conversely, because the if-clause licenses the proper use of the truncated it-cleft, the 
proposition in the if-clause must always be positive as to the existence of x.  This 
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means that if-clefts, by virtue of the if-clause, necessarily reverse the presupposition 
negative as to the existence of x. 
In this way, the presupposition-reversing function of if-clefts is a kind of 
pragmatic effect.  The primary function of if-clefts is evoking questions and attracting 
much attention of the hearer to the focalized elements. 
 
7.4.3.5.  Summary 
     In this subsection, I argued that the presupposition-reversing function of if-clefts 
proposed in the last subsection is a pragmatic effect.  From the above argument, I 
revise the assumption in (30) and propose the following as the discourse function of 
if-cleft sentences: 
 (47) The Discourse Function of If-Cleft Sentences 
  The discourse function of the if-cleft sentence is evoking a question in hearer‟s 
mind and attracting much attention to the focalized element in the main clause 
so that the element can serve as the topic for the following discourse. 
On the basis of (47), I revise the figure in (33) as follows: 
 (48)  Preceding Context   Succeeding Context 
                    If X,   it is Y        
       
     F1: Evoking a question  F2: Introducing new topic Y 
     Speaker‟s View 
As argued above, the function of switching the flow of discourse is not a primary but a 
secondary effect of if-clefts.  Thus it comes as no surprise that the if-cleft can be used 
as a discourse opener as in (36) or used without switching the flow of discourse.  
What I would like to emphasize here is that the if-cleft sentence is a very effective 
Discourse adopting Y as Topic Old Presupposition
If-Cleft 
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device, because its form is particularly appropriate for providing a new topic for the 
following discourse.  For one thing, as argued above, by evoking a wh-question in 
hearer‟s mind, the if-cleft sentence successfully attracts his/her attention to the 
focalized element in the following it-cleft; for another, by putting the focalized 
element in the end position of the sentence, its form rigidly observes what is called the 
end-focus principle. 
      
7.5.  A Reasoning Process Model: The Conditional Construction as an Epitome 
of Human Rational Capacity 
    This section deals with a related issue, challenging the validity of the paraphrase 
in (26), repeated here as (49): 
 (49)   If X, it is Y 
   = If X and if you ask me WH, I’ll answer it is Y 
It should be noted that the main clause of an if-cleft is not necessarily manifested as a 
declarative sentence, i.e. the assertive form of it is Y, as exemplified bellow: 
 (50) a.  If anyone can solve this problem, is it John? 
  b.  If someone gave her that money, who is it? 
(Declerck and Seki (1990:27)) 
In the sentences in (50), the main clauses manifest themselves as interrogatives.  In 
the discussion above, I have claimed that the main clause is an answer to a covert 
wh-question in the if-clause and proposed the paraphrase in (49).  Clearly, the 
paraphrase does not take cases like (50) into consideration.  In this sense, the 
paraphrase is invalid.  Thus I need to reconsider the meaning of if-clefts. 
In this connection, the following examples may shed light on the matter: 
 (51) a.  Does anyone out there actually like Hinder?  If so, I bet it is all women. 
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(guru7777.blogspot.com/2007/05/hinder-sucks.html) 
  b.   Do you have a home intrusion system?  If so, why?  It is because you 
fear that someone may try to enter your home without your permission. 
(http://renewingnehemiah.com/) 
The first thing to note is that the pro-form so occurs in each if-clause in (51).  In 
example (51a), the so refers to the yes/no-question “Does anyone out there actually 
like Hinder?”.  Likewise, in example (51b), the so refers to “Do you have a home 
intrusion system?”.  This means that the so can be substituted for the questions, as 
exemplified below: 
 (52) a.  If anyone out there actually likes Hinder, I bet it is all women. 
  b.   If you have a home intrusion system, why?  It is because you fear that 
someone may try to enter your home without your permission. 
From this observation, I assume that yes/no-questions are hidden in (or linguistically 
embodied as) if-clauses in if-clefts.  Not only so-substitution in (51) but also the use 
of it-clefts as main clauses shows that hidden yes/no-questions are always answered 
positively; otherwise one cannot use truncated it-clefts as main clauses (see Section 
7.4).  In other words, if-clauses always hypothesize about the relevant questions 
positively. 
  Second, note that in (52b) the second sentence answers the why-question in the 
main clause of the first sentence.  It is not off the mark to assume that the 
why-question is the linguistic embodiment of the implicit wh-question.  In fact, like 
(52b), the implicit question in (52a) can be linguistically expressed, as in: 
 (53)   If anyone out there actually likes Hinder, who is it?  I bet it is all 
women. 
Though admittedly one should not draw an overly far-reaching conclusion from these 
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relatively few examples, one may be justified in suggesting as a possibility that an 
if-cleft semantically contains at least the following four steps: yes/no-questioning, 
positively-oriented hypothesization (P-Hypothesization, for short), wh-questioning, 
and answering.  To put it differently, if-clefts seem to reflect a pattern of human 
rational thinking process.  Let us demonstrate this point: 
 (54) They say that nobody can do it.  If anyone can do it, it is John. 
 (55)   Preceding Presupposition:¬X (Nobody can do it.) 
 
     Yes/No-Questioning: ¬X or X? (Can anyone do it?) 
     P-Hypothesization: If X (If so…/ If anyone can do it,) 
     Wh-Questioning: wh.. is it? (who is it?) 
     Answering: it is Y (it is John) 
 
    Succeeding Discourse 
Figure (55) illustrates the four reasoning steps relevant to the discourse in (54).  To 
begin with, the speaker questions or challenges the presupposition nobody can do it, 
because s/he does not intend to accept it (Yes/No-Questioning).  Then, s/he presents a 
new presupposition opposing the old one (P-Hypothesization).  These steps are 
responsible for the function of reversing the flow of discourse.  Thirdly, under the 
new presupposition, the speaker searches for the appropriate value of x 
(Wh-Questioning).  Lastly, s/he gives the final answer in the form of it is Y. 
     However, recall that the presupposition preceding if-clefts is not always negative 
about the existence of x, as discussed in the previous section.  In this case, too, the 
reasoning process illustrated above holds true: 
 (56) Donna was pretty sure she could love someone.  If she had loved anyone, it 
If-Cleft 
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would have been Bill.                    (= (43b)) 
 (57)   Preceding Presupposition:X (She could love someone.) 
 
     Yes/No-Questioning: ¬X or X? (Was there anyone?) 
     P-hypothesization: If X (If so…/ If there had been anyone,) 
     Wh-Questioning: wh.. is it? (who would it have been?) 
     Answering: it is Y (it would have been Bill) 
 
    Succeeding Discourse 
One may argue that if the preceding presupposition and the speaker‟s opinion are not 
contradictory with each other, then the speaker need not follow the reasoning process 
in (57) because s/he need not question or challenge the preceding presupposition.  
However, note that if-clefs represent the speaker‟s personal opinion or mental attitude.  
To express his/her own attitude, the speaker needs to accept the presupposition 
tentatively and to think of it from his/her own viewpoint.  To think of the 
presupposition from his/her own viewpoint, the speaker needs to follow some 
reasoning steps like those shown in (57). 
     Admittedly, the validity of this assumption is still open to discussion, but it has 
some advantages in analyzing if-clefts.  Firstly, the assumption that the process of 
yes/no-questioning is contained in if-clauses can easily and plausibly explain why 
if-clefts contain polarity items such as any or some in many cases.  It is also 
compatible with the fact that the semantic affinity of conditional if-clauses and polar 
questions is repeatedly pointed out (cf. Bolinger (1978), Huddleston and Pullum 
(2002), to name a few). 
Secondly, this assumption is quite compatible with the discourse functions of 
If-Cleft 
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if-clefts.  Recall that the purpose of the use of if-clefts is to evoke a question in 
hearer‟s mind and attracting much attention to the focalized element in the main clause 
so that the element can serve as the topic for the following discourse.  For that 
purpose, the speaker first of all needs to question or challenge the old presupposition.  
Thus it stands to reason that the step of questioning the plausibility of the old 
presupposition is an essential part of the semantics of if-clefts.    
Lastly, setting up the four steps in the meaning of if-clefts is more desirable from 
the viewpoint of a colloquial discourse: 
 (58) A: It is said that today‟s computers can do everything from sending us to the 
moon to beating us at chess. 
  B:  If there is anything they cannot do, what is it? 
  A: It‟s thinking and acting at their will. 
  B:  That makes a lot of sense.  In fact, it‟s rather difficult even for us human 
beings! 
The paraphrase in (49) above does not take colloquial discourse into consideration, so 
that it cannot explain dialogues.  In actual conversations like dialogue (58), the 
speaker of an if-cleft does not always give its answer by him/herself.  On the other 
hand, the reasoning process model proposed here can explain such dialogues, if the 
four steps can be shared by each participant.  Admittedly, it is difficult to verify 
empirically that such a psychological or mental process is contained in if-clefts as 
semantic substance.  However, implicit in the analysis I have presented here is the 
long-standing assumption that the conditional construction is an epitome of Man’s 
rational capacity (Akatsuka (1997:323)), which is the reason why conditionals have 
been taken up in philosophy and psychology, as well as linguistics.  From this 
perspective, it is not unreasonable to posit a psychological reasoning process model 
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like those in (55) and (57).  
 
7.6.  Conclusion 
     In this chapter, I was concerned with if-cleft sentences and investigated their 
discourse functions.  I made the following points: (i) the interdependency between 
the protasis and apodosis of an if-cleft is in parallel with that between a wh-question 
and its answer, and (ii) the discourse function of the if-cleft sentence is evoking a 
question in hearer‟s mind and attracting much attention to the focalized element in the 
main clause so that the element can serve as the topic for the following discourse.  In 
addition, I proposed a reasoning process model behind the use of if-cleft sentences and 
our rational thinking. 
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Chapter 8 
 
The Semantics and Pragmatics of N1-nara N2 Conditionals 
 
8.1.  Introduction 
     Although Japanese conditional constructions in general have attracted the 
attention of many researchers (cf. Arita (1993)), conditional expressions such as those 
exemplified below have been regarded as exceptional and thus have been left out of 
consideration: 1, 2 
 (1) a.  sake-nara Kosinokanbai 
    sake-if Koshinokanbai 
    „When it comes to sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.‟ 
  b.  sikaku-nara  Yuukyan 
    qualification-if  U-CAN 
    „When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.‟ 
 (2) a.  otoko-nara issyoo-no  sigoto-o  motu  beki  da 
    man-if lifelong-R work-Acc  have  should Part 
    „If you are a man, you should have lifelong work.” 
  b.  sensei-nara yame-ro to yuu beki da 
                                                     
1 Here I treat the marker no as a postposition (P), following Nishiyama (2003).  According to 
Nishiyama (2003), the postposition no in N1-no N2 constructions such as issyoo-no sigoto „life-long 
work‟ only indicates some pragmatic relation between N1 and N2:  N1-no N2 means “the N2 that has 
relationship R with N1.”  Thus, in what follows, I will use R as the abbreviation of Relation to 
represent the meaning of no in the glosses of examples. 
2 The abbreviations used in the glosses of examples are as follows: Acc = accusative case, App = 
apposition marker, AspV = aspectual verb, Comp = comparative marker, Cop = copulative verbs, Ex = 
exclamation marker, Imp = imperative marker, Neg = negative marker, Nom = nominative case, Part = 
sentence ending particle, Pred = predicate marker, Pol = politeness marker, Quot = quotation marker, 
R = relation marker, Top = topic marker.  In what follows, English translations in the single 
quotations represent the intended meaning of N1-nara (wa/no) N2 and related constructions. 
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    teacher-if stop-Imp  Quat should Part 
    „If you are a teacher, you should say “Stop it.”‟ 
In (1) and (2), the nominal expression (hereafter, N) is directly attached to the 
conditional marker nara.  Let us refer to those conditionals as N-nara conditionals.  
N-nara conditionals can be further divided into two subclasses: N1-nara N2 
conditionals such as those in (1) and N-nara S(entence) conditionals such as those in 
(2). 
N1-nara N2 conditionals like those in (1) are composed of two nominal 
expressions and an expression connecting them, i.e. the conditional conjunction nara.  
They are often used in advertisements and commercial messages as sales messages or 
phrases of recommendation:  N2 is presented as the best or most desirable example 
relevant to N1.  Thus, the sentences in (1) are roughly interpreted as “When it comes 
to sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai (Koshinokanbai is best)” and “When it 
comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN (U-CAN is best),” respectively.  
In N-nara S conditionals like those in (2), on the other hand, a nominal 
expression is adjacent to nara, followed by a sentence (i.e. apodosis).  In many cases, 
the apodosis of N-nara S conditionals expresses the speaker‟s judgment or assessment 
(for more details, see Takanashi (1995)).  In the literature, the conjunction nara in 
N-nara S conditionals has been regarded as a topic marker, and thus has been 
investigated in comparison with wa (cf. Mikami (1960), Morita (1990), Nihongo 
Kizyutu Bunpoo Kenkyuukai (ed.) (2009), among others). 
     This chapter examines N1-nara N2 conditional constructions used as phrases of 
recommendation, focusing on their semantics and pragmatics.  The purpose is to 
propose a licensing condition of N1-nara N2 conditionals and to clarify how they can 
be interpreted as phrases of recommendation.  The main claims are the following: 
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 (3) a.  The N1-nara N2 construction is licensed if the relation between N1 and 
N2 can be construed semantically or pragmatically as that of an 
attribute and its subject and if the candidates for N2 can be compared 
with each other by a single criterion common to them. 
  b.  The recommendation reading arises from the incompatibility between 
the logical meaning of the linguistic form and that of the semantic 
relation of N1 and N2. 
     The organization of this chapter is as follows.  Section 8.2 discusses previous 
studies and the scope of this chapter.  Section 8.3 gives basic facts about N1-nara N2 
constructions, and propounds problems relevant to their licensing condition and 
interpretation.  Section 8.4 proposes a licensing condition of the constructions, 
investigating the difference between N1 and N2, i.e. that the former is non-referential, 
while the latter is referential.  Section 8.5 explains why N1-nara N2 constructions 
allow the recommendation reading.   Section 8.6 points out that part of the analysis 
here is applicable to other phrases of recommendation such as N1-wa N2 constructions 
and N1-no N2 constructions.  Section 8.7 offers concluding remarks. 
 
8.2.  Previous Studies and the Scope of this Chapter 
8.2.1.  Previous Studies 
     As already argued, N1-nara N2 constructions have been treated as exceptional  
conditional expressions, and thus have been left out of consideration.  A few 
researchers such as Mikami (1960), Morita (1990), Suzuki (1991), Masuoka and 
Takubo (1992), and Takanashi (1995) pay attention to N-nara constructions in 
general.3  To put it precisely, they focus on N-nara S constructions such as those in 
                                                     
3 Mikami (1960), Morita (1990), and Masuoka and Takubo (1992) treat the conjunction nara as a 
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(2) without distinguishing them from N1-nara N2 constructions.
4  To the best of my 
knowledge, no researchers have investigated N1-nara N2 constructions in detail.
5  
Therefore I will develop the argument that follows without referring to those previous 
studies unless necessary. 
 
8.2.2.  Scope 
     The scope of this chapter should be mentioned.  The following fact shows that 
N1-nara N2 constructions have subclasses, which have not been pointed out so far: 
 (4) sake-nara sake. nigorizake-nara  nigorizake.  meigara-o  yuu 
  sake-if  sake  unrefined sake-if  unrefined sake brand-Acc say 
  hituyoo-wa  ari mas en. 
  necessity-Top be Pol Neg 
  „All you have to say is “Sake” or “Unrefined sake,” if you want to drink 
them.  You don‟t have to specify a brand.‟ 
 (5) (Talking about something to eat with one‟s drink) 
  nihonsyu-nara  surume,  syootyuu-nara  yakko. 
   Japanese sake-if dried cuttlefish shochu-if chilled tofu 
  “If you drink sake, dried cuttlefish is best as a snack; if you drink shochu, 
chilled tofu is best.‟ 
In (4), the N1s and N2s are in a tautological relationship with one another.  The nara 
in (5) seems to correspond to contrastive nara (cf. Akatsuka (1986:347-348)) in 
sentential conditionals, as can be understood from the intended meaning.  Although it 
                                                                                                                                                                     
topic marker, while Suzuki (1991) and Takanashi (1995) treat it as a conditional marker.  Here I am 
not concerned with the functional status of nara. 
4 For the grounds to distinguish between N-nara S and N1-nara N2 constructions, see footnote 11. 
5 The only exception is Shizawa (2011b, c), on which this chapter is based. 
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would be interesting and significant to depict all of the characteristics of N1-nara N2 
constructions, I restrict myself to the case wherein the constructions are used as 
phrases of recommendation.6 
     Here I refer to the relationship between sentential nara-conditionals and N1-nara 
N2 constructions.  Some previous studies such as Mikami (1960) regard N1-nara N2 
constructions as being derived from ordinary sentential conditionals by the truncation 
or deletion of parts of the sentence.  However, as Suzuki (1991:6) points out, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to restore the deleted parts: 
 (6) sikaku-nara Yuukyan 
  „When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.‟ 
 (7) a.  sikaku (o  toru)-nara  Yuukyan (ga  ii). 
    qualification (Acc get)-if  U-CAN (Nom good) 
    „If you want to get qualifications, U-CAN is a good choice.‟ 
  b.  sikaku (o  toru)-nara  Yuukyan (wa  yoku  nai). 
    qualification (Acc  get)-if  U-CAN (Top  good  Neg) 
    „If you want to get qualifications, U-CAN is not a good choice.‟ 
If N1-nara N2 constructions like expression (6) were derived from “full” or sentential 
conditional constructions such as those in (7) by deleting the parts in the parentheses, 
then expression (6) would be ambiguous, allowing both of the interpretations in (7) 
according to the context.7  Interestingly enough, however, it is not (7b) but (7a) that is 
                                                     
6 Contrastive N1-nara N2 constructions like (5) will be discussed in Section 8.4 in terms of the 
licensing condition of N1-nara N2 constructions with the recommendation reading. 
7 Note here that different subject markers are used in the parenthesized parts in (7):  the nominative 
marker ga is used in (7a), while the topic marker wa is used in (7b).  Interestingly enough, they 
cannot be replaced with each other, as shown below: 
 (i) a. ?? sikaku-o toru nara Yuukyan wa ii. 
    „If you want to get qualifications, U-CAN is a good choice.‟ 
  b. * sikaku-o toru nara Yuukyan ga yoku nai. 
    „If you want to get qualifications, U-CAN is not a good choice.‟ 
Unfortunately, I am not in a position to give any sufficient explanation for the contrast.  However, the 
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chosen as the unmarked, natural interpretation of example (6) by native speakers of 
Japanese.  It is impossible to interpret example (6) as (7b).  If N1-nara N2 
constructions are derived from “full” conditional constructions, then one cannot 
properly explain why (7b) is never accepted as a possible interpretation of expression 
(6).  Therefore, I do not regard N1-nara N2 constructions as truncated constructions 
but as independent, distinct constructions. 
 
8.3.  Basic Observations and Problems 
8.3.1.  Basic Observations 
     This section will investigate the semantics and function of N1-nara N2 
constructions.  As is stated in Section 8.1, they are often used in advertisements as 
sales messages or phrases of recommendation:  N2 is presented as the best or most 
desirable example relevant to N1.  Let us observe the following examples: 
 (8) a.  sake-nara Kosinokanbai                               (= (1a)) 
    sake-if Koshinokanbai 
    „When it comes to sake, Koshinokanbai is best.‟ 
  b.  densi  zisyo-nara  Kasio-no  Ekusuwaado 
    electronic dictionary-if  Casio-R  Ex-word 
    „When it comes to electronic dictionaries, Casio‟s Ex-word is best.” 
The expression in (8a) presents Kosinokanbai as the representative of Japanese sake 
and recommends it.  Likewise, the expression in (8b) presents Ekusuwaado as the 
representative of electronic dictionaries and recommends it.  In many cases, N1 refers 
to categories or groups such as sake or densi zisyo „electronic dictionary‟.  N2 such as 
                                                                                                                                                                     
contrast may be ascribed to the difference between categorical and thetic judgments (cf. Kuroda 
(1972)): wa has to do with the former and ga with the latter.  For more details about the relationship 
between the two judgments and the use of wa/ga, see Kuroda (1972). 
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Kosinokanbai or Ekusuwaado, on the other hand, is an element belonging to the set 
referred to by N1.  That is, as far as the examples in (8) are concerned, the 
relationship between N1 and N2 can be formalized as follows: 
 (9) N2 ∈ N1 
However, closer observation reveals that the relationship between N1 and N2 
cannot necessarily be reduced to the relationship in (9).  Let us examine the following 
examples: 
 (10) a. ee kaiwa-nara  Berurittu 
   English conversation-if  Berlitz 
   „When it comes to English conversation, Berlitz is the best school.‟ 
  b. nihon syu-nara  Daisiti Syuzoo 
   Japanese sake-if  Daishichi Sake Brewery 
   „When it comes to Japanese sake, Daishichi Sake Brewery is the best 
brewer.‟ 
  c. chuukaman-nara  Yamazaki 
   Chinese style steamed bun with a filling-if Yamazaki 
   „When it comes to Chinese steamed buns, Yamazaki is the best 
company.‟ 
  d. ryokoo-nara  Kyooto 
   travel-if  Kyoto 
   „When it comes to travels, Kyoto is the best tourist spot to visit.” 
In the examples in (10), clearly, N1 and N2 are semantically or pragmatically related to 
one another, but the relationship cannot be reduced to (9).  For example, the 
expression in (10a) does not present Berurittu as the best example of ee kaiwa „English 
conversation‟; rather, it represents Berurittu as the best school or means for learning 
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English conversation.  In this case, it is more natural to regard the relationship 
between ee kaiwa and Berurittu as that of a purpose and its means or that of business 
and a company.  From this perspective, the relationships between N1 and N2 in the 
examples in (10) can be captured as follows: 
 (11) a. ee kaiwa-nara Berurittu  (N1= purpose; N2 = means) 
  b. nihon syu-nara Daisiti Syuzoo (N1= product; N2 = producer) 
  c. chuukaman-nara Yamazaki (N1= product; N2 = producer) 
  d. ryokoo-nara Kyoto (N1= event; N2 = place) 
As far as the examples in (11) are concerned, N1 and N2 are intimately related and 
conceptually contiguous with each other.  N2 is presented as what the speaker thinks 
is the most salient or outstanding thing related to N1.  This indicates that N1 and N2 
belong to the same ICM in Lakoff‟s (1987) terminology.  That is, N1-nara N2 
constructions explicitly express the metonymic relation between N1 and N2. 
     From this viewpoint, I recapture the relationship between N1 and N2 in the 
examples in (8).  Since the relationship between N1 and N2 is that of a set and its 
element, the examples in (8) explicitly express synecdochic relations.8  That is say, in 
both types of N1-nara N2 constructions, i.e. metonymic type and synecdochic type, N1 
and N2 are in a mapping relation with each other in terms of Fauconnier‟s (1985, 1997) 
                                                     
8 The idea of explicit metonymic/synecdochic relations is borrowed from Mori (2002).  What Mori 
refers to as explicit metonymic/synecdochic expressions is exemplified below: 
 (i) a. Komati-wa  bizin-no   daimeesi  da 
   Komachi-Top beautiful woman-R  pronoun  Cop 
   „Komachi is the pronoun of a beautiful woman.‟ 
  b. Nagasima-wa  Kyozin-no sinboru da 
   Nagashima-Top Giants-R   symbol Cop 
   „Nagashima is the symbol of the Giants.‟ 
In (ia), a synechdochic relation holds between Komati (part) and bizin „a beautiful woman‟ (whole).  
In (ib), a metonymic relation holds between Nagasima (a baseball player) and Kyozin (team).  As 
seen in these examples, the metonymic/synecdochic relations are explicitly represented by the 
expressions daimeesi „pronoun‟ and sinboru „symbol‟.  Although N1-nara N2 constructions have no 
phrases equivalent to daimeesi and sinboru, they are in parallel with Mori‟s explicit metonymic/ 
synecdochic expressions in that reference points and targets are explicitly realized. 
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Access Principle, i.e. F(N1)=N2.
9  In (11a), for example, the N2 Berurittu works as the 
trigger or reference point to access the target ee kaiwa „English conversation‟.  
Through this indirect identification procedure, N2 is recognized as the best or most 
desirable individual with regard to N1. 
 
8.3.2.  Problems 
     In the previous subsection, I have pointed out that metonymic and synecdochic 
relations hold between N1 and N2.  However, this does not fully explain the semantic 
characteristics of N1-nara N2 constructions.   
First, there are some cases wherein N1-nara N2 constructions cannot be licensed 
even if metonymic and synecdochic relations hold between N1 and N2: 
 (12) a # Doraemon-nara dorayaki. 
    Doraemon-if round cake filled with bean jam 
    „When it comes to Doraemon, nothing is better than dorayaki.‟ 
  b. # interia-nara sofaa 
    furniture-if sofa 
    „When it comes to furniture, nothing is better than sofas.‟ 
In (12a), Doraemon is a popular comic character in Japan.  Dorayaki „round cake 
filled with bean jam‟ is Doraemon‟s favorite food.  In this sense, dorayaki and 
Doraemon have an intimate relationship with each other (at least for those who know 
about the comic).  In addition, one can use the word dorayaki to refer to Doraemon 
by saying “Dorayaki yaroo (lit. You, dorayaki!),” which shows that a metonymic 
                                                     
9 The Access Principle (also called the Identification Principle) is defined as follows (cf. Fauconnier 
(1997:41)): 
 If two elements a and b are linked by a connector F (b=F(a)), then element b can be identified by 
naming, describing, or pointing to its counterpart a. 
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relation can hold between dorayaki and Doraemon.  However, as is shown, the 
expression in (12a) cannot be interpreted as a phrase of recommendation.  In (12b), 
on the other hand, the N1 interia „furniture‟ can be construed as the categorical 
property of the N2 sofaa „sofa‟.
10  In this sense, expression (12b) is in parallel with 
the expression in (8a), which is impeccable as a phrase of recommendation.  
Nevertheless, expression (12b) is not acceptable in the intended sense.  The examples 
in (12) show that the mapping relation in (9) does not work as the licensing condition 
of the N1-nara N2 construction. 
     In addition, let us observe the following example: 
 (13) uwaki-nara  iPhone                      (FLASH, March. 1, 2011) 
  love affair-if  iPhone 
  „When it comes to love affairs, nothing is better than iPhone.‟ 
At first glance, in (13) it is difficult to recognize an intimate relationship (such as those 
in (8) and (10)) between uwaki „love affair‟ and iPhone.  However, the preceding 
context, which is omitted in (13), enables us to recognize a close relationship between 
uwaki and iPhone: 
 (14) keetai  meeru hukugendo  chekku  „uwaki-nara  iPhone‟ 
  mobile phone mail  restorability check  love affair-if iPhone 
  „Compare mobile phones in terms of the restorability of deleted e-mails: 
iPhone is best for love affairs.‟ 
From the preceding expression keetai meeru hukugendo chekku „checking the 
restorability of deleted e-mails‟, those who read the expression in (14) can understand 
that the expression uwaki-nara iPhone recommends iPhone from the viewpoint of the 
                                                     
10 The meaning of the Japanese word interia is slightly different from that of the English word interior 
in that the former is usually used as the synonym of kagu „furniture‟.  Thus furniture is used as the 
literal meaning of interia in the glosses. 
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restorability of deleted e-mails.  By the preceding expression, one can recognize a 
purpose-means relationship between uwaki and iPhone. 
     The above observation indicates that the metonymic/synecdochic relation (or 
mapping relation) between N1 and N2 is not a crucial factor for guaranteeing or 
licensing the N1-nara N2 construction; such relationships are no more than effects.  In 
other words, even if two nominal expressions have metonymic/synecdochic relations 
with each other, it is not necessarily possible to use them as N1 and N2 (cf. (12)).  It 
follows that there is another different semantic/pragmatic relationship between N1 and 
N2 which produces metonymic or synecdochic relationships.  Investigating the “true” 
semantic/pragmatic relationship between N1 and N2 will enable us to propose a 
licensing condition for the N1-nara N2 construction. 
     Second, it should be considered how one can interpret N1-nara N2 constructions 
as phrases of recommendation.  As already argued, they are often used as sales 
messages in advertisements:  N2 is presented as the best or most desirable example 
relevant to N1.  However, the interpretation is not compositional in that the 
recommendation meaning of N1-nara N2 constructions is not strictly predictable from 
its immediate constituents.  Consider, again, the expression in (10a), repeated here as 
(15) here: 
 (15) ee kaiwa-nara  Berurittu 
  English conversation-if  Berlitz 
  „When it comes to English conversation, nothing is better than Berlitz.‟ 
The example in (15) is composed of three linguistic units: N1 ee kaiwa „English 
conversation‟, the conditional marker nara „if‟, and N2 Berurittu.  It is obvious that 
the expression has no element which directly corresponds to the recommendation 
meaning. 
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     As pointed out in the previous subsection, N1-nara N2 constructions explicitly 
express metonymic/synecdochic relationships between N1 and N2.  This means that 
N2 stands for N1 or things conceptually contiguous to N1.  In this sense, N2 typifies 
N1.  In this light, one can assume that the recommendation reading should be 
attributed to the function of standing for/ typifying something.  However, standing 
for/typifying something is not always associated with being good or desirable.  
Consider the following example: 
 (16) kee   hanzai-no daihyoo  dearu  manbiki-o  maikai  
  minor  offense-R representation Cop shoplifting-Acc every time 
   kurikaesi  sai han  si-teiru  onna-ga  ikani  ooi  kotoka 
  repeatedly again  offense do-AspV woman-Nom how many Ex 
  „How many women there are who repeatedly do shoplifts, which typifies 
minor offenses!‟ 
(http://hissi.org/read.php/newsplus/20060305/VEVvMjhMMy9P.html) 
In this example, manbiki „shoplifting‟ is treated as the typical case of kee hanzai 
„minor offense‟:  manbiki stands for or typifies kee hanzai.  However, Manbiki 
would never be interpreted as desirable.  As is evident from this example, standing 
for something does not always imply being desirable. 
     One may argue that manbiki and kee hanzai are never interpreted as desirable 
because ordinary people have background or encyclopedic knowledge that they are 
undesirable.  However, this is not the case.  Let us examine the following examples: 
 (17) kee   hanzai-nara  manbiki 
  minor  offense-if  shoplifting 
 (18) a.  If you commit a minor offense, shoplifting is desirable. 
  b.  If you commit a minor offense, shoplifting is undesirable. 
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In (17), kee hanzai and manbiki, which are interpreted as undesirable in (16), are used 
in the N1-nara N2 construction, substituted for N1 and N2, respectively.  Interestingly 
enough, although there is almost no opportunity to see expressions like (17), native 
speakers of Japanese choose (18a), not (18b), as the unmarked interpretation of the 
expression in (17).  This means that the function of recommendation does not arise 
from the lexical meaning of the nouns occurring in the positions of N1 and N2 but from 
the constructional meaning.  However, ascribing the recommendation meaning to the 
constructional meaning does not fully explain how N1-nara N2 constructions are 
interpreted as such.  Thus, its mechanism should be investigated and clarified. 
     From the above argument, the problems to be addressed in this chapter can be 
summarized as follows: 
 (19) a. What is the true relationship between N1 and N2? 
  b. What licenses the N1-nara N2 construction? 
  c.  How is the N1-nara N2 construction interpreted as a phrase of 
recommendation? 
In the following sections, I will address the three questions in (19) in turn. 
 
8.4.  The Licensing Condition of N1-nara N2 Constructions 
8.4.1.  The True Relationship between N1 and N2: Attribute and Its Subject 
     This subsection deals with question (19a), examining the relationship between 
N1 and N2 in more detail.  Observe the following examples: 
 (20) a.  sake-nara Kosinokanbai 
    „When it comes to sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.‟ 
  b.  sikaku-nara Yuukyan 
    „When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.‟ 
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  c.  nihonsyu-nara Daisiti Syuzoo 
    „When it comes to Japanese sake, nothing is better than Daishichi 
Sake Brewery.‟ 
  d.  uwaki-nara iPhone 
    „When it comes to love affairs, nothing is better than the iPhone.” 
Let me first investigate the nature of N1.  What should be pointed out here is that NPs 
occurring in the N1 position are non-referential in that they have no token reference 
identifiable to both the speaker and hearer.  To put it differently, non-referential NPs 
alone can occur in the position of N1 in N1-nara N2 constructions.  Let us focus on 
the nominal expressions in the N1 positions in (20).  Note here that they do not seem 
to refer to specific referents.  In this connection, Takanashi (1995) points out that the 
N in the N-nara conditional construction (including N1-nara N2 constructions like 
those in (20)) is generic and refers to a category, class, or group. 
According to Nishiyama (2003), generic noun phrases are referential in that they 
refer to types to which token entities belong.  However, it is not the case that one 
regards the N1 as referential.  Let us consider the following example: 
 (21)   zoo-wa  hana-ga  naga-i 
    elephant-Top  nose-Nom  long-Pred. 
    „Elephants have long trunks.‟ 
Sentence (21) is what is called a generic sentence.  The subject or topic NP zoo 
„elephant‟ is generic in that it does not refer to a specific elephant; rather, it refers to a 
type or group to which elephants belong.  In this sense, the NP zoo is referential.  
Note here that the phrase to yuu mono „that which is called‟ or to yuu syu „the 
species/class called‟ can be added to the subject NP of generic sentences: 
 (22) a.  zoo  to yuu mono-wa  hana-ga  naga-i 
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    elephant  that which is called-Top nose-Nom  long-Pred. 
    „That which is called an elephant has a long trunk.‟ 
  b.  zoo  to yuu syu-wa  hana-ga  naga-i 
    elephant  the species called-Top  nose-Nom  long-Pred. 
    „The species called elephant has a long trunk.‟ 
In contrast, the addition of those phrases, i.e. to yuu mono and to yuu syu, to the N1 
renders the examples in (20) unacceptable: 
 (23) a. * sake {to yuu mono/to yuu syu}-nara Kosinokanbai 
    „When it comes to {that which is called sake/the class called sake}, 
nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.‟ 
  b. * sikaku {to yuu mono/to yuu syu}-nara Yuukyan 
    „When it comes to {that which is called qualification/the class called 
Japanese sake}, nothing is better than U-CAN.‟ 
  c. * nihonsyu {to yuu mono/to yuu syu}-nara Daisiti Syuzoo 
    „When it comes {that which is called Japanese sake/the class called 
Japanese sake}, nothing is better than Daishichi Sake Brewery.‟ 
  d. * uwaki {to yuu mono/to yuu syu}-nara iPhone 
    „When it comes to {that which is called love affair/the class called 
love affair}, nothing is better than iPhone.” 
The unacceptability of (23) shows that N1 of N1-nara N2 constructions is different 
from the subject or topic NP of generic sentences in that the former does not refer to a 
type or group. 
     The non-referentiality of N1 is further corroborated by the following data: 
 (24) a. * sono sake-nara Kosinokanbai 
    „When it comes to that sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.‟ 
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  b. * ano sikaku-nara Yuukyan 
    „When it comes to that qualification, nothing is better than U-CAN.‟ 
  c. * sanbon-no nihonsyu-nara Daisiti Syuzoo 
    „When it comes to three bottles of Japanese sake, nothing is better 
than Daishichi Sake Brewery.‟ 
  d. * nikai-no uwaki-nara iPhone 
    „When it comes to two love affairs, nothing is better than iPhone.” 
In (24a-b), the deictic expressions sono „that‟ and ano „that‟ are added to the N1s, 
which renders the examples ungrammatical.11  Likewise, in (24c-d), the addition of 
quantifiers such as sanbon-no „three (bottles of)‟, nikai-no „twice‟ to the N1s makes the 
examples ungrammatical.  It is generally acknowledged that deictic expressions and 
quantifiers are essentially referential (cf. Nishiyama (2003:125)).  The facts shown in 
(23)-(24) confirm that nominal expressions that can occur in the position of N1 are 
essentially non-referential. 
Now let us turn our attention to N2.  Let us examine the examples in (20), 
repeated here as (25): 
 (25) a.  sake-nara Kosinokanbai 
    „When it comes to sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.‟ 
  b.  sikaku-nara Yuukyan 
    „When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.‟ 
  c.  nihonsyu-nara Daisiti Syuzoo 
    „When it comes to Japanese sake, nothing is better than Daishichi 
                                                     
11 As understood from examples such as sono otoko-nara wakaru hazu da „That man should know 
about it.‟ and kimi-nara doo suru „What would you do?‟, this restriction is not relevant to N-nara S 
constructions.  In this respect the approaches taken by the previous studies, i.e. Mikami (1960), 
Suzuki (1991), and Takanashi (1995), are inadequate. 
 - 227 - 
Sake Brewery.‟ 
  d.  uwaki-nara iPhone 
    „When it comes to love affairs, nothing is better than the iPhone.‟ 
In the examples in (25), the N2s (i.e. Koshinokanbai, Yuukyan, Daisiti Syuzoo, and 
iPhone) refer to particular, substantial entities in the real world.  In this sense, they 
have token referents and thus are referential by nature.  In other words, N2 is the 
position wherein referential nominals can occur. 
This is further confirmed by the fact that deictic expressions such as kono „this‟ 
and koko „here‟ can occur in the position of N2:  
 (26) a.  sikaku-nara  koko/soko 
    qualification-if  here/there 
    „When it comes to qualifications, this/that is the best.‟ 
  b.  ee kaiwa- nara  kono  kyoozai. 
    English conversation-if this  teaching material 
    „When it comes to English conversation, this is the best teaching 
material.‟ 
  c.  umai gyooza-nara kono omise 
    delicious gyoza-if this  shop 
    „When it comes to delicious gyoza, this is the best shop.‟ 
From the above observations, I conclude that N2, as opposed to N1, is the position 
where referential nominals can occur. 
     Now I am in a position to consider the true relation between N1 and N2.  In this 
section, I have clarified that N1 is the position wherein non-referential nominals should 
occur, while N2 is the position wherein referential nominals can occur.  It is well 
known that non-referential nominal expressions denote attributes (cf. Kuno (1970)).  
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On the other hand, the nominals in N2, which have particular token referents, should 
be interpreted as individuals.  Thus the relation between N1 and N2 can be 
schematically represented as follows: 
 (27)   N1[attribute]-nara N2[individual] 
Clearly, the representation in (27) shows that the relation between N1 and N2 should be 
interpreted as that between an attribute and its subject. 
For a better understanding of the attribute-subject relation, let us observe the 
following examples: 
 (28) a.  sake-nara Kosinokanbai                           (=(25a)) 
    „When it comes to sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.‟ 
  b.  aka-i   hana-nara  manzyusyage 
    red-Pred  flower-if  cluster amaryllis 
    „When it comes to red flowers, cluster amaryllises are the best.” 
In (28) the N2s Kosinokanbai and manzyusyage „cluster amaryllis‟ are members of 
Japanese sake and red flowers, respectively:  the N1s denote the categories to which 
the referents of N2s belong.  To put it in another way, N1 denotes a categorical 
attribute (cf. Masuoka (2005)) of N2. 
     Let us turn our attention to some of the other examples: 
 (29) a.  sikaku-nara Yuukyan     (= (25b)) 
    „When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.‟ 
  b.  nihonsyu-nara Daisiti Syuzoo    (= (25c)) 
    „When it comes to Japanese sake, nothing is better than Daishichi 
Sake Brewery.‟ 
In the expressions in (29), the nominal expressions in N1 do not denote the categories 
to which the referents of the nominals in N2 belong.  In the case of (29a), Yuukyan is 
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a company which provides correspondence courses for lifelong learning, including 
sikaku „qualification‟.  In other words, sikaku is one of the company‟s justifications 
for existence.  In this sense, sikaku is equivalent to the telic role of qualia structure 
(cf. Pustejovsky (1995)).12  Needless to say, qualia structure encodes information 
about particular properties and activities associated with lexical items.  In this way, 
there is sufficient reason to think of sikaku „qualification‟ as an attribute of the 
company Yuukyan.   
The example in (29b) can be explained in almost the same way as the case of 
(29a).  Nihonsyu „Japanese sake‟ is a product made by the brewery named Daisiti 
Syuzoo.  Conversely, Daisiti Syuzoo, as the name Syuzoo „brewery‟ indicates, is a 
company exclusively producing sake, and thus cannot exist without sake.  That is, 
nihonsyu can be construed as the raison d’être of Daisiti Syuzoo.  In this sense, 
nihonsyu can be construed as an essential attribute or at least a defining characteristic 
of Daisiti Syuzoo. 
At first glance, the following examples may be problematic for my claim in that 
it is difficult to construe the N1s as the attributes of the N2s. 
 (30) a.  ame-nara  Tutiya Keeiti. 
    rain-if  Tsuchiya Kei-iti 
    „When it comes to rainy conditions, Kei-ichi Tsuchiya is the fastest 
driver.‟ 
  b.  uwaki-nara iPhone     (= (25d)) 
    „When it comes to love affairs, nothing is better than iPhone.‟ 
Let us first examine the expression in (30a).  It is true that ame „rain‟ cannot be an 
                                                     
12 In the generative lexicon theory, the term telic role is defined as the essential function and purpose 
of the referent of a lexical item.   
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attribute of human beings.  However, if one has encyclopedic knowledge about Keeiti 
Tutiya, a famous racing driver, it is fully possible to regard rain as a kind of attribute 
for him:  he has been famous for his exceptional driving skills in rainy conditions.  
He began competing in the Le Mans 24 hour races in 1994.  In 1999, he was in the 
second place overall, driving a car named Toyota GT-One TS020.  In this race, his 
time during the night session was the fastest, because he excels at driving during 
nighttime and in rainy conditions.  Since then he has been called ame-no Tutiya „In 
rainy conditions, Tsuchiya is the fastest driver,‟ or yoru-no Tutiya „In night sessions, 
Tsuchiya is the fastest driver.‟ 13   In this way, one can recognize an intimate 
relationship between his driving skills and rainy conditions.  Rain can be recognized 
as an attribute, or at least a defining characteristic of Keeiti Tutiya. 
     In the case of (30b), one cannot straightforwardly construe uwaki „love affair‟ as 
an attribute of iPhone, either.  In the actual world, love affairs are not recognized as 
what characterizes the iPhone.  Thus the existence of the iPhone would not be 
affected by the non-existence of love affairs.  So, why is this expression used on the 
cover of a magazine? 
     The answer is that uwaki is, or at least can be construed as, an attribute of 
iPhone.  Let us observe the example in (14) again: 
 (31) keetai  meeru hukugendo  chekku  „uwaki-nara  iPhone‟ 
  mobile phone mail  restorability check  love affair-if iPhone 
  „Check the restorability of deleted e-mails: iPhone is most suitable for love 
affairs.‟ 
As argued earlier, the expression keetai meeru hukugendo chekku „checking the 
restorability of deleted e-mails‟ enables us to understand easily that the phrase 
                                                     
13 The similarity between the N1-nara N2 construction and N1-no N2 will be argued in Section 8.6. 
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uwaki-nara iPhone recommends iPhone from the viewpoint of the restorability of 
deleted e-mails.  It goes without saying that if it is difficult to restore deleted e-mails 
of a mobile phone, the phone is suitable for love affairs; if it is easy to do so, the phone 
is not suitable for love affairs.  The magazine has a report on the match-fixing 
scandal in sumo wrestling:  during an investigation into sumo wrestlers‟ illegal 
gambling (baseball betting), the police scrutinized mobile phones confiscated from 
suspected wrestlers; as a result, they found that some sumo wrestlers arrange outcomes 
and even detail the moves to be used.  The report says that iPhone‟s deleted e-mail is 
very difficult to restore, compared to those of other mobile phones.  The phrase 
uwaki-nara iPhone presupposes this report.  Under the presupposition, uwaki is 
associated with the restorability of deleted e-mails and the mail system of mobile 
phones.  That is, uwaki can be construed as an attribute of iPhone through inference:  
if the restorability of deleted e-mails is low, the possibility of “inappropriate 
relationships” being discovered is also low.  From that viewpoint, iPhone is suitable 
for love affairs.   
     It should be noted here that in the examples in (30), the attribute-subject relation 
holds not semantically but pragmatically.  That is, in N1-nara N2 constructions, the 
relation between N1 and N2 can be construed either semantically or pragmatically as 
that of an attribute and its subject.  Conversely, the constructions are not accepted 
unless the attribute-subject relation holds between N1 and N2 either semantically or 
pragmatically. 
     Construing the relationship between N1 and N2 as that of an attribute and its 
subject enables us to understand why metonymic/synecdochic mapping relations are 
established between N1 and N2:  since attribute is defined as a quality or feature of 
something, i.e. subject, a part-whole relationship in a broader sense necessarily holds 
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between N1 and N2. 
     From the discussion so far, I extract the following generalization: 
 (32) The N1-nara N2 construction is licensed if the relation between N1 and N2 
can be construed semantically or pragmatically as that of an attribute and 
its subject. 
Now let me explain the unacceptability of the examples in (12) on the basis of the 
generalization in (32): 
 (33) a # Doraemon-nara dorayaki. 
    Doraemon-if round cake filled with bean jam 
    „When it comes to Doraemon, nothing is better than dorayaki.‟ 
  b. # interia-nara sofaa 
    furniture-if sofa 
    „When it comes to furniture, nothing is better than sofas.‟ 
(= (12)) 
Let us first examine example (33a).  In this case, the N1 Doraemon is a referential NP, 
while the N2 dorayaki „round cake filled with bean jam‟ is ambiguous between 
referential and non-referential.  If it is interpreted as referential, it refers to a class of 
confectionery called dorayaki.  On the other hand, if it is interpreted as 
non-referential, it refers to no substantial entity, only representing a property of being a 
dorayaki.  In either case, it is difficult to construe the N1 as an attribute of the N2.  
Hence, the example is judged unacceptable.  In the case of (33b), on the other hand, 
things are not that simple:  the N1 interia „furniture‟ denotes the category to which the 
N2 sofaa „sofa‟ belongs, which means that the N1 can be construed as the categorical 
attribute of sofaa.  In this sense, example (33b) is in parallel with the impeccable 
examples in (28).  Nevertheless, example (33b) is unacceptable as a phrase of 
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recommendation.  This phenomenon requires a more detailed explanation, which will 
be given in the following subsection. 
 
8.4.2.  Comparability of N2 
     Before going into a detailed discussion of the unacceptability of example (33b), 
let us observe the following examples: 
 (34)  ? interia-nara kono  sofaa 
    furniture-if  this  sofa 
    „When it comes to furniture, nothing is better than this sofa.‟ 
 (35)   tokaitekina  interia-nara kono sofaa 
    urban  furniture-if this  sofa 
    „When it comes to furniture designed for urban life, this sofa is best.‟ 
(http://store.shopping.yahoo.co.jp/sofarld/a4aaa4b9a4.html) 
Compare these examples with example (33b).  In (34), the deictic word kono „this‟ is 
added to the N2 sofaa „sofa‟.  In (35), the modifier tokaitekina „urban‟ is adjoined to 
N1 interia „furniture‟, besides the addition of kono to the N2.  Interestingly enough, 
both examples are more acceptable as phrases of recommendation than example (33b).  
It should be investigated why this difference in acceptability arises.  To answer this 
question properly, let us consider the function of N1-nara N2 constructions, i.e. 
recommending N2 as the best or most desirable example relevant to N1. 
     Recommending something necessarily requires the process of selecting it from 
more than one candidate; selecting something requires comparing the candidates with 
one another by some measure.  That is, a particular N2 is presented as a result of 
comparing the candidates for N2 by a single measure relevant to or common to N1.
14  
                                                     
14 The example in (33a), whose unacceptability has already been explained by the generalization in 
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In other words, the N1-nara N2 construction is an expression wherein the speaker is 
interested in selecting an individual (N2), using a given attribute (N1) as a clue. 
     Take, for example, sake-nara Kosinokanbai „When it comes to sake, nothing is 
better than Koshinokanbai‟.  In this case, there are many different candidates for N2 
(i.e. subjects having sake as the categorical attribute) besides Kosinokanbai, such as 
Kubota, Zyuuyondai, and Isoziman.  They share a certain measure or criterion, like 
taste or quality, on the basis of which they are evaluated.  As a result of the 
evaluation, Koshinokanbai is selected as N2.  In the case of sikaku-nara Yuukyan 
„When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN‟, the candidates for N2 
share criteria such as the probability of success and the number of qualifications or 
courses.  On the basis of such criteria, the candidates for N2 are compared and 
evaluated.  In fact, in addition to the candidate finally selected as N2, other candidates, 
i.e. the objects of comparison or evaluation, can be linguistically realized: 
 (36) a.  sake-nara  Kubota-yori  Kosinokanbai 
    sake-if  Kubota-Comp  Koshinokanbai 
    „When it comes to sake, Koshinokanbai is better than Kubota.‟ 
  b.  sikaku-nara  Nitii-yori  Yuukyan 
    qualification-if  Nichii-Comp  U-CAN 
    „When it comes to qualifications, U-CAN is better than Nichii.‟ 
Furthermore, NPs denoting comparison criteria can occur in the position of N1, as 
shown below: 
 (37) a.  oisisa-nara  Kosinokanbai 
    deliciousness-if  Koshinokanbai 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(32), is also deviant in this respect:  There is no other candidate for Doraemon‟s favorite food than 
dorayaki. 
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    „When it comes to taste, Koshinokanbai is best.‟ 
  b.  {gookaku ritu /  sikaku-no  syurui}-nara Yuukyan 
    {pass  probability / qualification-R kind}-if  U-Can 
    „When it comes to {the probability of success/the variety of 
qualifications}, U-CAN is best.‟ 
Incidentally, the example in (31) is one of the cases wherein comparison criteria are 
explicitly given in context. 
     Now let us return to the anomalous example in (33b).  In the case of (33b), one 
can enumerate many possible candidates for N2: sofa, table, wardrobe, chair, and the 
like.  Note here that they all belong to the same category, i.e. interia „furniture‟ or 
„movables‟, but are different from one another in terms of function.  That is, one 
cannot compare candidates for N2 by a single measure common to them.  Take a sofa 
and a table, for example.  A sofa is roughly defined as a long comfortable seat with a 
back and arms, for two or more people to sit on.  A table, on the other hand, can be 
defined as a piece of furniture that consists of a flat top supported by legs, usually used 
for dining.  As these definitions show, they are different from each other in their 
functions.  They do not share any inherent comparison criterion.  A sofa and a table 
cannot be compared with each other any more than height and weight can in terms of a 
single common criterion. 
     Now, let us consider why reinforcing the degree of referentiality of N2 improves 
the acceptability of the N1-nara N2 construction, as shown in (34).  The explanation 
is as following.  The deictic word kono „this‟ renders it easier to construe the N2 as an 
individual, which in turn makes it easier to construe the N2 as the subject of the 
attribute denoted by the N1.  Moreover, kono differentiates a particular sofa from 
other sofas.  To put it another way, the addition of kono reinforces the interpretation 
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that the candidates for N2 are limited to sofas, which makes it possible to compare the 
candidates for N2 in terms of a single common criterion such as comfortableness or 
design.  The same effect can be seen when N2 is a trade name, as shown below:
15 
 (38) a.  interia-nara  kaiteki  sofaa-no  esuta 
    furniture-if  comfortable  sofa-App Esta 
    „When it comes to furniture, Esta, a comfortable sofa, is best.‟ 
  b.  gakki-nara  Yamaha-no  Kurabinooba 
    musical instrument-if  Yamaha-R Clavinova 
    „When it comes to musical instruments Yamaha‟s Clavinova is best.‟ 
In (38), the trade name of a sofa Esta and the trade name of an electronic piano 
Clavinova are presented as N2.  In the same way as the deictic word kono „this‟ in 
(34) and (35), trade names differentiate particular products from other products of the 
same kind.  In (38a), the name Esta reinforces the interpretation that the candidates 
for N2 are limited to sofas.  In (38b), the name Clavinova reinforces the interpretation 
that the candidates for N2 are limited to electronic pianos.
16  Furthermore, as shown 
in (35), the manifestation of the expression tokaitekina „urban‟ evokes a specific 
comparison criterion such as the design suitable for urban life. 
     If the above argument is on the right track, then the following condition can be 
obtained, besides the generalization in (32): 
 (39) The N1-nara N2 construction is licensed if the candidates for N2 can be 
compared with one another by a single criterion. 
It is crucial for N1-nara N2 constructions whether or not the candidates for N2 can be 
                                                     
15 I am indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers of Nihongo Bunpoo (Journal of Japanese 
Grammar) for providing me with the example in (38b). 
16 In the case of (38b), another interpretation is possible:  the candidates for N2 are other kinds of 
instruments such as guitars, (classic) pianos, and trumpets.  The reason is that musical instruments 
have an internal comparison criterion, i.e. timbre or tone color. 
 - 237 - 
compared with one another by a single criterion. 
 
8.4.3.  Conclusion: the Licensing Condition of N1-nara N2 Constructions 
     In this section, I have been concerned with the licensing condition of N1-nara N2 
constructions, investigating the nature of nominal expressions in the position of N1 and 
N2.  Now I am in a position to answer the question in (19b).  From the above 
discussion, the following licensing condition can be obtained as follows: 
 (40) The Licensing Condition of N1-nara N2 constructions 
   The N1-nara N2 construction is licensed if the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
  a.  The relation between N1 and N2 can be construed semantically or 
pragmatically as that of an attribute and its subject. 
  b.  The candidates for N2 can be compared with one another by a single 
criterion. 
 
8.5. The Question of Why N1-nara N2 Constructions Can Be Interpreted as 
Phrases of Recommendation 
     This section deals with the question in (19c):  How is the N1-nara N2 
construction interpreted as a phrase of recommendation? 
     In the previous section, I argued that the comparability of candidates for N2 is 
one of the key factors to license N1-nara N2 constructions:  it is crucially important 
whether or not the candidates for N2 can be compared with one another by some 
criteria inherent to them.  Taking this into consideration, I rephrase question (19c) as 
“Why is N2 always selected as desirable or best, never as undesirable or worst?”  
Here, I will investigate the mechanism of the recommendation reading in terms of 
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logic expressed by conditional constructions, based on the traditional view that 
conditional sentences have been regarded as an epitome of human rational capacity. 
     Let me first introduce the logic expressed by general conditionals.  Generally 
speaking, the conditional sentence in human language has been typically compared to 
the mathematical conditional “p→q”, which means that if p is true, then q is also true.   
In this case, p expresses a sufficient condition for q, while q expresses a necessary 
condition for p.  When “p→q” and “q→p” are spontaneously established, p is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for q.  The symbol → is regarded as semantically 
equivalent to the linguistic expression nara (or nara-ba) „if then‟.  Thus, according to 
this formulation, N1 linguistically expresses a sufficient condition for N2, while N2 is a 
necessary condition for N1. 
     As argued above, the N1-nara N2 construction is an expression wherein the 
speaker is interested in selecting an individual (N2), using a given attribute (N1) as a 
clue.  To put it differently, the speaker selects a particular individual as N2 from 
among the candidates in terms of the attribute expressed by N1.  Needless to say, this 
means that there is more than one candidate that has an attribute denoted by N1.  Take 
for example the expressions sake-nara Kosinokanbai „Koshinokanbai is best with 
regard to Japanese sake‟ and uwaki-nara iPhone „iPhone is most suitable for love 
affairs‟: 
 (41)  Candidates for N2 Candidates for N2 
     N1(attribute)  Kosinokanbai☜ N1(attribute) iPhone☜ 
   sake Hakkaisan      love affairs Docomo 
   Kubota （＝restorability of deleted mails） au  
   Zyuuyondai  Softbank 
   etc. 
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As illustrated in Figure (41), Kosinokanbai and iPhone are not the only candidates for 
N2.  What is selected as N2 depends on the speaker‟s taste and intention.  Thus the 
logical relation between N1 and N2 can be represented as follows: 
 (42) a.  p (Kosinokanbai) → q (sake) 
    „If something is Koshinokanbai, then it has sake as an attribute.‟ 
  b.  p (iPhone) → q (uwaki) 
    „If something is iPhone, then it has love affairs (= the low restorability 
of deleted e-mails) as an attribute.‟ 
That is, in terms of their semantic relation, N1 is a necessary condition for N2, while N2 
is a sufficient condition for N1. 
     To summarize the discussion so far, an incompatibility or conflict can be seen 
between the logical meaning of the linguistic form and that of the semantic relation of 
the referents of N1 and N2.  Observe the following: 
 (43) a.  Logical Meaning of the Linguistic Form: N1→N2 
  b.  Semantic Relation of the Referents of N1 and N2: N2→N1 
In terms of the linguistic forms, N1 represents a sufficient condition for N2, while N2 
represents a necessary condition for N1.  In terms of the semantic relationship, on the 
other hand, N1 is a necessary condition for N2, while N2 is a sufficient condition for N1.  
Here let me assume that the incompatibility or conflict between the logical meaning of 
the linguistic form and that of the semantic relation of N1 and N2 give rise to the 
recommendation reading. 
The explanation goes as follows.  A closer look at the representations in (43) 
reveals that the combination of the representations (43a) and (43b) shows a so-called 
biconditional relationship:  N1 is the necessary and sufficient condition for N2.  To 
put it more precisely, the N1-nara N2 construction expresses the logical relation (N1→
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N2)∧(N2→N1) by putting N1, which is intrinsically a necessary condition for N2, into 
the slot of sufficient condition in the linguistic form, and by putting N2, which is 
intrinsically a sufficient condition for N1, into the slot of necessary condition in the 
linguistic form. 
For a better understanding of this explanation, take for example the expressions 
sake-nara Kosinokanbai and uwaki-nara iPhone again.  In the former example, the 
logic If something is Koshinokanbai, then it has sake as its attribute is always true, 
while the reversed logic, i.e. If something has sake as its attribute, then that something 
is Koshinokanbai, is not always true.  As shown in figure (41), there are many other 
candidates for something that has sake as its attribute.  The latter case, i.e., 
uwaki-nara iPhone, can be dealt with in the same way.  As argued above, uwaki „love 
affairs‟ pragmatically refers to an attribute of mobile phones in general, i.e. the low 
restorability of deleted e-mails.  The low restorability of deleted e-mails is shared, 
though different in degree, by all mobile phones.  Therefore, the logic If something is 
iPhone, then it has the low restorability of deleted e-mails as its attribute is always 
true, but the reversed logic If something has the low restorability of deleted e-mails as 
its attribute, then that something is iPhone is not always true. 
However, the N1-nara N2 construction forcibly establishes or coerces the 
reversed logic by its linguistic form.  By doing so, against the intrinsic relationship 
established between N1 and N2, the construction establishes the logic If something has 
N1 as its attribute, then that something is N2, and if something is N2, then that 
something has N1 as its attribute, i.e. (N1→N2)∧(N2→N1).  In this way, establishing 
the relation “N1 ≡ N2” logically excludes other candidates for N2.  This gives rise to 
the recommendation reading.  That is, although there are many other candidates for 
N2, the speaker selects only one candidate by excluding other candidates logically, 
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which generates the interpretation that the selected N2 is the only and best candidate of 
all. 
 
8.6.  Toward the Whole Picture of Phrases of Recommendation 
     This section addresses the characteristics of other expressions used as phrases of 
recommendation, i.e. N1-wa/no N2 constructions.  Specifically, I will point out that 
these constructions share the main characteristics of N1-nara N2 constructions.  
Unfortunately, the conclusion drawn here is tentative, but it is enough to show that 
there is a possibility of dealing with a variety of phrases of recommendation in a 
unified manner. 
     In Section 8.4, I argued that N1-nara N2 constructions have the following 
characteristics: 
 (44) a.  Nominal expressions occurring in the N1 position must be 
non-referential. 
  b.  Nominal expressions occurring in the N2 position are referential. 
  c.  The relation between N1 and N2 can be construed semantically or 
pragmatically as that of an attribute and its subject. 
In what follows, I will show that other phrases of recommendation, i.e. N1-wa N2 
constructions and N1-no N2 constructions, share these characteristics. 
 
8.6.1.  Non-Referentiality of N1 
     To begin with, let us consider the nature of N1 in N1-wa N2 and N1-no N2 
constructions.  As discussed above, a non-referential NP alone can occur in the 
position of N1 of N1-nara N2 constructions.  To determine whether this is also true of 
N1-wa/no N2 constructions, let us investigate the following examples:   
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 (45) a.  sikaku-wa/no  Yuukyan 
    qualification-Top/R  U-CAN 
    „When it comes to qualifications, U-CAN is best.‟ 
  b.  ee kaiwa-wa/no  Berurittu 
    English conversation-Top/R  Berlitz 
    „When it comes to English conversation, Berlitz is best.‟ 
  c.  nihon syu-wa/no  Daisiti Syuzoo 
    Japanese sake-Top/R  Daishichi Sake Brewery 
    „When it comes to Japanese sake, Daishichi Sake Brewery is best.‟ 
Recall here that I used two tests to differentiate whether nominal expressions refer to 
type or group: (i) adding to yuu mono „that which is called‟ and to yuu syu „the 
species/class called‟ to N1 and (ii) adding deictic/quantifier expressions to N1.  Let us 
first see whether the phrase to yuu mono „that which is called‟ and to yuu syu „the 
species/class called‟ can be added.  As in the case of N1-nara N2 constructions, the 
addition of these phrases to the N1 renders the examples in (45) unacceptable: 
 (46) a. * sikaku {to yuu mono/to yuu syu}-wa/no Yuukyan 
    „When it comes to {that which is called qualification/the class called 
qualification}, U-CAN is best.‟ 
  b. * ee kaiwa {to yuu mono/to yuu syu}-wa/no Berurittu 
    „When it comes to {that which is called English conversation/the class 
called English conversation}, Berlitz is best.‟ 
  c. * nihon syu {to yuu mono/to yuu syu}-wa/no Daisiti Syuzoo 
    „When it comes to {that which is called Japanese sake/the class called 
Japanese sake}, Daishichi Sake Brewery is best.‟ 
The unacceptability of (46) shows that the N1 of these constructions is also 
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non-referential. 
     Now let us turn to the second criteria, i.e. the addition of deictic/quantifier 
expressions.  As shown below, the addition of deictic/quantifier expressions to N1 
results in unacceptable expressions:  
 (47) a. * sono  sikaku-wa/no  Yuukyan 
    that  qualification-Top/R  U-CAN 
    „When it comes to that qualification, U-CAN is best.‟ 
  b. * ano  ee kaiwa-wa/no  Berurittu 
    that  English  conversation-Top/R  Berlitz 
    „When it comes to that English conversation, Berlitz is best.‟ 
  c. * kono  nihon  syu-wa/no Daisiti Syuzoo 
    this  Japanese sake-Top/R  Daishichi Sake Brewery 
    „When it comes to this Japanese sake, Daishichi Sake Brewery is 
best.‟ 
 (48) a. * mittu-no sikaku-wa/no  Yuukyan 
    three-R qualification-Top/R U-CAN 
    „When it comes to three qualifications, U-CAN is the best.‟ 
  b. * takusan-no ee kaiwa-wa/no  Berurittu 
    many-R  English conversation-Top/R Berlitz 
    „When it comes to many English conversation, Berlitz is best.‟ 
  c. * ooku-no  nihon  syu-wa/no Daisiti Syuzoo 
    much-R  Japanese sake-Top/R  Daishichi Sake Brewery 
    „When it comes to much Japanese sake, Daishichi Sake Brewery is 
best.‟ 
In (47), the deictic expressions sono „that‟, ano „that‟, and kono „this‟ are added to N1, 
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which renders the examples ungrammatical.  Likewise, in (48), the addition of 
quantifiers such as mittu-no „three‟, takusan-no „many‟ and ooku-no „much‟ to the N1s 
makes the examples ungrammatical.  The facts shown in (46)-(48) confirm that in all 
the three constructions nominal expressions that can occur in the position of N1 are 
essentially non-referential.  In this way, they share the characteristic given in (44a). 
 
8.6.2.  Referentiality of N2  
     Now let us turn our attention to N2, i.e. the characteristic in (44b).  Let us 
examine the examples in (45), repeated here as (49): 
 (49) a.  sikaku- wa/no  Yuukyan 
    qualification-Top/R  U-CAN 
    „When it comes to qualifications, U-CAN is best.‟ 
  b.  ee kaiwa-wa/no  Berurittu 
    English conversation-Top/R  Berlitz 
    „When it comes to English conversation, Berlitz is best.‟ 
  c.  nihon syu-wa/no  Daisiti Syuzoo 
    Japanese sake-Top/R  Daishichi Sake Brewery 
    „When it comes to Japanese sake, Daishichi Sake Brewery is best.‟ 
In (49), as in the case of N1-nara N2 constructions, the N2s (i.e. Yuukyan, Berurittu and 
Daisiti Syuzoo) are proper nouns referring to particular, actual companies in the real 
world.  In this sense, they have token referents and thus are referential by nature.  
Furthermore, deictic expressions such as kono „this‟ and koko „here‟ also can occur in 
the position of N2: 
 (50) a.  ee kaiwa- wa  kono  kyoozai. 
    English conversation-Top  this   teaching material 
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    „When it comes to English conversation, nothing is better than this 
teaching material.‟ 
  b.  umai gyooza-no  kono omise 
    delicious gyoza-R this  shop 
    „When it comes to delicious gyoza, nothing is better than this shop.‟ 
From the above observation, I conclude that N2 of N1-wa/no N2 constructions is in the 
position where referential NPs can occur, as is the case of N1-nara N2 constructions.  
In this way, the three constructions share the characteristic given in (44b). 
 
8.6.3.  Attribute-Subject Relation 
     The above observation has shown that N1-wa/no N2 constructions share the 
characteristics in (44a-b) with N1-nara N2 constructions.  This leads us to conclude 
that N1 can be construed as an attribute of N2 in N1-wa/no N2 constructions as well as 
in N1-nara N2 constructions. 
With regard to N1-no N2 constructions, it is worth noting that Koya (2010) takes 
a similar view.  On the basis of Nishiyama‟s (2003) classification of no, Koya 
examines N1-no N2 constructions in detail, pointing out that N1 serves as a merkmal or 
salient characteristic of N2.  His term merkmal, a German word, means salient 
characteristics of N2.  In this sense, Koya‟s view is, to some extent, compatible with 
mine.  It is safe to say that all three constructions share the characteristic in (44c). 
 
8.6.4.  For Future Research 
As just argued, I have shown that N1-nara/wa/no N2 constructions share the 
characteristics in (44).  However, just because the three constructions are similar 
from such a viewpoint, it does not mean that they are parallel in all aspects.  It should 
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be noted that N1-nara/wa/no N2 constructions are different from each other in 
structure:  they seem to be based on conditional sentences (i.e. complex sentences 
composed of a main clause and a subordinate clause introduced by a conjunct), copular 
sentences (i.e. simple sentences wherein two grammatical elements are connected by 
copular verbs such as be), and noun phrases composed of a head (N2) and a modifier 
(N1), respectively.  With this in mind, I will discuss in what follows some remaining 
problems and present a future direction. 
 
8.6.4.1  The Peculiarity of N1-no N2 Constructions 
     First of all, although I have pointed out that the relation between N1 and N2 can 
be construed semantically or pragmatically as that of an attribute and its subject, this 
also differentiates N1-no N2 constructions from N1-nara/wa N2 constructions in some 
cases: 
 (51) a. # sake-no Kosinokanbai 
    „Koshinokanbai, the best sake.” 
  b. # densi zisyo-no Ekusuwaado 
    „Ex-word, the best e-dictionary.‟ 
 (52) a.  sake-nara/wa Kosinokanbai 
    „Koshinokanbai is the best sake.” 
  b.  densi zisyo-nara/wa Ekusuwaado 
    „Ex-word is the best e-dictionary.‟ 
In (51) and (52), the N1s refer to categories to which the referents of N2s belong.  In 
other words, the N1s denote categorical attributes of the N2s.  It should be noted here 
that, as shown in (51), such a relation cannot be allowed in N1-no N2 constructions.  
Interestingly enough, however, the examples below show that the addition of modifiers 
 - 247 - 
to N1 improves their acceptability: 
 (53) a.  tuka-eru densi zisyo-no  Ekusuwaado 
    use-able  electronic dictionary-R Ex-word 
    „Ex-word, the useful e-dictionary.‟ 
  b.  oisi-i   osake-no  Kosinokanbai 
    delicious-Pred.  sake- R Koshinokanbai 
    „Koshinokanbai, the delicious sake.‟ 
In this connection, Koya (2010:198-199) points out that N1 must be informative 
enough in order to serve as a merkmal.  However, as shown in the contrast between 
(51) and (52), his statement does not hold true for N1-nara/wa N2 constructions.  It 
should be investigated why this “informative constraint‟ operates on N1-no N2 
constructions alone. 
Second, it is worth noting that it is difficult for deictic pro-forms such as koko 
„here‟ and kore „this‟ to occur as N2 in the N1-no N2 construction in many cases: 
 (54) a.  sikaku-nara/wa/#no koko 
    „When it comes to qualifications, this is the best place.‟ 
  b.  umai sake-nara/wa/#no kore 
    „When it comes to good sake, this is the best.” 
One finds this anomalousness mysterious, taking into consideration the acceptability 
of the following example: 
 (55) umai gyooza-no  kono omise 
  delicious gyoza-R  this  shop 
  „When it comes to delicious gyoza, this is the best shop.‟ 
This example is impeccable, although the deictic expression kono „this‟ occurs.  The 
only difference between (54) and (55) lies in function:  in (54) the deictic expressions 
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are used as pronominally, while in (55) kono is used as a determiner or pronominal 
modifier. 
Unfortunately, I am not in a position to give any clear explanation for these 
phenomena.  However, a clue to the answer may lie in their difference in structure, as 
alluded to above. 
In N1-no N2 constructions, N2 is the head and N1-no serves as an adjunct, i.e. 
modifier PP (Postpositional Phrase) (cf. Nishiyama (2003:18)); that is, the whole 
expression is an NP.  More precisely, N1 serves as a modifier or classifier of N2.  
Thus, it may be that deictic expressions used as pronouns such as those in (54) are 
restrictive enough, so that further classification is rejected. 
With regard to N1-nara N2 constructions and N1-wa N2 constructions, the former 
are intimately related to nara-conditionals (i.e. complex sentences) and the latter to 
copular sentences (i.e. NP-wa NP-da „NP be NP‟).  That is to say, N1 and N2 are, to 
some extent, independent of each other in that N1 serves neither as a modifier nor as a 
classifier of N2 in these constructions.  Nevertheless, it must be admitted that this 
perspective does not provide a sufficient explanation of the difference in acceptability 
between (54) and (55).  This is a problem that remains for future research. 
 
8.6.4.2.  From the Viewpoint of Specification 
     Lastly, I would like to point out the close relationship of N1-nara/wa N2 
constructions and another construction, i.e. specificational copular sentences.17  As 
discussed in Section 8.3, N1 is the position where non-referential nominal expressions 
alone can occur, while N2 is the position where referential nominal expressions can 
                                                     
17 In this subsection I will not deal with N1-no N2 constructions, because it is not clear at all whether 
they can be analyzed as a variation of specificational sentences. 
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occur.  This means that the relation between N1 and N2 of the constructions at issue 
can be regarded as in parallel with that between B (non-referential) and A (referential) 
of the copular sentence B-wa A-da „B is A‟, which Nishiyama (2003) refers to as 
inverted specificational sentences.  To put it differently, the parallelism suggests that 
N1-nara/wa N2 constructions can be investigated in a unified manner from the 
viewpoint of specification. 
     A specificational sentence is defined as one whose semantic function is to 
specify a value for a variable (Declerck (1988:2)).  In many cases, specificational 
sentences are linguistically realized as simple copular sentences.  Take, for example, 
the sentence The bank robber is John Thomas.  This sentence is specificational 
because it specifies a value (John Thomas) for the variable „the x who is a bank 
robber‟. 
In the cases of sake-nara Koshinokanbai and sake-wa Koshinokanbai, both of 
them can roughly be interpreted as “The best sake is Koshinokanbai.”  This 
interpretation is specificational in that it specifies the value Koshinokanbai for the 
variable „the x which is the best sake‟.  In this sense, they can be regarded as 
variations of specificational sentences in a broader sense. 
     The same is true for other cases such as sikaku-nara/wa Yuukyan and 
ame-nara/wa Tutiya Keeiti.  They are pragmatically interpreted in such a way that  
“U-CAN offers the best correspondence courses for qualifications” and “Kei-ichi 
Tsuchiya is the best driver in rainy conditions,” respectively.  They are specificational 
because they specify the values Yuukyan and Kei-ichi Tsuchiya for the variables „the x 
which offers the best correspondence courses for qualifications‟ and „the x who is the 
best driver in rainy conditions‟. 
     Recall that the relation of N1 and N2 constructions can be construed as that of an 
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attribute and its subject, and note that this relation can be reinterpreted in terms of 
synecdoche and metonymy.  If N1 denotes a category to which N2 belongs, then a 
synecdochic relation holds between them.  If, on the other hand, N1 and N2 are 
semantically contiguous with each other, a metonymic relation holds.  As argued in 
Section 8.3.1, such relations can be understood from the viewpoint of a mapping 
relation or the Access Principle (Fauconnier (1997)), as shown below: 
 (56)   F(N1) = N2 
The formula in (56) shows that if the value for N1 is input, then the value for N2 is 
output by virtue of a pragmatic function mapping.  To put it differently, N1-nara/wa 
N2 constructions linguistically represent the relation if N1 is specified, then N2 is also 
specified.  This leads us to the conjecture that nara-conditionals in general can be 
investigated in terms of specificational meaning.  This view is not so misdirected, if 
one takes the etymology of conditional markers into consideration:  the conjunct nara 
„if‟ is derived from the copular nari „be‟ (Traugott (1985:291)).  A related issue will 
be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
8.7.  Concluding Remarks 
     This chapter was concerned with N1-nara N2 constructions as phrases of 
recommendation and their licensing condition.  I made the following points.  First, I  
clarified that N1 is in the position wherein non-referential NPs occur, while N2 is in the 
position where referential NPs can occur.  Second, on the basis of the fact just 
pointed out, I claimed that N1 denotes an attribute and N2 its subject:  the relationship 
between N1 and N2 is that of an attribute and its subject.   Furthermore, it was 
clarified that the comparability of candidates for N2 affects the licensing of the 
construction.  Third, I pointed out that the recommendation reading comes from the 
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incompatibility between the logical meaning of the linguistic form (i.e. N1 is the 
sufficient condition for N2, while N2 is the necessary condition for N1) and that of the 
semantic relation of N1 and N2 (i.e. N2 is the sufficient condition for N1, while N1 is 
the necessary condition for N2):  the combination of the two logics produces the 
equivalent relation between N1 and N2. 
In conclusion, I would like to touch very briefly on an interesting phenomenon 
related to a subclass of N1-nara N2 constructions.  As argued in Section 8.4, the 
comparability of candidates for N2 is one of the key factors to license N1-nara N2 
constructions:  it is crucially important whether or not the candidates for N2 can be 
compared with one another by some criteria inherent to them.  Hereafter I will refer 
to such comparing criteria as internal criteria. 
Taking this into consideration, one may expect that infelicitous examples like 
(33b), i.e. interia-nara sofaa can be rendered acceptable if external criteria are 
introduced by context, which makes it possible to compare candidates for N2.  This 
expectation is borne out, as shown below: 
 (57) (kore made sita  taka-i  kaimono-wa)  interia-nara sofaa.(cf. (33b)) 
  (this until  did  high-Pred purchase-Top) furniture-if sofa 
  „(Talking about expensive purchases one has made) As for furniture, a sofa 
is the most expensive purchase.‟ 
In this example, the price of purchases is introduced as a comparison criterion.  The 
unacceptable expression in (33b) is rendered fully acceptable.  Interestingly enough, 
the N1-nara N2 constructions licensed by external criteria lose recommendation 
readings:  the N1 sofaa „sofa‟ is not presented as the most desirable example of 
movables.  In this case, the N1 restricts the topic, i.e. the most expensive purchase one 
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has ever made, to interia „furniture‟.18  The N1-nara N2 construction in (57) is most 
likely to be used as an answer to questions like “What is the most expensive purchase 
you have ever made?”19  It is possible that the speaker might answer the question by 
just saying “Sofaa.”  However, expressing the phrase interia-nara evokes the 
presence of other expensive purchases.  The following dialogue illustrates this: 
 (58) A:  kore made  sita  itiban taka-i  kaimono-wa  nani. 
    this  until  did  most  high-Pred  purchase-Top what 
    „What is the most expensive purchase you have ever made?‟ 
  B:  interia-nara sofaa.  kuruma-nara Biiemdaburyuu.  
    furniture-if  sofa   car-if  BMW 
    „As for furniture, it is a sofa; as for cars, it is a BMW.” 
In the dialogue in (58), sofaa „sofa‟ and Biiemdaburyuu „BMW‟ are presented 
contrastively as the answers to the question given by speaker A.  Neither of the 
N1-nara N2 constructions are interpreted as phrases of recommendation in this 
example.  That is, whether or not N1-nara N2 constructions are interpreted as phrases 
of recommendation may depend on whether comparison criteria are internal or 
external.  A more detailed and careful study is certainly needed to substantiate such a 
claim. 
                                                     
18 Morita (1990) takes a similar view, although he does not distinguish N1-nara N2 constructions with 
recommendation readings and those with contrastive meanings. 
19 Example (5) may be categorized into this class. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Conditional Constructions as Seen from the Viewpoint of 
Specification 
 
9.1.  Introduction 
     In the preceding chapters, I investigated conditional constructions that have been 
regarded as peripheral in the literature: adnominal conditionals, if-cleft sentences, and 
N1-nara N2 conditionals. 
     In this chapter, I will briefly touch on the concept of specification.  Specifically, 
I will show that those conditional constructions which appear to have no relationship 
with one another except that they are classified as conditionals can be captured in a 
unified manner from the viewpoint of the semantic concept of specification.  The 
main claim in this chapter is as follows:  conditional constructions can, to some 
extent, be captured in parallel with specificational copular sentences.  That is, 
conditionals have the function of specifying values for variables.  As such, the 
concept of specification plays an important role in investigating conditional 
constructions. 
     Before going into a detailed discussion, let us review the concept of 
specification.  Observe the following examples: 
 (1) a.  The bank robber is John Thomas. 
  b.  The only people that can help you are the Prime Minister and the Queen 
herself. 
(Declerck (1988:5)) 
The copular sentences in (1) are referred to as specificational sentences.  
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Specificational sentences are roughly defined as follows:  a specificational sentence 
is one whose semantic function is to specify a value for a variable (Declerck (1988:2)).  
Thus, sentence (1a) is specificational because it specifies a value (John Thomas) for 
the variable the X who is the bank robber.  Likewise, sentence (1b) specifies the two 
values (the Prime Minister and the Queen herself) that satisfy the variable the only 
X-es that can help you. 
     As pointed out by Higgins (1976), specifying values for a variable is very 
similar to enumerating the items on a list.  That is, sentence (1b) enumerates the two 
items that figure on the list whose heading is people that can help you.  The same is 
true of sentence (1a), wherein the list in question has only one item on it.  With 
regard to specificational sentences in Japanese, a similar view is found in Nishiyama 
(2003), who argues that (inverted) specificational sentences, i.e. A-wa B-da „A is B‟, 
represent the speaker‟s interest in looking for or searching for B, which is fitting for 
the variable in A, and enumerate the candidates.  In any case, the purpose of a 
specificational sentence is to make it possible for the speaker to pick out the referent(s) 
from a set (Declerck (1988:10)). 
 
9.2.  Observations 
Let us first review the conditional constructions examined in Part 2: 
 (2) Adnominal Conditionals 
  a.  The price if you pay now is predictable; the price if you wait a year is 
not. 
  b.  The location if it rains and the location if it doesn‟t rain are within five 
miles of each other. 
 (3) If-Cleft Sentences 
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  a.  If anyone can help us, it is John. 
  b.  If I am to find a criticism, it is in the rather erratic organisation of the 
material. 
 (4) N1-nara N2 Conditionals 
  a.  sake-nara Kosinokanbai 
    „When it comes to sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.‟ 
  b.  sikaku-nara  Yuukyan 
    „When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.‟ 
In the preceding chapters, I have examined these constructions from the viewpoint of 
semantic/pragmatic-based syntax, focusing on the relationship between linguistic form 
and meaning.  In what follows, I will investigate these constructions in turn in terms 
of specification, showing that the specification can be seen as one of the important 
functions of conditional constructions. 
 
9.2.1.  Adnominal Conditionals as Seen in Terms of Specification 
     To begin with, let me investigate adnominal conditionals (ACs).  Let us see the 
examples in (2), repeated here as (5): 
 (5) a.  The price if you pay now is predictable; the price if you wait a year is 
not. 
  b.  The location if it rains and the location if it doesn‟t rain are within five 
miles of each other. 
As argued in Chapter 6, sentence (5a) represents the following relation:  the price will 
be determined or specified if the hearer decides to pay it now.  Likewise, sentence 
(5b) implies the relationship wherein the location will be decided according to the 
weather.  Recall here that NPs modified by ACs should be construed as having 
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resultant values to be determined by the fulfillment of the condition described in the 
if-clause; that is, unspecified variables are included in the NPs modified by ACs.  
This means that AC (the) X if Y represents a specification relation as follows: 
 (6) Variable X is specified if condition Y is fulfilled. 
 (7)    X1 ☜ (specified) 
     X2 
   if Y X3 
      
     Xn 
Figure (7) shows that the value of X is specified by the fulfillment of condition Y.  
Note here that, as can be inferred from (6) and figure (7), the specification relation 
ACs represent is slightly different from that of copular sentences.  In the copular 
specificational sentence A is B (e.g. The bank robber is John Thomas.), the NP in the 
position of B (e.g. John Thomas) directly specifies the variable the X that is A.  It 
follows that the specificational sentence A is B can be paraphrased as the X that is A is 
B (cf. Declerck (1988:5)).  In ACs, however, the specific value specified by the 
fulfillment of the condition in the if-clause is not explicitly stated.  Rather, they 
metalinguistically represent the relation of variable X being specified if condition Y is 
fulfilled.  In this sense, ACs can be termed as metalinguistic specificational sentence. 
 
9.2.2.  If-Cleft Sentences as Seen in Terms of Specification 
     Let us turn our attention to if-cleft sentences.  Let us examine the examples in 
(3), repeated here as (8): 
 (8) a.  If anyone can help us, it is John. 
  b.  If I am to find a criticism, it is in the rather erratic organisation of the 
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material. 
One can easily recognize specificational meanings in if-cleft sentences.  In (8a), the 
variable introduced by the pronominal anyone is specified by the focalized element in 
the it-cleft sentence, i.e. John.  Likewise, in (8b), an implicit variable like in x is 
specified by the focalized element in the it-cleft sentence, i.e. in the rather erratic 
organisation of the material.  Recall that the interdependency between the protasis 
and apodosis of an if-cleft is in parallel with that of a wh-question and its answer.  In 
this sense, sentence (8a) is in parallel with the pair Who can help us? and It’s John.  
With regard to copular sentences with specification meaning, Declerck (1988:6) argues 
that specifying a value (or values) for a variable (or enumerating the items on the list) 
is very similar to providing an answer to a question.  Thus, the sentence The bank 
robber is John Thomas is naturally felt to provide an answer to the question Who is the 
bank robber?  In this respect, a parallelism can be recognized between if-cleft 
sentences and copular sentences with specification meaning. 
One difference between them is, however, whether the question-answer relation 
is linguistically manifested or not.  In if-cleft sentences, the if-clause is the realization 
of a wh-question, as argued in Chapter 7.  Furthermore, recall that the if-clause also 
functions as the presupposition to use the main clause (it-cleft).  In specificational 
copular sentences, on the other hand, wh-questions are not necessarily realized 
linguistically.  Nevertheless, wh-questions are implied in such cases.  A consequence 
of this is that specificational copular sentences have exactly the same presuppositions 
as question-answer pairs (Declerck (1988:6)).  That is, if-cleft sentences explicitly 
express the (part of) contextual information that specificational copular sentences 
requires.  In this sense, if-cleft sentences can be regarded as extended specificational 
sentences. 
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9.2.3.  N1-nara N2 Constructions as Seen in Terms of Specification 
     Lastly, I would like to point out the close relationship of N1-nara N2 
constructions and specificational copular sentences.  Let us investigate the examples 
in (4), repeated here as (9a) and (9b), and related construction, i.e. the N1-wa N2 
construction ((9c) and (9d)): 
 (9) a.  sake-nara Kosinokanbai 
    „When it comes to sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.‟ 
  b.  sikaku-nara  Yuukyan 
    „When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.‟ 
  c.  sake-wa Kosinokanbai 
    „When it comes to sake, nothing is better than Koshinokanbai.‟ 
  d.  sikaku-wa  Yuukyan 
    „When it comes to qualifications, nothing is better than U-CAN.‟ 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 8, N1 is the position where non-referential nominal 
expressions alone can occur, while N2 is the position where referential nominal 
expressions can occur.  I also pointed out that the relation between N1 and N2 of the 
N1-nara N2 construction at issue can be regarded as in parallel with that between B 
(non-referential) and A (referential) of the copular sentence B-wa A-da „B is A‟, 
which Nishiyama (2003) refers to as inverted specificational sentences.  Furthermore, 
note here that N1-wa N2 constructions are closely related to the copular sentence B-wa 
A-da (cf. Morita (1990:108)).  In this sense, it is not irrelevant to assume that 
N1-nara/wa N2 constructions and specificational copular sentences form a natural 
class. 
To repeat, in the cases of (9a) sake-nara Kosinokanbai and (9c) sake-wa 
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Kosinokanbai, both of them can roughly be interpreted as “The best sake is 
Koshinokanbai.”  This interpretation is specificational in that it specifies the value 
Kosinokanbai for the variable „the x which is the best sake‟.  In this sense, they can 
be regarded as variations of specificational sentences in a broader sense.  The same is 
true for (9b) sikaku-nara Yuukyan and (9d) sikaku-wa Yuukyan.  These expressions 
are pragmatically interpreted as “U-CAN offers the best correspondence courses for 
qualifications.”  Expressions (9b) and (9d) are specificational in that they specify the 
value Yuukyan for the variable „the x which offers the best correspondence courses for 
qualifications‟ 
Furthermore, recall that by using N1-nara N2 constructions, the speaker selects a 
particular individual as N2 among the candidates in terms of the attribute expressed by 
N1 (see Chapter 8, Figure (41)).  In other words, the purpose of a N1-nara N2 
construction is to make it possible for the speaker to pick out the referent(s) from a set.  
In this respect, N1-nara N2 constructions are quite in parallel with specificational 
copular sentences. 
 
9.3.  Conditionals Are Specificational 
     So far I have shown that the conditional constructions taken up in Part 2 can be 
recaptured from the viewpoint of specification:  they can, to some degree, be 
regarded as variants of specificational sentences.  Then, how about other, typical 
conditionals?  To go one step further, one may notice that conditionals in general are, 
to some extent, specificational.  Let us take English conditionals for instance. 
 
9.3.1.  Predictive Conditionals 
Let us first examine the following example: 
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 (10) If it rains, the match will be canceled. 
Example (10) is a predictive conditional in Dancygier‟s (1998) terminology.1.  As 
inferred from its name, example (10) describes the speaker‟s prediction of the 
cancellation of the match in case of rain.  It is widely acknowledged that in this kind 
of conditional construction, the protasis expresses a sufficient condition for the 
fulfillment of the apodosis (Sweetser (1990:115)), i.e. p→q, in a mathematic or logic 
formula.  With regard to example (10), this relationship can be diagrammatically 
illustrated as follows: 
 (11)  p (it rains) →q (the match will be cancelled) 
     q 
                       p 
 
As this kind of relation is often called inclusion or material implication, p implies q.  
As Ferguson et al. (1986:5) point out, since material implication has a long history and 
is the most worked-over and best known logical relation between propositions that 
corresponds to the conditional sentences of natural languages, linguists are often 
tempted to use it as the defining basis for conditionals.  However, this explanation is 
quite incompatible with our intuition:  if the figure in (11) is the case, then p 
presupposes q.  To put it differently, p is established on the basis of q.   
In contrast, example (10) states that the speaker predicts the cancellation of the 
match on the basis of the truth of rain.  In other words, the speaker picks out a 
possible result (or specifying a result) as the apodosis from a set, presupposing the 
truth of the protasis.  This can be diagrammatically illustrated as follows: 
                                                     
1 Besides open conditionals like example (10), Dancygier (1998) classifies so-called counter-factual 
conditionals (e.g. If it rained, the match would be canceled/If it had rained, the match would have been 
canceled.) as predictive conditionals. 
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 (12)    the match will be held. 
     the match will be cancelled.☜ (specifying a probable result) 
  If it rains the match will be postponed. 
   p  the match will be suspended. … etc. 
       Set of q 
As illustrated, in saying “If it rains, the match will be cancelled,” the speaker picks out 
or specifies a probable result, presupposing the truth of rain.  As seen above, the 
process of picking out a candidate is indispensable for specificational meaning. 
Furthermore, recall here that specifying a value (or values) for a variable is very 
similar to providing an answer to a wh-question (Declerck (1988:6)).  For example, 
the specificational sentence It is John who loves Mary is in parallel with the following 
question-answer pair: Who loves Mary? It is John.  This semantic characteristic 
seems to be shared by conditional constructions in general.  Observe the following 
examples for confirmation: 
 (13) a.  If it rains, we‟ll cancel the picnic. 
  b.  What will happen if it rains? ― (Then) We‟ll cancel the picnic. 
  c.  What if it rains? ― (Then) We‟ll cancel the picnic. 
As shown in (13b) and (13c), the apodosis in (13a) is quite similar to providing an 
answer to a wh-question.  In this sense, conditional constructions contain variables in 
the apodosis.  Thus, there is sufficient reason to regard predictive conditionals as a 
variation of specificational sentences. 
 
9.3.2.  Non-Predictive Conditionals 
     Let us turn to what Dancygier (1998) refers to as non-predictive conditionals, i.e. 
epistemic conditionals, speech-act conditionals, and rhetorical conditionals.  Consider 
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the following examples: 
 (14) If John went to that party, (then) he was trying to infuriate Miriam. 
(Sweetser (1990:116)) 
 (15) If I haven‟t already asked you to do so, please sign the guest book before you 
go.   (Sweetser (1990:118)) 
 (16) a.  If they are Irish, I‟m the Pope. 
  b.  He‟s ninety if he‟s a day. 
             (Greenbaum and Quirk (1990:319)) 
Example (14) is an epistemic domain conditional.  Epistemic conditionals like (14) 
can be explained in almost the same way as predictive conditionals, except that the 
apodosis of epistemic conditionals cannot be directly questioned by wh-phrases.2  
Epistemic-domain conditionals state that the speaker draws a conclusion from or on 
the basis of the protasis.  As in the case of predictive conditionals, the speaker picks 
out a possible conclusion from a set in his/her mind.  In this sense, the speaker 
specifies the apodosis. 
     Particularly interesting is the case of speech-act conditionals, exemplified in 
(15).  In speech-act conditionals, the specifying relation is reversed.  This means 
that the speaker picks out or specifies the protasis, presupposing the apodosis.  For a 
better understanding of this, recall that the if-clause of speech-act conditionals is used 
as a kind of introductory remarks to make the utterance more polite or appropriate:  
the speaker is making it clear why s/he believes what s/he communicates to be 
appropriate, but admitting the possibility for the hearer to see the situation differently 
(see Section 3.5.5 in Chapter 3 and Dancygier (1998:90-91)).  That is, the focus of 
                                                     
2 If we replace the apodosis in (14) with a wh-phrase, we gain the content-domain reading alone.  
Note, however, that the apodosis in epistemic conditionals can be paraphrased into „I conclude that x‟, 
wherein the phrase he was trying to infuriate Miriam can be regarded as the value for the variable x. 
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the speaker is put on the apodosis rather than on the protasis.  To put it another way, 
the speaker picks out a possible condition to make what s/he intends to communicate 
felicitous.  This may be illustrated as follows:3 
 (17)    if I may ask, 
     if you don‟t mind my asking, 
  please sign the guest book  if I haven‟t already asked you to do so,☜ 
  before you go. if you like, 
    q if you‟re interested, …etc. 
                          Set of p 
In this sense, the relation of speech-act conditionals and other conditionals like 
predictive and epistemic conditionals is in parallel with that of specifying sentences (A 
is B) and inverted specificational sentences (B is A). 
     Lastly, let us investigate the examples in (16), i.e. rhetorical conditionals.  
According to Quirk et al. (1985) and Greenbaum and Quirk (1990), sentence (16a) is 
interpreted as “Since I‟m obviously not the Pope, they‟re certainly not Irish.”  In this 
type of rhetorical conditional, the speaker strongly asserts the falsehood of the protasis 
by presenting an obviously false proposition in the apodosis.  That is, for effective 
communication, the speaker should pick out a false proposition to make it easy for the 
hearer to understand that the proposition in the if-clause is false or absurd.  In this 
sense, rhetorical conditionals like (16a) are in parallel with predictive and 
epistemic-domain conditionals.  The speaker specifies what s/he thinks is the most 
effective apodosis at least to communicate the intended rhetorical meaning, as shown 
below: 
                                                     
3 Figure (17) does not mean that the clause order in (14) is reversed.  It shows that the speaker 
specifies a possible protasis on the basis of what s/he wants to communicate (i.e. the speech act 
conveyed by the apodosis).  
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 (18)    I‟m Elvis Presley. 
     I‟m the Pope.☜ (specified) 
  If they are Irish, I‟m Japanese. 
    p (false) I‟m Superman. … etc. 
     Set of q (false) 
     Example (16b), on the other hand, strongly asserts the truth of the apodosis (he’s 
ninety), presenting an obviously true proposition (he’s a day).  To put it another way, 
the speaker picks out what s/he thinks is the most effective protasis to communicate 
the intended rhetorical meaning “p is patently true, hence q must be true.”4  In this 
sense, rhetorical conditionals like (16b) are in parallel with speech-act conditionals. 
 
9.4.  Conclusion 
     In this chapter, I have investigated various conditionals from the viewpoint of 
specification.  I have shown a possibility that conditional constructions can be dealt 
with in a unified manner in terms of the concept specification. 
One may argue that conditionals, non-predictive conditionals in particular, are 
different from specificational copular sentences and not specificational in that they 
don‟t specify values for variables.  I admit that this is the case.  However, what I am 
claiming here is not that conditionals are equivalent to specificational copular 
sentences in every respect, but rather that they are similar in the mental process of the 
speaker, i.e. picking out or specifying a possible item from a set. 
In this respect, I assume that the linguistic category “specificational sentence” 
                                                     
4 Note that rhetorical conditionals like those in (16) are recognized as grammaticalized or idiomatic 
expressions.  In the actual use, the content of the protasis is determined according to the content of 
the apodosis.  Thus, if the content refers to someone‟s age, then if he’s a day is used; if the content 
refers to the worth of something in terms of money, then if it’s worth a cent is used (e.g. The painting 
must be worth a thousand dollars if it’s worth a cent (Quirk et al. (1985:1095)). 
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shows a prototype effect (cf. Lakoff (1987)).  Thus, prototypical specificational 
sentences like those in (1) show the following characteristics: (i) a simple sentence 
consisting of two nominal phrases and a copular connecting them, i.e. A be B, (ii) the 
nominal phrase in the position of A semantically contains a variable, (iii) the nominal 
phrase in the position of B represents a value for the variable contained in A, and (iv) 
B is picked out from a set.  On the other hand, conditional sentences like (14) show 
the following characteristics: (ii) a complex sentence consisting of two propositions 
and a conjunction connecting them, i.e. If X, Y (Y if X), (ii) the position of Y may 
contain a variable (cf. (13)), (iii) the apodosis may represent a value for the variable 
contained in the position of Y, and (iv) Y is picked out from a set.  There is a close 
affinity between specificational copular sentences and conditional constructions:  the 
difference is whether the specificational relation (variable-value) is realized in a simple 
sentence or a complex sentence.  In addition, even in specificational copular 
sentences, the variable-value relation can be realized between two independent 
sentences as in Who loves Mary? It is John.  It stands to reason that specificational 
sentences show prototype effects and that conditionals can be regarded as 
non-prototypical, peripheral cases in specificational sentences. 
For the present, I cannot go further in detail, because the data considered here 
covers just a part of the issue.  It is enough to state here that without such a viewpoint, 
one would overlook the following similarities found between conditionals and copular 
sentences: (i) In many languages such as Japanese, Russian, Swahili, and Bengali, 
conditional markers are etymologically derived from copular verbs (Traugott 
(1985:291)), and (ii) In many languages, conditional markers function as topic 
markers:  the if-clause (and its equivalents) is a topic, and the main clause is a 
comment (Haiman (1978, 1985)). 
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Chapter 10 
 
Summary 
 
  Before concluding this thesis, let me review what I discussed in the preceding 
chapters.  Part 1 of this thesis was concerned with speech-act domain conditionals 
(SACs) in Japanese and English.  In Chapter 3, I mainly investigated Japanese SACs 
and classified them into two types according to the obligatory/optional occurrence of 
speech-act verbs and their differences in interpretation.  In Chapter 4, based on the 
findings of Chapter 3, I conducted a contrastive study of Japanese and English SACs. 
   Chapter 3 made the following points.  With regard to Type 1 SACs, which do 
not require speech-act verbs, their apodoses serve as reference points (cf. Langacker 
(1993, 2008)) to access implicit conclusions.  Put differently, in interpreting Type 1 
SACs, one goes through a chain of inferences, using the reference point ability step by 
step, to reach an implicit illocutionary force.  In combination with the reference point 
ability, the Desirability Principle (cf. Akatsuka (1998)) plays an important role in 
restricting the number of possible conclusions or illocutionary forces intended in Type 
1 SACs. More specifically, the consistency of the values of desirability (i.e. 
DESIRABLE/UNDESIRABLE) through a chain of inferences facilitates the extraction 
of appropriate illocutionary forces.  Type 2 SACs, on the other hand, obligatorily 
require speech-act verbs for functional reasons: one is to explicitly express or 
guarantee the causal relation with the protases, and the other is to indirectly connect 
the protases and fake apodoses.  Conversely, without speech-act verbs, Type 2 SACs 
could not maintain the causal relation and would lose semantic relations between the 
protases and fake apodoses.  In the last section of Chapter 3, I pointed out that 
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Japanese conditionals have developed special markers for the three domains (i.e. 
content, epistemic, and speech-act), while English conditionals can be ambiguous 
among the three domains without changing their forms.  Specifically, in English, an 
alleged typical content domain conditional can be interpreted as an epistemic and even 
as a speech act conditional; in Japanese, on the other hand, the forms of content, 
epistemic and speech-act conditionals are different from one another with the help of 
specialized markers such as four conditional markers (i.e. tara, reba, to, and nara), 
epistemic markers (e.g. noda), and speech-act verbs (e.g. yuu „tell‟). 
  In Chapter 4, I conducted a contrastive study of Japanese and English Type 2 
SACs (Type 2 J- and E-SACs) in terms of addressee-orientedness mainly based on 
Hirose (1995, 1997, 2000) and related studies such as Wada (2005, 2008, 2010).  I 
elaborated further on the discussion in Chapter 3 to show that Type 2 J-SACs need 
speech-act verbs because Japanese is a communicatively weak language by nature.  
On the other hand, Type 2 E-SACs do not need speech-act verbs because English is a 
communicatively strong language by nature.  In terms of clause linkage, I showed 
that the characteristics of the two languages are attributed to or motivated by the 
semantic concepts of speaker involvement (cf. Maat and Degand (2001)) and 
C-gravitation (cf. Wada (2005)), which is further corroborated by German SACs.  
Furthermore, as a working draft for future research, I argued that public/private-self 
centeredness may correlate with the degree of extensibility via metonymic operations 
(cf. Yasui (2005)).  In this connection, I developed my argument on the basis of the 
working hypothesis that metonymy works not only on the lexicosemantic (i.e. word 
meaning) level but also on the lexicogrammatical (i.e. syntax) level, which is 
supported by the notion of grammatical metaphor (cf. Halliday (1994)).  In the last 
section, I discussed related issues, pointing out that in particular the possibility that my 
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analysis is applicable to other conjunctions such as because and since and to other 
languages such as Korean.      
     In Part 2, I investigated the conditionals which have not been dealt with in detail 
in the literature: adnominal conditionals, if-cleft sentences, and N1-nara N2 
constructions.  In the last chapter of this part, I observed those conditionals in terms 
of specification, contrasting them with specificational copular sentences. 
     Chapter 6 dealt with adnominal conditionals (ACs).  I clarified that ACs are 
allowed under the condition that (i) the referent of a noun modified by an if-clause 
must be one that can be construed either semantically or pragmatically as having a 
resultant value to be determined by the fulfillment of the condition described in the 
if-clause, and (ii) the values of Desirability in nominal apodoses and ACs must be 
consistent with each other.  Nominal expressions modified by ACs are construed as 
results brought about by the fulfillment of the conditions described in the if-clause, and 
if such a construal is impossible or difficult from semantic information alone, 
pragmatic information may fill in the gaps. 
     In Chapter 7, I discussed the discourse function of if-cleft sentences, focusing on 
the form-meaning mapping of the construction.  I made the following points: (i) the 
interdependency between the protasis and apodosis of an if-cleft is in parallel with that 
between a wh-question and its answer, and (ii) the discourse function of the if-cleft 
sentence is evoking a question in hearer‟s mind and attracting much attention to the 
focalized element in the main clause so that the element can serve as the topic for the 
following discourse. 
     In Chapter 8, I was concerned with N1-nara N2 constructions and their licensing 
condition.  I made the following points: (i) the N1-nara N2 construction is licensed if 
the relation between N1 and N2 can be construed semantically or pragmatically as that 
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of an attribute and its subject and if the candidates for N2 can be compared with each 
other by a single criterion common to them, and (ii) the recommendation reading of 
the construction arises from the incompatibility between the logical meaning of the 
linguistic form and that of the semantic relation of N1 and N2.  Furthermore, I  
pointed out that the attribute-subject relation of N1 and N2 holds true for related 
expressions, i.e. N1-wa N2 and N1-no N2constructions. 
     Chapter 9 attempted to account for conditional constructions in terms of the 
semantic concept specification on the basis of the investigations from Chapters 5 to 8.  
Pointing out that conditional constructions and specificational copular sentences share 
some characteristics, I showed that a variety of conditional constructions, which 
appear to have no relationship except that they are classified as conditionals, can be 
captured in a unified manner from the viewpoint of the semantic concept of 
specification. 
     Through the discussion, this thesis has corroborated the hypothesis that 
linguistic form is not independent of the meaning it conveys:  it is well-motivated by 
semantic and/or pragmatic principles.  It is expected that the discussion in Part 1 will 
theoretically contribute to Hirose‟s (2010, 2011) framework referred to as the 
Three-Tier Model of Language Use.  Furthermore, I hope that the investigation of 
peripheral conditionals in Part 2 will support Konno‟s (2005) generalization to the 
effect that marked linguistic forms correlate with their specialized functions. 
In conclusion, I would like to touch briefly on a few related issues.  First, let us 
observe the following example: 
 (1) „If it were not for the fact that I never speak ill of my colleagues –‟ 
Professor McGonagall broke off, and they saw that her nostrils had gone 
white.  She went on, more calmly, „Divination is one of the most imprecise 
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branches of magic.  I shall not conceal from you that I shall have very 
little patience with it.  True Seers are very rare, and Professor Trelawney 
…‟                     (J. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Prisoner 
 of Azkaban [italics are mine]) 
The passage in (1) includes a speech-act conditional sentence, i.e. If it were not for the 
fact that I never speak ill of my colleagues, Divination is one of the most imprecise 
branches of magic.  In this example, Professor McGonagall, one of the main 
characters in the Harry Potter series, criticizes a branch of magic called Divination.  
The if-clause expresses a condition that makes felicitous the utterance “Divination is 
one of the most imprecise branches of magic.”  What is interesting about this 
example is that the if-clause is expressed in counterfactual form.  As far as I know, no 
researchers concerned with speech-act conditionals have noticed the existence of 
counterfactual speech-act conditionals like (1). 
I assume that the tense form in the if-clause has to do with what Fillmore (1990) 
and Dancygier and Sweetser (2005) refer to as epistemic stance.  According to 
Fillmore, epistemic stance refers to the speaker‟s mental association with or 
dissociation from the world of the protasis.  The conjunction if and the counterfactual 
past form (distant verb form in the terminology of Dancygier and Sweetser (2005)) in 
the protasis stands for the negative epistemic stance of the speaker.  This means that 
the speaker psychologically distances him/herself from belief in the mental space set 
up by the if-clause (the speaker’s dissociation from belief in the same terminology).  
The most likely explanation of the counterfactual use of speech-act conditionals is that 
it has the function of evading the speaker‟s responsibility for his/her utterance.  For 
example, Professor McGonagall avoids responsibility for her criticism of Divination, 
or Professor Trelawney, who teaches the subject at Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and 
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Wizardry.  If this perspective is correct, then the contents of the apodosis of 
counterfactual speech-act conditionals is limited to or at least likely to be what the 
speaker finds hard to say: criticisms, reproaches, or accusations.  Unfortunately, since 
I have no other example, I cannot go into this issue any further.  I leave the 
verification of this prediction for future research. 
Let us turn our attention to a second issue.  Let us examine the following 
examples: 
 (2)   If Mary is late, she went to the dentist. (Dancygier (1998:86)) 
Sentence (2) is an example of epistemic conditionals in English.  In this sentence, the 
speaker draws the conclusion she went to the dentist from the premise Mary is late.  
According to Dancygier (1998), the sentence in (2) can be rephrased in two ways as 
follows: 
 (3) a.  If Mary is late, it means she went to the dentist. 
   b.  If Mary is late, she must have gone to the dentist. 
   (Dancygier (1998:88)) 
In (3a), the phrase it means is used to explicitly state the epistemic character of the link 
between the if-clause and the main clause of the epistemic conditional sentence.  In 
(3b), in place of the phrase it means, the epistemic modal must is used for the same 
reason.  From the comparison of (2) with (3), it can be understood that the occurrence 
of epistemic markers (i.e. must/it means) is optional in English epistemic conditionals.  
The grammaticality of epistemic conditionals in English is not significantly affected 
by the presence or absence of epistemic markers such as must and it means. 
  As Arita (2006) points out, Japanese epistemic conditionals, on the other hand, 
obligatorily require epistemic markers such as ni tigainai „must‟ and noda.  Let us 
observe the following examples: 
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 (4) * mosi marii-ga tikoku si-teiru nara, kanozyo-wa haisya-ni  itta. 
   Hyp  Mary-Nom late  do-AspV if  she-Top  dentist-Loc  went 
   „If Mary is late, she went to the dentist.‟ 
(Arita (2006:141)) 
 (5) a.  mosi marii-ga tikoku si-teiru nara, kanozyo-wa haisya-ni 
     Hyp Mary-Nom late  do-AspV if  she-Top  dentist-Loc  
     itta  nda 
     went Ep 
    „If Mary is late, it means she went to the dentist.‟ 
(Arita (2006:141)) 
   b.  mosi marii-ga tikoku si-teiru nara, kanozyo-wa haisya-ni 
     Hyp Mary-Nom late  do-AspV if  she-Top  dentist-Loc 
     itta ni-tigainai 
     went must 
     „If Mary is late, she must have gone to the dentist.‟ 
The ungrammatical sentence in (4) is a literal counterpart to sentence (2), where no 
epistemic marker occurs.  In (5a), the epistemic marker nda (an abbreviated form of 
noda) occurs, which renders the sentence grammatical.  In the same way, in (5b), the 
epistemic modal ni-tigainai „must‟ occurs, and thus the sentence is impeccable.  As 
Arita (2006:142) points out, English epistemic conditionals and Japanese ones are the 
same in that some inference processes are included in them, but they are quite different 
as to whether the inference processes should be obligatorily expressed or not. 
  Note that the phenomenon just observed is in parallel with the phenomenon of 
Type 2 SACs dealt with in Chapter 4.  It should be considered what mechanism 
works behind the occurrence of the epistemic markers at issue, although I am not in a 
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position to give any clear answer.  However, it may be reasonable to assume that the 
obligatory/optional occurrence of epistemic markers and that of speech-act verbs are 
related to each other in some way or other. 
  What is brought to mind here is causality.  As discussed in this thesis, the 
notion of causality is indispensable in conditionals.  In Chapter 3, I revealed that 
speech-act verbs in Type 2 J-SACs guarantee causality.  Specifically, the causality in 
Type 2 J-SACs is guaranteed between the nara-clause and speech-act verb.  This 
leads me to conjecture that causality in the epistemic domain, as well as that in the 
speech-act domain, must be explicitly stated in Japanese conditionals:  the former is 
linguistically realized as epistemic markers such as noda or ni-tigainai, while the latter 
is linguistically realized as speech-act verbs such as yuu or osieru. 
  In this connection, Tsunoda‟s (2004) analysis of noda seems suggestive.  
Tsunoda (2004:73-74) assumes that a certain reasoning process of human beings is 
involved with the occurrence of noda.  The reasoning process involved with the 
occurrence of noda is schematically represented as follows:1 
 (6 ) A Model of Reasoning Process of Human Beings 
   1. Awareness → 2. Question → 3. Inference → 4. Answer 
(Tsunoda (2004:73) [English translation is mine]) 
According to Tsunoda, the epistemic marker noda appears at the last step of this 
process (4. Answer).  For a better understanding of the reasoning process, take the 
following dialogue as an example (cf. Tsunoda (2004:74)):2 
 (7) A:  kinoo  rensyuu yasun-da-ne.      [1. Awareness] 
                                                     
1 Although I will not discuss the reasoning process of noda in detail, the validity of the process per se 
is also an intriguing issue.  For more details, see Tsunoda (2004:69-128). 
2 It should be noted that as shown in dialogue (6), the reasoning process is not always in a single 
person‟s territory. 
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     yesterday practice absent-PAST-tag 
     „You were absent from practice yesterday, weren‟t you?‟ 
     Doo sita-no. [2. Question] 
     how did-Interrogative 
     „Why?‟ 
     mata sabot-ta-no. [3. Inference] 
     again skip-PAST-Interrogative 
     „Did you skip it again?‟ 
   B:  onaka-ga ita-katta nda-yo. [4. Answer] 
     belly-Nom ache-PAST Ep-AOE 
     „I had a stomach ache.‟ 
Tsunoda‟s explanation of this dialogue is as follows.  At the first step (Awareness), 
speaker A comes to be aware that speaker B was absent from the practice on the 
previous day.  Speaker A wonders why speaker B was absent (Question), and infers 
that speaker B might have skipped the practice (Inference).  Receiving these 
utterances (or reasoning process) of speaker A, speaker B gives the answer onaka-ga 
ita-katta nda-yo „I I had a stomach ache‟.3 
  As shown in this dialogue, the epistemic marker nda (the allomorph of noda) 
appears at the last step of the process.  In other words, noda represents the result or 
effect of a reasoning process.  In the same way, the first step can be regarded as a 
cause or premise of the reasoning process.  This can be more clearly shown if the 
process in (7) is rephrased in a conditional construction.  Observe the following 
example: 
                                                     
3 Tsunoda (2004:73) states that not all the steps in a reasoning process are realized as sentences or 
utterances.  She argues that even if some parts of the process are not realized, the occurrence of noda 
makes us notice the implicit existence of the reasoning process. 
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  (8)   kinoo rensyuu yasun-da nara, (kimi-wa) onaka-ga ita-katta nda-ne. 
     „If you were absent from the practice yesterday, it means that you felt 
a pain in the belly, did you?‟ 
It is not clear yet whether Tsunoda‟s reasoning process is valid or not, and I will not 
challenge its validity here.  However, the point is that noda, as well as ni-tigainai 
„must‟, can be thought to guarantee the causality at the epistemic level. 
In addition, I must refer to another study concerning the occurrence of noda:  
Ikarashi‟s (2011b) argument is also suggestive and noteworthy.  Ikarashi (2011b) 
regards no(da) as a linguistic marker showing that the speaker‟s conclusion is drawn 
from abductive reasoning.  What Ikarashi refers to abductive reasoning is based on 
the formulation of abduction by Peirce (1940): 
 (9) The surprising fact, C, is observed; 
   But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, 
   Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. 
(Peirce (1940:151)) 
Peirce‟s (1940) abduction refers to the inference process of arriving at an explanatory 
hypothesis.  In other words, it is the reasoning process wherein one seeks a 
hypothesis plausible enough to give the explanation of an observed fact.  Let us 
reexamine the example in (5a), repeated here as (10), from the viewpoint of abductive 
reasoning: 
 (10)   mosi marii-ga tikoku si-teiru nara, kanozyo-wa haisya-ni 
    Hyp Mary-Nom late  do-AspV  if  she-Top  dentist-Loc 
    itta  nda 
    went Ep 
    „If Mary is late, it means she went to the dentist.‟ 
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In (10), what Peirce (1940) calls the surprising fact C is Mary‟s lateness (marii-ga 
tikoku si-teiru „Mary is late‟).  Accepting the fact, the speaker seeks a plausible 
hypothesis to explain why Mary is late.  In the speaker‟s belief, if it is the case that 
Mary went to the dentist, then it is a matter of course that she is late.  Then the 
speaker concludes that Mary went to the dentist. 
As seen above, both Tsunoda‟s (2004) and Ikarashi‟s (2011b) approaches seem 
successful in dealing with the occurrence of noda (nda) in epistemic conditionals in 
Japanese.4  Although it is intriguing to investigate which approach is more plausible, 
                                                     
4 In addition, Ikarashi (2011a) recognizes another type of noda, claiming that noda is also used as a 
linguistic marker of a deductive reasoning process, formulated as follows: 
 (i) If A then C 
  A 
  Therefore C 
(cf. Hirose (1991:20)) 
According to Ikarashi (2011a), when noda is involved in deductive reasoning, it marks not the 
conclusion but the premise of the reasoning process, i.e. A in (i).  The deductive noda (D-noda, in his 
terminology) shows that the speaker recognizes a proposition containing noda as a fact. 
If Ikarashi‟s (2011a) analysis is on the right track, it is applicable for the explanation of the 
difference between -nara and no-nara.  In fact, Noda et al. (2002:90-91) point out that the occurrence 
of no-nara shows the speaker‟s recognition of a fact.  Let us examine the following dialogue, 
wherein n is treated as the allophone of no: 
 (i) (Speaker B does not know that it is raining outside.) 
  A:  soto-wa  ame-da  yo. 
    outside-Top rain-Cop AOE 
    „It‟s raining outside.‟ 
  B1: ame-ga fut-teru n-nara, soto-ni  deru -no -wa  yame yoo. 
    rain-Nom  fall-Asp  Ep-if  outside-Loc go out-Nominalizer-Top stop  will 
    „If it‟s raining, I won‟t go out.‟ 
  B2:?? ame-ga fut-teru nara,  soto-ni  deru -no -wa  yame yoo. 
    rain-Nom  fall-Asp  if  outside-Loc go out-Nominalizer-Top stop  will 
    „If it‟s raining, I won‟t go out.‟ 
From the contrast between B1 and B2, we can infer that the occurrence of no in B1 renders the sentence 
more acceptable than the utterance in B2.  In this dialogue, speaker B recognizes the fact that it is 
raining outside by speaker A‟s utterance.  Note here the following points: (i) both no-nara and noda 
are decomposed into no + copular (nari „be‟ and da „be‟, respectively) and (ii) nari and noda is closely 
related to each other diachronically (cf. Fukuda (1998)).  Considering these points, we can expect 
that no-nara and noda show similar behaviors.  In fact, the nara-clause in (iB1) can be replaced with 
a noda-sentence without changing its meaning in any very significant way: 
 (ii) B3: ame-ga fut-teiru n-da. soto-ni  deru -no -wa  yame yoo. 
    rain-Nom  fall-Asp  Ep-Cop  outside-Loc go out-Nominalizer-Top stop  will 
   „If it‟s raining, I won‟t go out.‟ 
The following dialogue further confirms that no-nara marks the speaker‟s recognition of a fact. In 
contrast to the dialogue in (i), no-nara cannot be used in contexts like the following: 
 (iii) A2: tenki-wa  doo  ka-na. 
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I have to leave the matter open for future research. 
     Lastly, I would like to refer to the grammatical status of the sentence-ending 
particle da in Japanese.  Traditionally, da has been treated as copular verb especially 
when it is used in NP1-wa NP2-da „NP1 is NP2‟ constructions (cf. Masuoka and Takubo 
(1992), Nishiyama (2003), Niwa (2004), Imada (2010, 2011), among others).5  So far, 
I have also followed this traditional view for convenience.  However, the examination 
of N1-wa N2 constructions in Chapter 8 leads me to speculate that da is not a copular.  
If da is a copular, then one faces the question of why it can be freely deleted as long as 
the context allows.  Observe the following pair:6 
 (11) a.  sake-wa  Kosinokanbai-da 
     sake-Top  Koshinokanbai-Cop 
     Lit. „Japanese sake is Koshinokanbai.‟ 
   b.  sake-wa  Kosinokanbai. 
     sake-Top  Koshinokanbai 
     Lit. „Japanese sake, Koshinokanbai.‟ 
Leaving aside the question of whether or not expression (11b) is derived from sentence 
                                                                                                                                                                     
    weather-Top how Q-Part 
    „How is the weather?‟ 
  B4: * ame-ga fut-teru n-nara, soto-ni  deru-no-wa  yame yoo. 
    rain-Nom  fall-Asp  Ep-if  outside-Loc go out-Nominalizer-Top stop  will 
    „If it‟s raining, I won‟t go out.‟ 
  B5: ame-ga fut-teru nara,  soto-ni  deru-no-wa  yame yoo. 
    rain-Nom  fall-Asp  if  outside-Loc go out-Nominalizer-Top stop  will 
    „If it‟s raining, I won‟t go out.‟ 
In (iii), neither speaker A nor speaker B knows that it is raining outside.  In this case, the proposition 
ame-ga fut-teru „It‟s raining‟ cannot be recognized as a fact, which bars the use of n(o)-nara.  In this 
way, the above examples not only support Ikarashi‟s (2011b) claim to some extent, but also challenge 
the traditional view that nara and no-nara can be replaced with each other in many cases (cf. Suzuki 
(1993)).  In this connection, Tanomura‟s (1990) argument is suggestive.  He classifies no-nara into 
two types, i.e. Situation-Setting no-nara and Actual-State-Hypothesizing no-nara, pointing out that the 
former cannot be replaced with -nara.  Although it is intriguing to investigate whether or not his 
classification is valid to explain the contrast between (i) and (iii), I leave the issue open for future 
research. 
5 Another traditional view regards -da as a particle (cf. Yamaguchi (2011)). 
6 The English expressions in the single quotation marks are the literal translations of the examples. 
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(11a) by deleting da, the pair in (11) shows that the (non-)occurrence of da does not 
seem to influence either the grammaticality or interpretation of the two examples.  On 
the other hand, the deletion of the topic marker wa significantly influences the 
grammaticality of the two expressions: 
 (12) a.  sake *(-wa) Kosinokanbai-da 
   b.  sake *(-wa) Kosinokanbai. 
The contrast between (11) and (12) indicates that -da alone is not sufficient to connect 
the two NPs; rather, it is -wa that connects the NPs and establishes a predicate relation 
between them.  In my view, the combination “X-wa Y-da” should be regarded as a 
sort of correlative expressions like “either X or Y” and “so X that Y”.  Thus, the 
“X-wa Y-da” combination can be termed as correlative copular.  Although I should 
admit that it would be premature to go into this matter any further here, it is 
worthwhile to challenge the traditional view that da is a copular.  
As seen above, there is a long way to go to depict the whole picture of 
conditionals and related phenomena in Japanese and English.  The issue of the 
interaction of linguistic form, meaning, and discourse is an everlasting theme in my 
research. 
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